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DIVINE INFINITY IN THE WRITINGS OF HENRY OF GHENT

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THESIS

DIVINE INFINITY IN THE WRITINGS OF HENRY OF GHENT

(Summary)

Etienne Gilson brought the problem of the origin of the notion of divine infinity to the attention of historians of the middle ages in the early nineteen-fifties. Although research has since been conducted into the meaning and sources of the negative infinity of actuality current in the second half of the thirteenth century, the doctrine of positive infinity, the forerunner of our modern concept, has not been investigated. Three basic views of infinity paved the way for the work of Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), the apparent source of this doctrine.

According to the pre-Socratics, infinity was either a subsistent material principle unlimited in extent (Anaximander, Pythagoreans) or a spatial, temporal, or numerical property of some original stuff (Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Melissus, the pluralists). Plato did not predicate infinity of the Ideas, but in the Philebus he seemed to regard the infinite as a subsistent principle inferior to limit, as it had been for the Pythagoreans. Aristotle gave the first technical analysis of quantitative infinity. Having proved that there could be no actually infinite magnitude or number, he held that infinity was potential and a property of a process, not a product. Aristotle also ascribed infinite power to the prime mover, as the cause of an infinite motion over an infinite time. But here also infinity remained quantitative and predicated of the prime mover only by extrinsic denomination.

A new view of infinity was introduced by Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius, and John Damascene. According to these authors, the one, which was above being, was infinite both as transcending form (the limiting principle) and because its unity precluded its having an internal composition of form with formed. Similar types of infinity were ascribed to matter as infra-being and to intelligence and soul (while unformed) as pre-being. The Plotinian infinity of non-being was not applied to God in mediaeval Latin philosophy. In Augustine, Peter Lombard, and William of Auvergne, infinity remained extrinsic and relative, as it had been for the pre-Socratics and Aristotle.

Richard Fishacre seems to have been the first author to expound an infinity of being, according to which infinity was predicated of God absolutely, on account of the simplicity of His essence and without reference to anything extrinsic to it. This view apparently was unknown to Albert the Great until near the end of his life, but it was adopted by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas, both of whom argued from God's actuality to His simplicity and then from His simplicity to His infinity. These authors generally regarded infinity as a negative divine attribute, though in one text Bonaventure said that the "highest position" corresponded to it. Richard of Middleton, however, explicitly stated that "infinite" does posit something in God. The work of Richard of Middleton probably postdated Henry of Ghent's Summa, a. 44 by nearly five years.

A. 44 of Henry's Summa, "On the infinity of God", contains two questions, the first of which inquires whether God is infinite. As Henry's opponents here are those who know only material infinity, he begins by rejecting from God the infinity of the pre-Socratics, which was matter or an attribute of matter. Next he treats a concept of infinity that seems to have arisen from his own (Avicennian) metaphysics: God is not infinite by indifference to contraction in an infinite number of supposits, as the absolute essence is. Divine infinity must agree with the mode of being of a self-subsistent and totally actual form. It can be contrasted with creaturely infinity in three ways: (1) Divine infinity is actual, whereas creaturely infinity is only potential (as Aristotle argued); (2) God's infinity follows upon perfection and totality, whereas potential infinity precludes both; (3) Divine infinity is formal, but creaturely infinity is material. The form of God, unlike the forms of creatures, does not place limitations on God. That is, although deitas completes the being of God, it does not designate or determine it to a genus or species, because God is wholly identical with His form. Thus, the indeterminate being of God can contain the mode of being of every possible being. The manner of this comprehension, explains the reply to the fourth objection, is unified (unlike the way in which the infinite quantum contains other quanta as parts) and unconfused (in contrast to the way in which the genus comprehends its differentiae). Because God comprehends all modes of being actually and not as parts, the existence of participated beings does not wound the divine totality.

Henry's reply to the second question, which asks whether "infinite" signifies positively, negatively, or privatively, seems to be directed against the thirteenth-century exponents of negative infinity. He begins his response by distinguishing three types of infinity: (1) the negation of a terminus in that which has no process, (2) the privation of a terminus in that which has a process and is naturally constituted to end, (3) the position of a perpetually extended process in that which is not naturally constituted to end. The second cannot be predicated of God, and the first, though it makes clear God's lack of internal and external limitations, does not express what we mean to ascribe to God by the term "infinite". This is clear (1) from the nature of the negation, for we mean to ascribe a certain dignity to God by means of "infinite", which a negation per se can never accomplish. It is apparent to Henry that God contains an aspect (ratio) superior to perfection and totality that is commonly expressed by "infinite", which then must signify a position (2) from the nature of the thing signified. (3) From its mode of imposition, "infinite" is negative, but only secondarily, inasmuch as it signifies the negation or privation of finitude, which is a real privation of further extension. Primarily, it signifies the position of further extension, for the negation or privation of a privation is a real position. The reply to the third objection points out that, although perfection, totality, and infinity are really identical with each other and with the divine essence, yet there is a distinction of reason between them, such that "infinite" adds the higher, positive note "further extension" to perfection and totality.

Henry's solution to the first question contributes little to the analyses of infinity presented by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas: their opponents are the same, and the conclusions that divine infinity is actual, formal, and consistent with totality and perfection are found in all three. Henry's major innovation seems to involve a simple shift of emphasis from infinity as following upon actuality, and simplicity to infinity resulting from actuality, perfection, and totality. This modification is mainly the consequence of Henry's location of infinity as the last volitional divine attribute.

The same notion of infinity of actuality is present in the response to the second question. Henry probably gave it a positive character (1) because he was concerned to preserve the hierarchical structure of the volitional attributes, each of which adds a higher, positive note to the preceding attribute and (2) because of the theory of signification expounded in a. 32, according to which divine names negative in form signify real positions.

Henry of Ghent's contribution to the history of infinity thus appears to be restricted to a reinterpretation of the late thirteenth-century infinity of actuality. Despite its influence on Duns Scotus and the moderns, Henry's positive infinity does not seem to reflect the new metaphysics that the introduction of infinity of non-being and the development of infinity of actuality so clearly evidence.

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DIVINE INFINITY
IN THE
WRITINGS OF HENRY OF GHENT

BY

DIANE E. DUBRULE

A Thesis Submitted in Conformity with the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

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FOREWORD

In 1954 Étienne Gilson presented a paper to the Congrès international augustinien[1] in which he traced the notion of divine infinity in Augustine. Begun as an attempt to find the source of the attribute of infinity, absent from Sacred Scripture, but so prominent in Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and in all of modern theology, the presentation closed by drawing the attention of historians to "l'importance qu'offriraient des recherches sur le developpement de la notion métaphysique de l'infini positif, depuis ses origines cappadociennes, ou peut-être plotiniennes, en passant par Augustin, Denis, Damascène, et suivant ensuite le courant médiéval jusqu'à Nicolas de Cues" (p. 574).

The attention of historians was thus drawn to the investigation of the history of infinity. During the last ten years L. Sweeney and his students at St. Louis University have studied the notion of infinity in Aristotle, Plotinus, John Damascene, Augustine, Peter Lombard, Richard Fishacre, and most of the prominent theologians of the thirteenth century. However, these scholars have devoted their efforts only to discovering the origins of the negative infinity of actuality common in the second half of the thirteenth century. The meaning and sources of the positive infinity which Professor Gilson found in Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus has remained uninvestigated. It is with the problem of the interpretation, significance, and originality of Henry of Ghent's notion of positive infinity that this thesis is concerned.

Henry of Ghent was the most important theologian at the University of Paris in the last quarter of the thirteenth century. During the period between 1276 and 1292, while regent master at Paris, he held numerous quodlibetic and ordinary disputations, supported the condemnation of Latin Averroism, became embroiled in the controversy between the seculars and the mendicants, and was present at the Council of Lyons and several synods. He died in 1293, leaving two great works, Quodlibeta[2] and Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum[3]. For the next four centuries, these writings, which came to have the status of textbooks in theology, were read and commented upon. Regrettably, his work was almost forgotten between the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries and is still sadly neglected.[4]

This thesis attempts to give an exact account of the doctrine of infinity presented by Henry of Ghent in a. 44 of the Summa. It also considers the significance, originality, and sources of the notion of positive infinity, but not its influence on Duns Scotus and modern philosophers, who deserve separate studies. Similarly, the present work treats neither the problems of God's knowledge of an infinite number of things nor the infinity of His power. Henry's answers to these questions, though often original, have no bearing upon the interpretation of the positive infinity of being expounded in the article "De Infinitate Dei".[5]

The study may be divided into three large sections. The first contains two chapters of historical background on the topic of infinity in which the notion of infinity is traced through twenty-five authors. The second (in two chapters) presents a commentary on Summa, a. 44. For the convenience of the reader, the text of the edition of 1520 has been inserted within the commentary and the references for texts quoted by Henry have been placed in the notes. The text has been double spaced, in order to provide sufficient space for footnote numbers, and divided into paragraphs according to the sense. Punctuation and spelling have been brought into conformity with modern usage. Other texts quoted from the Summa have been treated in a similar manner.

The concluding chapter presents answers to the questions that must be asked of any writer on infinity, namely, How is his view to be interpreted? What are its sources? Does it represent a significant advance over earlier theories? What are its metaphysical, physical, or theological bases? In addition, some speculation is ventured on the reasons for the peculiar pattern of the history of infinity.

It is hoped that the present work, even if its conclusions are negative, will at least interest other philosophers in the history of divine infinity in the late mediaeval and modern periods and encourage them to view the Gandavian master in his proper intellectual perspective.

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (I)

Prior to the efforts of Henry of Ghent, there were nearly eighteen centuries of speculation on the question of divine infinity. The advances made by Henry in this continuing discussion are clearly dependent upon his predecessors' thought. The concept of quantitative infinity developed by the Greeks paved the way for the discovery of the spiritual infinity of Christian philosophy; it also provided a point of comparison and contrast for spiritual infinity during the entire Christian period. Speculation about divine infinity, which began with the neo-Platonists, made its greatest progress during the thirteenth century. Henry's contribution must be viewed as a conclusion to these eighteen centuries of development. In order to understand the doctrine in its historical context, one must be aware of the course of development that led up to his work. In order to estimate the value of his contribution, one must have immediately in mind the sources on which he consciously or unconsciously depended. It is, therefore, necessary to preface the analysis of Henry's doctrine with an historical sketch of his predecessors' theories of infinity.

The sketch is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the development of quantitative infinity and any rudimentary form of spiritual infinity to be found among the Greeks, the second with spiritual infinity from the neo-Platonists to Henry of Ghent. Part I considers nearly all authors who wrote about infinity, though certain schools (e.g. neo-Pythagoreans, Sceptics) have been omitted for reasons of space. However, Part II considers only a selection of authors. Most of these have already been investigated by Sweeney and his students; still, since they have not been treated from the point of view of positive infinity, but rather with the aim of discovering the first attribution of infinity to the divine being, and for the reasons already given, it seems worthwhile to survey them here. It will appear to some--particularly with reference to Part II--that numerous authors have been unjustifiably omitted from the study. The grounds for the omissions are as follows: (1) Space does not permit the inclusion of even all of the important figures; (2) The requisite time for research of some authors' doctrines is incompatible with that presently available, forcing their postponement for later consideration; (3) Often the authors made no new contribution, but simply restated earlier theories. Lastly, it should be noted that the sequence of the survey is generally chronological, but occasionally (e.g. in the case of the Christian neo-Platonists) later authors have been placed in the schools to which they doctrinally belong.

Pre-Socratics

Milesian School

Apart from some vague references in early Greek mythological accounts of the formation of the cosmos,[1] the significance of which it is difficult to determine, the first philosophically relevant use of the term 'apeiron' occurs in the writings of the Milesian School.

Anaximander of Miletus formulated the first comprehensive account of the universe that is still extant. He made the apeiron (infinite or indefinite), which is not identifiable with any of the elements, the originative stuff from which all things are separated and to which they return:

> The Non-Limited is the original material of existing things; further, the source from which existing things derive their existence is also that to which they return at their destruction, according to their necessity; . . (DK 12 B 1).[2]

Two other fragments (DK 12 B 2, 3) make it clear that Anaximander regarded the infinite as temporally infinite. However, for the interpretation of 'apeiron' in the above fragment we are forced to rely on Aristotle and the doxographical tradition. Two interpretations appear to be possible: (1) The infinite is spatially infinite; (2) The infinite is qualitatively indefinite and, hence, lacking in internal divisions. The first interpretation is supported by Aristotle and the doxographical summaries of Theophrastus' account,[3] but, since things that are separated off eventually return to their source, the original stuff need not be quantitatively infinite.[4] Lacking further evidence, we are forced to leave both of these possibilities open. At Phys., III, 4, 203b13-15 (DK 12 A 15), Aristotle tells us that Anaximander also regarded the infinite as divine because it is "immortal and indestructible". The attribution of divinity is made to the infinite not because of its spatial infinity or indefiniteness, but because of its immortality, and here Anaximander appears to follow in the Homeric tradition.

Anaximenes of Miletus, described by Theophrastus (*ap.* Simplic., *Phys.*, 24, 26) as a companion of Anaximander, made infinite air the original stuff:

> Anaximenes son of Eurystratus, of Miletus, a companion of Anaximander, also says that the underlying nature is one and infinite like him, but not undefined as Anaximander said but definite, for he identifies it as air; and it differs in its substantial nature by rarity and density (DK 13 A 5; tr. Kirk and Raven).

Air, for Anaximenes, is spatially infinite but qualitatively defined. It is divine, either a god or the source of gods, according to Cicero, Augustine, and Aetius (DK 13 A 10), but the texts do not discuss any relation between the divinity and the infinity of air. We may, therefore, surmise that, as in the case of Anaximander, the original stuff is called divine in accordance with the theomorphic tradition of Homer. In Anaximenes, then, the only infinity attributed to the original source is material, spatial, and quantitative.

Xenophanes of Colophon

In contrast to the Milesians, Xenophanes conceived two elements, earth and water, as the originative sources of all things (DK 21 B 29, 33). Earth is said to be extended infinitely in the downward direction:

> This is the upper limit of the earth that we see at our feet, in contact with the air; but the part beneath goes down to infinity (*es apeiron hikneitai*) (DK 21 B 28).

No mention is made of infinite extension in any other direction, and the fragment may be understood as a reaction to the Milesian conceptions of the earth as floating on water (Thales) or air (Anaximenes).

In other fragments, Xenophanes attacks the anthromorphic conception of the gods found in Homer and Hesiod (DK 21 B 10-12, 14-16) and asserts that there is only one god:

> There is one god, among gods and men the greatest, not at all like mortals in body or in mind (DK 21 B 23).

This one god is described as seeing, thinking, hearing, and having position (DK 21 B 24-26) and, hence, possesses both corporeal and incorporeal properties. Xenophanes nowhere identifies god with earth, which is spatially infinite in one direction,[5] nor does he attribute either infinity or finitude directly to god:

> For Parmenides seems to fasten on that which is one in definition, Melissus on that which is one in matter, for which reason the former says that it is limited, the latter that it is unlimited; while Xenophanes, the first of these partisans of the One (for Parmenides is said to have been his pupil), gave no clear statement, nor does he seem to have grasped the nature of either of these causes, but with reference to the whole material universe he says the One is God (Aristotle, Meta., A, 5; 986b18-25; DK 21 A 30; Oxford tr.).[6]

Xenophanes' entire account of god seems to be in opposition to anthromorphic conceptions. In the positive assertions that we (and Aristotle) possess, there is little to explain either the nature of Xenophanes' god or its relation to the universe.[7] The only type of infinity to be found in his writings is that attributed to the downward spatial extension of the earth.

Pythagorean School

Although it is impossible to distinguish the doctrines of separate members of the Pythagorean school, we are able to determine the general theory of the early Pythagoreans from the summaries given by Aristotle. According to the general theory, there are ten pairs of opposed principles: limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurality, etc.[8] The last nine pairs seem to be the equivalents of limit and unlimited as they exist on various levels.[9] Thus, the limit and unlimited of the geometrical level receive the names 'odd' and 'even' on the arithmetical level, etc. It is from the first two principles that all things are derived:

> They thought that finitude and infinity were not attributes of certain other things, e.g. of fire or earth or anything else of this kind, but that infinity itself and unity itself were the substance of the things of which they are predicated. This is why number was the substance of all things (Aristotle, Meta., A, 5; 987a 15-19; DK 58 B 8; Oxford tr.).

Limit and unlimited are the self-subsistent principles that function as the materials of existing things. From the second pair of opposites (i.e. limit and unlimited on the arithmetical level) numbers are formed:

> Evidently, then, these thinkers also consider that number is the principle both as matter for things and as forming both their modifications and their permanent states, and hold that the elements of number are the even and the odd, and that of these the latter is limited, and the former unlimited; . . (Ibid., 986a15-19; DK 58 B 5; Oxford tr.).[10]

The failure to differentiate between the arithmetical unit, the geometrical point, and the atom probably led the Pythagoreans to the construction of the universe out of numbers, whose elements are the odd and the even.[11]

On the cosmological level, the first thing that came into being was the unit. Aristotle tells us (*Meta.*, M, 6; 1080b20-21; DK 58 B 9; N, 3; 1091a12-18; DK 58 B 26) that the Pythagoreans did not or could not explain the process whereby it came into being. Once in being, the unit produces the dyad, the triad, and the other numbers by breathing in the void surrounding it:

> The Pythagoreans, too, held that void exists and that it enters the heaven itself, which as it were inhales it, from the infinite air. Further it is the void which distinguishes the natures of things, as if it were like what separates and distinguishes the terms of a series. This holds primarily in numbers, for the void distinguishes their nature (Aristotle, *Phys.*, IV, 6; 213b 22-27; DK 58 B 30; Oxford tr.).

The unlimited surrounding the unit is breathed in by the unit, which functions as limit on the cosmological level. Limitation of the unlimited produces lines, planes, and, ultimately, solids, the physical bodies of the visible universe.

The foregoing summary is sufficient to reveal the characteristics of the infinite and its place in the system of the Pythagoreans.[12] The infinite stands opposed to limit in the table of contraries. On the other levels in the table, it receives the names 'even', 'plurality', 'left', 'female', 'moving', 'curved', 'darkness', 'bad', and 'oblong' and in general represents a principle inferior to limit. On the cosmological level, it seems to be the material used by the first unit to construct the visible universe. Completed things contain degrees of limit and infinity. Infinity, then, operates as a concrete principle in the universe as we know it. The probable derivation of infinity and limit from geometry, in which they manifest themselves as space and points binding a part of space,[13] indicates that infinity as a material principle is to be understood as infinite only in spatial extension. Its appearance on the inferior side of the table of opposites precludes any connection with deity.

Eleatic School

Parmenides, the founder of the Eleatic School, begins his "Way of Truth", the second part of his poem addressed to Zeno, with the axioms 'Being is', 'Not-being is not', 'Not-being is inconceivable'. He draws three conclusions from them: (1) Being is one, uncreated, and imperishable; (2) Being is indivisible and continuous; (3) Being is motionless and finite, like a well-rounded sphere. The argument for its finitude is as follows:

> And remaining in the same place, it rests by itself and thus remains there fixed; for powerful Necessity holds it in the bonds of a Limit, which constrains it round about, because it is decreed by divine law that Being shall not be without boundary. For it is not lacking; but if it were (spatially infinite), it would be lacking everything (DK 28 B 8, 29-33).

Being is held by necessity within fixed boundaries. The last line of the fragment is very difficult to interpret, but probably Parmenides thinks that the wholeness of being precludes its infinity (DK).

Parmenides' concept of being was defended by Melissus of Samos. However, he altered the theory in two respects: (1) Being is infinite; (2) Being has no bulk. He defends both spatial and temporal infinity of being:

> But as it Is always, so also its size must always be infinite (DK 30 B 3).

He adduces two reasons for the infinity of being: (a) If it had a beginning and an end, either spatially or temporally, it would be divisible into parts and, consequently, not one:

> Nothing that has a beginning and an end is either everlasting or infinite (DK 30 B 4).[14]

(b) If it had limits, it would have to be limited by something outside itself, and being would be at least two:

> If it were not One, it will form a boundary in relation to something else (DK 30 B 5).
>
> If it were infinite, it would be One; for if it were two, (these) could not be (spatially) infinite, but each would have boundaries in relation to each other (DK 30 B 6).[15]

The break with Parmenides on this issue undoubtedly indicates an attempt on Melissus' part to avoid the un-Parmenidean consequence that being is many. The same is true of his second modification of his master's position:

> If therefore Being Is, it must be One; and if it is One, it is bound not to have body. But if it had Bulk, it would have parts, and would no longer Be (DK 30 B 9).

Being is necessarily one, while everything with bulk is divisible into parts; hence, many. What is must, therefore, be without bulk. What sort of thing is this infinite being without bulk? Melissus undoubtedly did not imagine it to be something spiritual, as it is described as spatially infinite. The most likely interpretation seems to be that he regarded it as something _like_ empty space.[16] No identification of being with deity appears in Melissus.

Pluralists

Anaxagoras of Clazomenae asserts at the beginning of his book that material principles are infinite with respect to divisibility and number:

> All Things were together, infinite in number and in smallness. For the Small also was infinite. And since all were together, nothing was distinguishable because of its smallness. For Air and Aether dominated all things, both of them being infinite. For these are the most important (Elements) in the total mixture, both in number and in size (DK 59 B 1).

The original mixture, from which the objects of the visible world were separated out, contained an infinite number of extremely small seeds. While in this mixed state, different types of seeds were indistinguishable on account of their smallness, with the possible exception of air and aether, which were larger and more numerous particles and, hence, predominated. The smallness of the seeds was also infinite, and the reason for this seems to be set out in the third fragment:

> For in Small there is no Least, but only a Lesser: for it is impossible that Being should Not-Be; and in Great there is always a Greater. And it is equal in number to the small, but each thing is to itself both great and small (DK 59 B 3).

The particles are described as infinite in smallness because they are infinitely divisible. Thus, although matter naturally falls into an infinite number of seeds, the seeds themselves are infinitely divisible and non-atomic.

Mind causes the separation of things from the original mixture by beginning a revolution of the mass:

> Other things all contain a part of everything. but Mind is infinite and self-ruling, and is mixed with no Thing, but is alone by itself. If it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would have had a share of all Things, if it were mixed with anything; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as I have said before. And the things mixed (with Mind) would have prevented it, so that it could not rule over any Thing in the same way as it can being alone by itself.

> For it is the finest of all Things, and the purest, and has complete understanding of everything, and has the greatest power. All things which have life, both the greater and the less, are ruled by Mind. Mind took command of the universal revolution, so as to make (things) revolve at the outset. . . . It was this revolution which caused the separation off . . . (DK 59 B 12).

Mind has the power to cause the original revolution; it is 'infinite', 'self-ruling', 'mixed with nothing', 'alone by itself', 'finest' and 'purest' of all things, and 'has complete understanding of everything' and 'the greatest power'. It is quite clear from fr. 12 that the last seven attributes belong to mind because it must have the power to rule over all things. But what 'infinite' means here is not at all obvious. It may mean (1) infinitely divisible, (2) very powerful, or (3) omnipresent. (1) seems unlikely, for all particles are infinitely divisible, and the text seems to contrast mind with other things at this point. (2) is possible because of the proximity of 'self-ruling' to 'infinite'. But (3) seems to be supported by fr. 14:

> Mind, which ever Is, certainly still exists also where all other things are, (namely) in the multiple surrounding (mass) and in the things which were separated off before, and in the things already separated off (DK 59 B 14).

Mind is said to be eternal and present everywhere in this fragment. The adjectives 'finest' and 'purest' assigned to mind in fr. 12 indicate that it is a rare substance, but definitely corporeal. Spatial infinity may, then, be ascribed to it in order to account for its omnipresence, which in turn might help to explain its omniscience and great power.

Anaxagoras' two principles, the original mass and mind, are both described as infinite but in different ways: To the seeds he ascribes infinite divisibility and numerosity, to mind spatial and temporal infinity. Mind, in Anaxagoras, has many of the characteristics of God. However, since he apparently does not have any notion of the incorporeal, the infinity he ascribes to mind is quantitative and little related to the notion of divine infinity developed later.[17]

Leucippus and Democritus postulate atoms and the void as the bases of their atomic theory:

> Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being--the full and solid being being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make these the material causes of things. And as those who make the underlying substance one generate all other things by its modification, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities. These differences, they say, are three--shape and order and position (Aristotle, *Meta.*, A, 4; 985b4-15; DK 67 A 6; Oxford tr.).

Reacting to Parmenides, they substitute a plurality of indivisible unities for the Eleatic unicity of being and assert the existence of non-being or void. Atoms, void, the whole, and the *kosmoi* are all described as infinite. (1) Atoms are infinite with respect to number:

> They (*sc.* Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus) said that the first principles were infinite in number, . . (*Simplic.*, *De Caelo*, 242, 18; DK 67 A 14; tr. Kirk and Raven).

The shapes of the atoms are also infinitely numerous. Two reasons are suggested for this:

> And since they thought that truth lay in the appearance, and the appearances are conflicting and infinitely many, they made the figures infinite in number (Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.*, I, 2; 315b9-11; DK 67 A 9; Oxford tr.).

> He held that the number of shapes in the atoms was infinite on the ground that there was no reason why any atom should be of one shape rather than another . . . (Theophrastus, Phys. Op., fr. 8, ap. Simplic., Phys., 28, 9; DK 67 A 8; tr. Kirk and Raven).

(2) 'Infinite' is one of Democritus' names for the void:

> Democritus . . . ⟨posits a space infinite in magnitude, and he⟩[18] calls space by these names--'the void', 'nothing', and 'the infinite', while each individual atom he calls 'hing' [i.e. 'nothing' without 'not'], the 'compact' and 'being' (Aristotle, On Democritus, ap. Simplic., De Caelo, 295, 1; DK 68 A 37; tr. Kirk and Raven).

The type of infinity attributed to the void is spatial. Void (as Kirk and Raven note, p. 408) is not the space of Aristotle but the gaps between atoms, i.e. nothing. Hence, it is the area between the atoms that is spatially infinite, for Democritus. (3) From an infinite number of atoms and an infinite amount of area between them, the atomists easily deduce the infinite spatial extension of the whole:

> Leucippus holds that the whole is infinite . . . part of it is full and part void . . . (Diogenes Laertius, IX, 31; DK 67 A 1; tr. Kirk and Raven).

(4) Finally, there are an infinite number of worlds:

> Hence arise innumerable worlds, and are resolved again into these elements (Above quotation continued).

Kirk and Raven (p. 412) suggest that there are infinite worlds because there is no reason why one world should be formed rather than another--a reason already adduced for the infinity of atomic shapes.

The types of infinity attributed to the basic principles are clearly quantitative: atoms, their shapes, and worlds are infinite in number; void and the whole are infinite in extent of space. As divinity is attributed to none of these, the notion of infinity found in the atomists remains remote from the infinity of God.

Diogenes of Apollonia followed in the footsteps of Anaxagoras and Anaximenes, though he also borrowed from the atomists. He posited infinite air as the first principle:

> Diogenes the Apolloniate, almost the youngest of those who occupied themselves with these matters (*i.e.* physical studies), wrote for the most part in an eclectic fashion, following Anaxagoras in some things and Leucippus in others. He, too, says that the substance of the universe is infinite and eternal air, from which, when it is condensed and rarified and changed in its dispositions, the form of other things comes into being (Theophrastus, *Phys. Op.*, fr. 2, *ap.* Simplic., *Phys.*, 25, 1; DK 64 A 5; tr. Kirk and Raven).

Air, for Diogenes, is the sole element of physical things, the infinite forms of which (DK 64 B 5) are produced by condensation and rarification. He describes it as infinite, apparently meaning spatially as well as temporally. Aside from its function as the matter of things, it has all of the characteristics of Anaxagoras' mind:

> And it seems to me that that which has Intelligence is that which is called Air by mankind; and further, that by this, all creatures are guided, and that it rules everything; for this in itself seems to me to be God and to reach everywhere and to arrange everything and to be in everything (DK 64 B 5).

Air, like Anaxagoras' mind, is the ruling factor: divine, omnipresent, eternal, and infinite. If we understand Diogenes' doctrine to be dependent upon Anaxagoras and Anaximenes, we can only interpret his infinity as spatial. Three types of infinity are, therefore, found in Diogenes: (1) spatial and (2) temporal infinity of air, (3) numerical infinity of the forms of air.

Sophists

Sophists

Gorgias of Leontini wrote one book of philosophy, entitled On Being, in which he attempted to establish three propositions: (1) Nothing exists; (2) Even if anything exists it is inapprehensible by man; (3) If anything is apprehensible, it is inexpressible and incommunicable (DK 82 B 3). The nihilism of Gorgias is of interest to us only because, in the course of proving the first proposition (under the subdivision "Being does not exist as eternal"), he establishes that the infinite is nowhere:

> For if the existent is eternal (. . .), it has no beginning; for everything created has some beginning, but the eternal being uncreated had no beginning. And having no beginning it is infinite. And if it is infinite, it is nowhere. For if it is anywhere, that wherein it is is different from it, and thus the existent, being encompassed by something, will no longer be infinite; for that which encompasses is larger than that which is encompassed, whereas nothing is larger than the infinite; so that the infinite is not anywhere. Nor, again, is it encompassed by itself. For, if so, that wherein it is will be identical with that which is therein, and the existent will become two things, place and body (for that wherein it is is place, and that which is therein is body). But this is absurd; so that the existent is not in itself either. Consequently, if the existent is eternal it is infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere, and if it is nowhere it does not exist. So then, if the existent is eternal, it is not even existent at all (DK 82 B 3; tr. Nahm).

The argument is probably to be understood as an attack on those pre-Socratics who made the infinite their principle. Two of the fallacies in the argument, however, bring out points that ought to be noted in early Greek philosophy: (1) the proximity of temporal and spatial infinity, which is probably exemplified most clearly by Melissus (DK 30 B 2) and the Pythagoreans (DK 58 B 30), (2) the constant identification of existence with spatial extension, found universally among the pre-Socratics.[19]

Plato

The only discussion of infinity that exists in Plato's published works occurs at *Philebus*, 23C-27C in an avowedly ethical context. In the first part of the dialogue, Protarchus and Socrates have broached the question whether pleasure or intelligence is the good. They resolve that neither a life of pleasure without intelligence nor one of intelligence without pleasure contains the good (21E-22B) and decide to consider whether it is pleasure or intelligence that makes the combined life good (22C-D). Socrates begins the argument with a four-fold division of the universe:

> We said, I fancy, that God had revealed two constituents of things, the unlimited (*apeiron*) and the limit (*peras*). . . . Then let us take these as two of our classes, and, as the third, something arising out of the mixture of them both, though I fear I'm a ridiculous sort of person with my sortings of things into classes and my enumerations. . . . It appears to me that I now need a fourth kind as well. . . . Consider the cause (*aitia*) of the mixing of these two with each other, and put down that, please, as number four to be added to the other three (23C-D; tr. Hackforth).

4

Four kinds are distinguished in the universe of things: (1) the infinite, (2) limit, (3) the mixture of the two, (4) the cause of the mixture. Several examples are given of attributes of the infinite, 'hotter'-'colder', 'strongly'-'slightly', and finally a description of the infinite is reached that shows the principle of unity of this kind:

> When we find things becoming 'more' or 'less' so-and-so, or admitting of terms like 'strongly', 'slightly', 'very' and so forth, we ought to reckon them all as belonging

> to a single kind, namely that of the unlimited; . . (24E-25A; tr. Hackforth).

The unlimited is anything that admits the predicates 'more' or 'less' or their parallels. Limit, on the other hand, is that which does not admit such terms:

> Then things that don't admit of these terms, but admit of all the opposite terms like 'equal' and 'equality' in the first place, and then 'double' and any term expressing a ratio of one number to another, or one unit of measurement to another, all these things we may set apart and reckon--I think we may properly do so--as coming under limit (25A-B; tr. Hackforth).

Limit is, therefore, anything that "puts an end to the conflict of opposites with one another, making them well proportioned and harmonious by the introduction of number" (25E; tr. Hackforth). The introduction of limit in the unlimited produces the mixture, and with this we return to the ethical level:

> Socrates: Then it is here <in limit> that we find the source of fair weather and all other beautiful things, namely in the mixture of the unlimited with that which has limit?
>
> Protarchus: Of course.
>
> Socrates: And indeed there are countless more things which I may omit to enumerate, such as beauty and strength along with health, besides a whole host of fair things found in our souls. For that goddess of ours, fair Philebus, must have observed the lawlessness and utter wickedness of mankind due to an absence of limit in men's pleasures and appetites, and therefore established among them a law and order that are marked by limit (26A-B; tr. Hackforth).

The mixture, on the ethical level, is the state of the soul in which reason limits appetite. More generally, it is defined as the coming to be of things with limit:

> And now as to the third kind, I am reckoning all this progeny of our two factors as a unity, and you may take me to mean a coming-into-being, resulting from those measures that are achieved with the aid of limit (26D; tr. Hackforth).

The fourth kind is, of course, the cause of the mixture:

> As to the fourth, I hope I shall not be at fault in calling it the cause of the mixture and of the coming-to-be? (27B-C; tr. Hackforth).

The discussion we have been examining is clearly ethical. Its purpose is to establish the superiority of intelligence over pleasure within the mixed life by means of the identification of intelligence with limit and pleasure with the unlimited. But as the argument, in the main, proceeds on a quite general level, one must inquire whether it has a metaphysical significance. That is, is one to understand ideas and genera as falling under limit and matter, receptacle, chaos, and species as types of unlimited? The question is difficult, perhaps impossible, to answer. All that can be pointed out here is that nearly exact parallels to intelligence as limit and pleasure as unlimited do exist on the political, semantic, metaphysical, and physical levels.[20]

What can be derived from the discussion of the Philebus is that the infinite is imperfect, requires limit, and represents something evil rather than good. The dichotomy between limit and the infinite suggests the Pythagorean table of opposites, in which limit heads the good column and the infinite the bad. This attitude toward the infinite, absent from early Greek philosophy, with the exception of the Pythagoreans, is notably present in nearly all of Greek thought from Aristotle onward.

Other types of infinity are discussed in the Timaeus: (1) God is described as eternal (34A-B), whereas other gods and human souls are merely deathless (41A-42E). (2) The ideas are eternal and unchangeable (29A).[21] (3) The receptacle is also temporally infinite (52B), whereas the universe of things is only an "image of eternity" (37C-E). The number of worlds is finite and probably one, against the atomists (55C-D). Similarly, the world is finite in spatial extension and spherical is shape, without any void existing outside itself (33B-34B, 58A-B). The only type of infinity that Plato here attributes to physical and metaphysical principles is temporal.

Aristotle

Quantitative infinity

Aristotle's positive account of infinity is contained in Phys., III, 6-8.[22] The inquiry here is expressly limited to a consideration of the infinite as it exists among sensibles:

> Our inquiry (as physicists) is limited to its special subject-matter, the objects of sense, . . (III, 5; 204b1-2).[23]

The existence of the infinite among non-extended objects is, therefore, not in question, and the arguments presented have no direct relation to the prime mover.

At the end of chapter 4, Aristotle distinguishes two senses of 'infinite':

> (1) What is incapable of being gone through, because it is not its nature to be gone through (the sense in which the voice is 'invisible').
> (2) What admits of being gone through, the process however having no termination.
>   (a) What scarcely admits of being gone through.
>   (b) What naturally admits of being gone through, but is not actually gone through or does not reach an end (204a3-6).[24]

It is immediately obvious that sense (2b) is primary, and this is the only one that Aristotle considers in cc. 5-8. Having refuted the contention of some pre-Socratics that there is an infinite body in c. 5, Aristotle opens c. 6 with the following words:

> But on the other hand to suppose that the infinite does not exist in any way leads obviously to many impossible consequences: there will be a beginning and an end of time, a magnitude will not be divisible into magnitudes, number will not be infinite. If, then, in view of the above considerations, neither alternative seems possible an arbiter must be called in; and clearly there is a sense in which the infinite exists and another in which it does not (206a9-14).

Though the existence of an infinitely extended magnitude has been proved impossible, still we are constrained to allow the existence of the infinite in some way. Bearing in mind the distinction between potential and actual existence, we must, Aristotle thinks, admit that the infinite has potential but not actual existence (206a14-18). However, since potential existence normally implies eventual actual existence, the sense of 'potential existence' used here requires explanation:

> But the phrase 'potential existence' is ambiguous. When we speak of the potential existence of a statue we mean that there will be an actual statue. It is not so with the infinite. There will not be an actual infinite. The word 'is' has many senses, and we say that the infinite 'is' in the sense in which we say 'it is day' or 'it is the games', because one thing after another is always coming into existence. For of these things too the distinction between potential and actual existence holds. We say that there are Olympic games, both in the sense that they may occur and that they are actually occurring (206a18-25).

The paragraph distinguishes two senses of 'potential existence': (1) potential existence that implies eventual actual existence, (2) potential existence that is compatible with perpetual inactuality. If the parallel between the day and games and the infinite is to be taken seriously, what Aristotle means is that, e.g., the process of dividing a magnitude infinitely is potential in sense (1), but that the *completed* division is potential only in sense (2). What, however, is sense (2)? The next paragraph suggests the answer:

> For generally the infinite has this mode of existence: one thing is always being taken after another, and each thing that is taken is always finite, but always different. Again, 'being' has more than one sense, so that we must not regard the infinite as a 'this', such as a man or a horse, but must suppose it to exist in the sense in which we speak of the day or the games as existing--things whose being has not come to them like that of a substance, but consists in a process of coming to be or passing away; definite if you like at each stage, yet always different (206a27-33).

The type of existence that characterizes the infinite is that of a process, continuing indefinitely and dependent *for its existence* on a set of parts not yet taken up. It is contrasted with a statue or a horse, the being of which is conferred all at the same time, because its being is given successively by a series of finite parts coming into being or passing away. This meaning of 'potential existence' runs counter to the usual Aristotelian usage, that of sense (1),[25] and hence might more appropriately be termed 'dependent existence'.[26]

Since the being of the infinite consists in the possibility of continuing the process of taking up other parts, the infinite is sharply contrasted with the whole and complete:

> Our definition then is as follows:
>
> *A quantity is infinite if it is such that we can always take a part outside what has been already taken.* On the other hand, what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. For thus we define the whole--that from which nothing is wanting, as a whole man or a whole box. What is true of each particular is true of the whole

> as such--the whole is that of which nothing is outside (207a7-12).

The infinite is defined in a way that makes it necessary that it always lack something. Thus, it is incompatible with the whole and all, to which nothing is lacking (by definition). The pre-Socratics had identified the two, thinking that it was because the all was infinite that it contained all things. However, the infinite is rather the matter, i.e. what is contained:

> It ⟨the infinite⟩ is in fact the matter of the completeness which belongs to size, and what is potentially a whole, though not in the full sense. It is divisible both in the direction of reduction and of the inverse addition. It is a whole and limited; not, however, in virtue of its own nature, but in virtue of what is other than it. It does not contain, but, in so far as it is infinite, is contained. Consequently, also, it is unknowable, _qua_ infinite; for the matter has no form. (Hence it is plain that the infinite stands in the relation of part rather than of whole. For the matter is part of the whole, as the bronze is of the bronze statue.) (207a21-28).

The infinite whole of the pre-Socratics really contained all things by its wholeness, not by its infinity. _Qua_ infinite, it was merely the infinitely divisible magnitude contained by wholeness. The whole stands to the infinite as form to matter. By itself, the infinite is contained, unknowable, and part of a composite.

Having characterized the infinite in general, Aristotle turns to the ways in which the infinite exists in specific types of physical things: (1) Magnitudes are infinite in the direction of decrease, but not of increase. They are infinitely divisible, because it is always possible to take smaller and smaller parts of any given magnitude without reaching anything indivisible. However, since there is no potentially or actually infinite body, there is no magnitude infinite in the direction of increase:

> What is continuous is divided ad infinitum, but there is no infinite in the direction of increase. For the size which it can potentially be, it can also actually be. Hence since no sensible magnitude is infinite, it is impossible to exceed every assigned magnitude; for if it were possible there would be something bigger than the heavens (207b16-21).[27]

The infinite in the direction of increase must not be confused with the infinite by addition, which is in some sense the same as the infinite by division:

> In a way the infinite by addition is the same thing as the infinite by division. In a finite magnitude, the infinite by addition comes about in a way inverse to that of the other. For in proportion as we see division going on, in the same proportion we see addition being made to what is already marked off. For if we take a determinate part of a finite magnitude and add another part determined by the same ratio (not taking in the same amount of the original whole), and so on, we shall not traverse the given magnitude (206b3-9).

(2) The infinity of number consists in the possibility of dividing a magnitude infinitely:

> But in the direction of largeness it is always possible to think of a larger number: for the number of times a magnitude can be bisected is infinite. Hence, this infinite is potential, never actual: the number of parts that can be taken always surpasses any assigned number. But this number is not separable from the process of bisection, and its infinity is not a permanent actuality but consists in a process of coming to be, like time and the number of time (207b10-15).

Number is infinite in increase only, and its infinity is dependent on the possibility of bisecting a magnitude infinitely. Number is not infinite in decrease because (for the Greeks) the unit cannot be divided. (3) The infinity of movement and time is also dependent on the infinity of magnitudes: "Movement is called infinite in virtue of the magnitude covered by the movement (or alteration or growth), and time because of the movement" (207b23-25).

In conclusion, the infinite for Aristotle does not enjoy the status of an independent existent. It exists only as dependent on the potential existence of an infinite number of proportionately smaller parts into which any finite magnitude may be divided or (inversely) which may be added to any part of a finite magnitude. Thus, the infinite is material, unknowable, and contained by a form which confers wholeness upon it. In the concluding words of c. 7, "In the four-fold scheme of causes, it is plain that the infinite is a cause in the sense of matter, and that its essence is privation, the subject as such being what is continuous and sensible" (207b34-208a2).

Infinity and the prime mover(s)

The discussion of *Phys.*, III, 4-8 was explicitly stated to be concerned solely with sensible entities. However, in working toward the notion of divine infinity, we are primarily interested in non-sensible substances. For the relation between infinity and the prime movers, we must turn to *Phys.*, VIII and *Meta.*, Λ. We may immediately set aside the problem whether the prime mover is an efficient or a final cause, because in both discussions the prime mover is held to have infinite power. The arguments of *Phys.*, VIII, being more detailed, explain more clearly the process of arriving at this conclusion and, therefore, its ultimate significance.

The first nine chapters of *Phys.*, VIII are concerned with movement, its relation to first motion, and the cause of first motion. First, it is shown that movement (and its correlate, time) is eternal (cc. 1-2). Everything in motion is moved by something external to itself (c. 4), but, since the series of moved movers cannot go on infinitely, there must be an unmoved mover that causes the movement of the series (c. 5). Since movement is eternal, the prime mover must also be eternal (c. 6). Further, the first motion (caused by the prime mover) is one and continuous (c. 6). The motion is locomotion, for it is prior in nature, time, and degree of excellence to alteration and increase and is also the only motion that is continuous (c. 7). Of the three types of locomotion (rotatory, rectilinear, or a compound of the two) only rotatory locomotion is continuous. It is also infinite, complete, eternal, single, possessed of both rest and motion, measuring all other motions, and regular (cc. 8-9).

In chapter 10, Aristotle intends to prove that the first mover is without parts and without magnitude. First, he shows that nothing finite can cause an infinite motion and, hence, that it cannot cause motion during an infinite time (266a10-24). Further, an infinite force cannot reside in a finite magnitude, nor a finite force in an infinite magnitude (266a24-b27). Aristotle concludes that the first mover, which is the cause of an infinite and eternal motion, must have an infinite force and, hence, cannot have magnitude:

> Now that these points are settled, it is clear that the first unmoved movent cannot have magnitude. For if it has magnitude, this must be either a finite or an infinite magnitude. Now we have already proved in our course on Physics that there cannot be an infinite magnitude: and we have now proved that it is impossible for a finite magnitude to have an infinite force (dunamis), and also that it is impossible for a thing to be moved by a finite magnitude during an infinite time. But the first movent causes a motion that is eternal and does cause it during an infinite time. It is clear,

> therefore, that the first movent is indivisible and is without parts and without magnitude (267b17-26).

The same point is made in Meta., Λ, 7:

> It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power (dunamis); and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all) (1073a3-11).

There is no question in either of these texts of the prime mover's being infinite in its essence. That is, the problem of the infinite force of the prime mover is not resolved by asserting that the prime mover is either an infinite magnitude or an infinite incorporeal substance. Rather it is solved simply by denying that the prime mover has magnitude, the possibility of an infinite spiritual quantity remaining entirely unmentioned.[28] The questions that these texts do present are, Is the infinity of power a wholly new type of infinity, distinct from the quantitative infinity of Phys., III? Or is it derived from quantitative infinity and without implications of superior excellence?[29]

The arguments advanced in support of the infinity of the power of the prime mover depend upon the infinity of the motion caused by that power and, hence, also the infinity of the time occupied by the motion (Phys., VIII, 10; 266a10-23). Motion and time, it was argued in Phys., VIII, 1, are not merely infinitely divisible but infinite by addition in both directions. That is, there is neither beginning nor end to either time or motion. The prime mover must have infinite power precisely because it causes an infinite motion through an infinite time. Motion and time are quantitatively infinite, and, hence, the infinite power of the prime mover is derived from and dependent upon the quantitative infinity expounded in *Phys.*, III. The prime mover has a power that is infinite by what Sweeney has called "extrinsic denomination", i.e. by potentially or actually causing something infinite or an infinite set of things.[30] In the case of the prime mover, the power is infinite *only* because it causes an infinite and eternal motion.[31] Since such a notion of infinite power is reducible to the basic notions of causation and quantitative infinity, we must conclude that no new concept of infinity is introduced at *Phys.*, VIII or *Meta.*, Λ.

The Aristotelian discussions contributed to the history of infinity primarily in two ways: (1) An exact account of quantitative infinity was given; (2) A connection, however slight, was made between the prime mover, as immaterial first cause (whether efficient or final), and infinity. In the first way, the discussion provided a background against which divine infinity could be expounded as well as a source book for statements about infinity that allowed of various interpretations. Secondly, the attribution of infinity to the divine power by extrinsic denomination appears continually throughout the history of infinity.

Stoics

The Stoic School begun by Zeno of Citium held that the universe had two principles, an active principle identified with God and a passive principle like prime matter:

> They hold that there are two principles in the universe, the active principle (to poioun) and the passive (to paschon). The passive principle, then, is a substance without quality, i.e. matter, whereas the active is the reason inherent in this substance, that is God. For he is everlasting and is the artificer of each several thing throughout the whole extent of matter (Diogenes Laertius, VII, 134; tr. Hicks).

God, the active principle, forms the cosmos and stands to the finished cosmos as soul to body:

> God is one and the same with Reason, Fate, and Zeus; he is also called by many other names. In the beginning he was by himself; he transformed the whole of substance through air into water, and just as in animal generation the seed has a moist vehicle, so in cosmic moisture God, who is the seminal reason of the universe, remains behind in the moisture as such an agent, adapting matter to himself with a view to the next stage of creation. Thereupon he created first of all the four elements, fire, water, air, earth. . . . An element is defined as that from which particular things first come to be at their birth and into which they are finally resolved. The four elements together constitute unqualified substance or matter (Ibid., 136-37; tr. Hicks).[32]

Thus, god literally forms out of himself the four elements and so can be identified with the cosmos:

> The term universe or cosmos is used by them in three senses: (1) of God himself, the individual being whose quality is derived from the whole of substance; he is indestructible and ingenerable, being the artificer of this orderly arrangement, who at stated periods of time absorbs into himself the whole of substance and again creates it from himself (Ibid., 137; tr. Hicks).

God, as the source of the universe, is temporally infinite. Inasmuch as god is identified with the cosmos, the cosmos itself is also temporally infinite. However, the cyclic universal conflagration referred to at the end of Diogenes' summary implies that nothing is eternal as formed by god.[33]

In the formed world god operates as a *pneuma* or spirit that holds together the cosmos and its parts and is usually identified with the elements fire and air:

> Chrysippos' theory of mixture is as follows: he assumes that the whole material world is unified by a pneuma which wholly pervades it, and by which the universe is made coherent and kept together and is made intercommunicating (Alexander of Aphrodesias, *De Mix.*, 216m, 14ff.; tr. Sambursky).
>
> The pneuma-like substance makes for cohesion and the hyle-like is made cohesive. Therefore, they say that air and fire make cohesive and that earth and water are made cohesive . . . (Galen, *De Mult.*, 3; Arnim, II, 439; tr. Sambursky).[34]

Pneuma (i.e. god) is the same as fire and air and, hence, is material. It operates in the cosmos to create a tension that sets the parts of the cosmos in sympathy with one another (Cleomedes, *De Motu Circ. Corp. Cael.*, I, 1). The cosmos united by this means is a finite whole:

> The world, they say, is one and finite, having a spherical shape, such a shape being the most suitable for motion, . . . Outside of the world is diffused the infinite void, which is incorporeal. By incorporeal is meant that which, though capable of being occupied by body, is not so occupied.[35] The world has no empty space within it, but forms one united whole. This is a necessary result of the sympathy and tension which binds together things in heaven and earth (Diogenes Laertius, VII, 140; tr. Hicks).[36]

The cosmos of the Stoics is a finite body surrounded by an infinite void. The area within the cosmos is entirely filled and corporeal in character. The surrounding void is infinite in spatial extension, because (according to Cleomedes, loc. cit.) there is nothing that could bound it. It is the tension set up by pneuma that prevents the cosmos from being dispersed into the void (Ibid.).

Time, like the void, is conceived as incorporeal but self-existent:

> Whereas they ⟨the Stoics⟩ . . . supposed that time is an incorporeal thing conceived as self-existent, Epicurus supposed it to be a property of certain things (Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math., X, 227; tr. Bury).

Similarly, time is infinite in both directions:

> Chrysippus defined time as the interval of movement which sometimes is also called measure of swiftness and slowness, or the interval proper to the movement of the cosmos. And it is in time that everything moves and exists. It seems that time is to be taken in two senses, just like the earth and the sea and the void, namely in the sense of the whole and its parts. In the same way as void is all infinite everywhere, so time is all infinite in both directions; indeed, past and future are both infinite. And he states most clearly that no time is entirely present; for the division of continua goes on infinitely, and by this distinction time, too, is infinitely divisible. Thus no time is strictly present, but is defined only loosely (Stobaios, Ecl., I, 106; tr. Sambursky).

As well as being infinite in extent, time is infinitely divisible, for the "now" of time is not indivisible (Plutarch, De Com. Notit., 1081c). Likewise, there are no smallest parts of motion or place, which are, therefore, also infinitely divisible (Sextus Empiricus, X, 122, 139, 142).

To conclude this very brief outline, the Stoics employ 'infinite' in the traditional senses of temporal and spatial extension and of divisibility. The cosmos is finite both temporally and spatially, though, when equated with god, it must be temporally infinite. Void alone is spatially infinite. The only type of infinity that occurs within bodies is infinite divisibility, which is found in the three requirements of movement, i.e. motion, place, and time. The last of these is also infinite in extent. God is identified with pneuma, air, and fire and is, consequently, material. No attempt is made to attribute any sort of infinity to him other than temporal infinity. Void is incorporeal, but it is not the same as God, nor is any non-spatial infinity ascribed to it.

Epicureans

The physics of the Epicureans is founded upon the atomic theory of Leucippus and Democritus and is expounded in Epicurus' first letter (to Herodotus) and Lucretius' great poem, *De Rerum Natura*. Like the founders of atomism, the Epicureans regard the universe as constructed of atoms and void, both of which are infinite:

> Moreover, the universe is boundless. For that which is bounded has an extreme point: and the extreme point is seen against something else. So that as it has no extreme point, it has no limit; and as it has no limit, it must be boundless and not bounded. Furthermore, the infinite is boundless both in number of the bodies and in the extent of the void. For if on the one hand the void were boundless, and the bodies limited in number, the bodies could not stay anywhere, but would be carried about and scattered through the infinite void, not having other bodies to support them and keep them in place by means of collisions. But if, on the other hand, the void were limited, the infinite bodies would not have room wherein to take their place (Epicurus, *Ep.* 1, 41-42; tr. Bailey).

Atoms are held to be infinitely numerous, while space is infinite in extent. The universe, i.e. the sum of atoms and the gaps between them, is, therefore, also infinite in extent. The atomism of the pre-Socratics is modified in that the number of shapes is thought finite, instead of infinite:

> And so in each shape the atoms are quite infinite in number, but their differences of shape are not quite infinite, but only incomprehensible in number (Ibid., 42; tr. Bailey).

Two reasons for the departure from tradition are suggested by Lucretius (De Rer. Nat., II, 478-521): (1) An infinity of shapes must eventually be accounted for by larger sizes of atoms, but, in fact, all atoms are imperceptibly small; (2) The number of possible qualities in physical bodies is limited--e.g. there are extremes of hotness and coldness--and, because of this, an infinity of shapes of atoms is not necessary to explain them. As in early atomism, the number of worlds in the universe is infinite:

> Furthermore, there are infinite worlds both like and unlike this world of ours. For the atoms being infinite in number, as was proved already, are borne on far out into space. For those atoms, which are of such nature that a world could be created out of them or made by them, have not been used up either on one world or on a limited number of worlds, nor again on all the worlds which are alike, or on those which are different from these. So that there nowhere exists an obstacle to the infinite number of worlds (Epicurus, Ep. 1, 45; tr. Bailey).

Lastly, the universe is regarded as temporally infinite and indestructible:

> Furthermore, the universe always was such as it is now, and always will be the same. For there is nothing into which it changes: for outside the universe there is nothing which could come into it and bring about the change (Ibid., 39; tr. Bailey).

The reason given for this is, of course, the theory that nothing can come from or become nothing (for nothing does not exist).

We possess very few texts relating Epicurean views concerning the gods. Epicurus in the third letter (to Menoeceus) assigns immortality to the gods:

> First of all believe that god is a being immortal and blessed, even as the common idea of a god is engraved on men's minds, and do not assign to him anything alien to his immortality or ill-suited to his blessedness: but believe about him everything that can uphold his blessedness and immortality. For gods there are, since the knowledge of them is by clear vision (§124; tr. Bailey).

The gods are held to be immortal and to be known by a clear vision. Lucretius adds:

> This too you may not possibly believe, that the holy seats of the gods exist in any parts of the world: the fine nature of the gods far withdrawn from our senses is hardly seen by the thought of the mind; and since it has ever eluded the touch and stroke of the hands, it must touch nothing which is tangible for us; for that cannot touch which does not admit of being touched in turn. And therefore their seats as well must be unlike our seats, fine, even as their bodies are fine (De Rer. Nat., V, 146-154; tr. Munro).

The gods do not exist in the world but (presumably) in the void between worlds, nor do they have any effect on the world. They are of a material nature (for they have bodies), but their matter is fine and can be known by intellection, but not by sensation. C. Bailey has devoted a long section of The Greek Atomists and Epicurus (Oxford, 1928), pp. 438-481 to Epicurean theology, but he has not discovered an attribution of any type of infinity to the gods, other than temporal infinity.

We conclude that infinity enters Epicurean philosophy in physics and theology: in physics, atoms and worlds are infinite in number and in time, while void and the universe are both temporally and spatially infinite; in theology, the gods are temporally infinite.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND (II)

Neo-Platonists

Plotinus[1]

The Enneads of Plotinus contain an elaborate account of the structure of the universe. The one is the source of being (or intelligence), which contains all forms as a unity. Soul, which emanates from intelligence, contains the forms of all things in a separated way and from it proceeds the world of nature. Below nature stand matter and evil. Infinity is predicated of the three primary hypostases (the one, intelligence, and soul) and also of matter and evil, though in diverse ways.

For Plotinus, the one, or good, as the source of being must be above being; hence, non-being. Being is associated with form, determination, and limit, while, conversely, non-being is characterized by the negation of all of these:

> The totality of beings must come after The One because The One itself has no determinate form. The One simply is one while The Intelligence is what in the realm of being constitutes the totality of beings. Thus The One is not any of the beings The Intelligence contains but the sole source from which all of them are derived. That is why they are "beings"; they are already determined, each with its specific form; a being cannot be indeterminate, but only definite and stable. For

> intelligible beings such stability consists in the determination and form to which they owe their existence (V, 1, 7; tr. O'Brien).

The limitation that is necessarily found in all beings cannot exist in the one. Two reasons are given for its transcendence of limit:

> The First cannot be thought of as having definition and limit, for thus it would not be the Source but the particular item indicated by the definition assigned to it (V, 5, 6; tr. MacKenna).[2]

The one cannot have limit, because it must transcend its products. This explanation provides grounds only for attributing a kind of relative infinity to the one. That is, the one must lie above particular beings and so is "infinite" with respect to them, but it need not be infinite with respect to itself. The second explanation provides grounds for holding that the one is absolutely infinite:

> It ⟨the good⟩ is infinite also by right of being pure unity with nothing toward which to direct any partial content. Absolutely One, it has never known measure and stands outside of number, and so is under no limit either in regard to any extern or within itself; for any such determination would bring something of the dual into it. And having no constituent parts it accepts no pattern, forms no shape (V, 5, 11; tr. MacKenna).

The one must have no parts and, for this reason, no form, for these would imply duality in it. Transcending all form, it stands absolutely above all limitation and is infinite in its reality.[3]

A second type of infinity is suggested by the preceding text: The one is infinite because it is not circumscribed by any limitations external to itself:

> That Source, having no prior, cannot be contained: uncontained by any of those other forms of being, each held within the series of priors, it is orbed

> round all, but so as not to be pointed off to hold them part for part; it possesses but is not possessed. Holding all--though itself nowhere held--it is omnipresent, for where its presence failed something would elude its hold. At the same time, in the sense that it is nowhere held it is not present: thus it is both present and not present; not present as not being circumscribed by anything; yet, as being utterly unattached, not inhibited from presence at any point. That inhibition would mean that the First was determined by some other being; the later series, then, would be without part in the Supreme; God has His limit and is no longer self-governed but mastered by inferiors (V, 5, 9; tr. MacKenna).

Any being that could limit the one would not be derived from it but would have its source in some other. However, the one is the sole source and, as a result, cannot be contained by anything outside itself. This type of infinity seems occasionally to be linked with omnipresence and omnipotence:

> Again, if we think of the divine nature as infinite--and certainly it is confined by no bounds--this must mean that it nowhere fails; its presence must reach to everything; at the point to which it does not reach, there it has failed; something exists in which it is not (VI, 5, 4; tr. MacKenna).

> Yet its <the good's> Being is not limited; what is there to set bounds to it? Nor, on the other hand, is it infinite in the sense of magnitude; what place can there be to which it must extend, or why should there be movement where there is no lacking? All its infinitude resides in its power: it does not change and will not fail; and in it all that is unfailing finds duration (V, 5, 10; tr. MacKenna).

The third type of infinity that is applied to the one is infinity of power. The power of the one is identified with the one itself, and indeed the only positive way Plotinus thinks we can conceive of the one is as total power:

> The One, therefore, is beyond all things that are 'Thus': standing before the indefinable you may name any of these sequents but you must say 'This is none of them': at most it is to be conceived as the

> round all, but so as not to be pointed off to hold them part for part; it possesses but is not possessed. Holding all--though itself nowhere held--it is omnipresent, for where its presence failed something would elude its hold. At the same time, in the sense that it is nowhere held it is not present: thus it is both present and not present; not present as not being circumscribed by anything; yet, as being utterly unattached, not inhibited from presence at any point. That inhibition would mean that the First was determined by some other being; the later series, then, would be without part in the Supreme; God has His limit and is no longer self-governed but mastered by inferiors (V, 5, 9; tr. MacKenna).

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> The One, therefore, is beyond all things that are 'Thus': standing before the indefinable you may name any of these sequents but you must say 'This is none of them': at most it is to be conceived as the

> total power toward things, supremely self-concentred, being what it wills to be or rather projecting into existence what it wills, itself higher than all will, will a thing beneath it.(VI, 8, 9; tr. MacKenna).

If anything positive can be predicated of the one, it is power. All other predicates that can be properly applied are negative in form and meaning. As identified with the one, the power of the one will be infinite in itself. But it also seems to be infinite as producing the infinite totality of things:

> And the power ⟨of the good⟩ has infinity, for in no way will it ever fail, and there beings without cease exist through it (V, 5, 10).
>
> For It ⟨the one⟩ is the greatest of all things, not in size but in power--that which is without magnitude can be great in power, for the things which come after It are indivisible and without parts in their powers, not in their bulk. It must be considered as infinite, not by unlimited extension or size or number but by the unboundedness of Its power (VI, 9, 6; tr. Armstrong).

The endless series of beings that (ultimately) find their source in the one indicates that the one must have infinite power extending to them all. From the effects of any power we are to determine the nature of that power (IV, 8, 2; III, 8, 10), but has Plotinus really gone beyond Aristotle in these arguments? The power of the one is infinite because it extends to an infinite number of beings and, thus, is infinite by extrinsic denomination. To the degree that the power of the one is identical with the one itself, which is infinite in its reality, it is intrinsically infinite as transcending being.

Intelligence and soul are also infinite and undetermined at a certain stage. The intelligence proceeds from the one through three stages, life, vision, and intelligence (VI, 7, 17). The intelligence is undetermined in the first two stages; in the third, it gazes upon the one, thereby receiving form and limit:

> But the Life was a vestige of that Primal, not a life lived by it; Life, then, as it looked toward That was undetermined; having looked it had determination though That had none. Life looks to unity and is determined by it, taking bound, limit, form (VI, 7, 17; tr. MacKenna).

Similarly, soul at first is undetermined but receives form and limit from the intelligence:

> And it ⟨intelligence⟩ takes position toward the soul, becoming a light to the soul as itself finds its light in the First; whenever Intellectual-Principle becomes the determinant of soul it shapes it into Reasoning Soul, by communicating a trace of what itself has come to possess (Ibid.; tr. MacKenna).

Both intelligence and soul are indeterminate and infinite in themselves; only by gazing upon their sources do they take on limit and determination and, in effect, being. Yet their infinity is not that of transcending being, but of pre-being, and in this they differ from the one.

Similarly, intelligence and soul are infinite in power, since they are the sources of an infinite number of sequents. The number of ideas in the intelligence must be infinite because there are an infinite number of recurring cycles, and each individual in these cycles must have its own idea (V, 7, 1). But, as these are contained as a unity, the infinity in the intelligence is not numerical but resides in the power of producing such an infinite series:

> We ought not to be afraid of the infinity which this introduces into the intelligible world; for it is all in an indivisible unity and, we may say, comes forth when it acts (Ibid.; tr. Armstrong).

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The soul contains all individuals as distinct in a unity and, in this way, must be unbounded:

> It ⟨the soul⟩ is one and also unbounded, and contains all things together and each individual thing, distinct but not so distinguished as to be separate: otherwise how could it be unbounded? We speak of it as unbounded just because it contains all things together, every life and every soul and every intellect (VI, 4, 14; tr. Armstrong).

The type of infinity here attributed is the same as that attributed to intelligence at V, 7, 1, for Plotinus summarizes at V, 7, 3:

> There is nothing alarming about such limitlessness in generative forces and in Reason-Principles, when Soul is there to sustain all.
>
> As in Soul (principle of Life) so in Divine Mind (principle of Idea) there is this infinitude of recurring generative powers; the Beings there are unfailing (tr. MacKenna).

The infinity of power of the soul and the intelligence is parallel to that of the one: all are infinite in power as the sources of an infinite number of individuals, which they precontain as a unity.

Lastly, matter and evil are called 'infinite'. There are two distinct types of matter, sensible and intelligible (II, 4, 1-7). On each level, matter serves as the indefinite substratum that is defined and limited by form:

> Now matter is a thing that is brought under order--like all that shares its nature by participation or by possessing the same principle--therefore, necessarily, Matter is The Undelimited (the Absolute, the 'thing' Indefiniteness) and not merely the recipient of a non-essential quality of Indefiniteness entering as an attribute. . . . The Matter even of the Intellectual Realm is the Indefinite (the undelimited); . . (II, 4, 15; tr. MacKenna).

Matter in both realms is pure indefiniteness. The indefiniteness of intellectual matter is less pronounced than that of sensible matter because "Indefiniteness is greater in the less ordered object" (Ibid.). Consequently, it is even correct to call intelligible matter 'being':

> The matter There is something real, for That which is before it is beyond being. Here, however, that which is before matter is real, and so matter itself is not real; it is something else over against the excellence of real being (II, 4, 16; tr. Armstrong).[4]

Matter in both realms is pure indefiniteness. Yet intelligible matter, as produced by the one, is more real and so is less indefinite than the matter of sensible things, which follows being. The result is that the non-being of both types of matter is intimately associated with its indeterminateness and infinity.[5]

Sensible matter is also evil as totally lacking in everything: "That which has nothing because it is in want, must necessarily be evil" (II, 4, 16; tr. Armstrong). Primal evil seems, further, to be identical with matter. Evil lies neither in being nor beyond being, but rather is a kind of non-being (I, 8, 3):

> One might arrive at a conception of it by considering it as measureless opposed to measure, the unlimited as opposed to limit, formlessness as opposed to a forming principle, that which is always in need as opposed to self-sufficiency; as something always indefinite, nowhere at rest, affected by everything, insatiable, utter poverty: and by thinking that all this is not incidental to it but in a sort of way its substance, and that any part of it you see is by itself all this; . . . So that which underlies figures and forms and shapes and measures and limits and is decorated with ornaments that do not belong to it and has nothing good of its own, but is a phantasm as compared with reality and the substance of evil, if there really can be a substance of evil, has been discovered by our argument to be primal and absolute evil (Ibid.; tr. Armstrong).[6]

The nature of evil is indefiniteness and lack of limit. As in the case of matter, the unlimitedness of evil is identified with its non-being.

Infinity of non-being is predicated of matter and evil inasmuch as they are below being, of the one as transcending being, and of intelligence and soul when they are still unformed and, hence, as pre-being. The infinity of non-being is associated with lack of form and limitation wherever it occurs in Plotinus. Infinity of power is ascribed to each of the three primal hypostases through extrinsic denomination, because they are the sources of an infinite number of beings. Yet to the extent that the powers of the one, intelligence, and soul are identical with their realities, these powers will be infinite by intrinsic denomination, from the non-being of their realities.

Proclus

The system of Proclus is similar to that of Plotinus. The source of the universe is the one, which transcends every description and operates as one, good, and god. The universe itself contains six principles: (1) being, the cause of the actual world, (2) power, the power of being to produce the world, (3) mind, the activity of being containing the world potentially, (4) soul, the power of mind to produce the world, (5) nature, the immediate cause of the material world, (6) body, the material world.[7] Furthermore, there is a series of principles that follow immediately upon the one, but yet are prior to the universe: (1) definiteness-itself, the existence of the one,[8] (2) infinity-itself, the power of the one (E.T., 90), (3) foreknowing, the activity of the one, (4) the class of underlying receivers, the second effects of the one.[9]

Since the one stands above both definiteness-itself and infinity-itself, it cannot be described as having or being either of these.[10] Instead definiteness-itself and infinity-itself seem to represent the aspects of the one's existence and power separated and placed below the one:

> Prior to all that is composed of limit and infinitude there exist substantially and independently the first Limit and the first Infinity (E.T., 90; tr. Dodds).
>
> Infinity is not the First Principle; for that is the measure of all things, being Good (prop. 12) and Unity (prop. 13). Neither is it Being; for Being is infinite and not Infinity. Cause of all things infinite in potency and cause of all infinitude in things, Infinity falls between the First Principle and Being (E.T., 92; tr. Dodds).

Infinity-itself is identical with first potency: "The first Potency is Infinity" (Ibid.; tr. Dodds). Further, infinity-itself is infinite only in potency. The infinite manifests itself in quantity, size and power: "For all infinitude is either of quantity or of bulk, or else of potency" (E.T., 86; tr. Dodds). Infinity-itself, because it is located between the one and being, stands above magnitude and, hence, like being, cannot be infinite in number or size, but only in power (Ibid.). A fourth type of infinity that may be derived from infinity of power is perpetuity (E.T., 84-85), but this is inferior to infinity-itself:

> But it is plain that perpetuity is an infinitude; for that which never fails is infinite, and this is what we mean by perpetuity, which involves an unfailing subsistence. Hence infinitude is prior to perpetuity, since that principle is more causative which gives rise to the greater number of terms and is more universal (prop. 60). Thus the first Infinity is prior to Eternity (E.T., 94; tr. Dodds).

Infinity-itself is not perpetual simply because it stands above existence, since limit-itself is its co-principle and not its superior (*E.T.*, 90). Infinity-itself is, therefore, only infinite in power.

Of course, this does not mean that it is limited in any of these aspects:

> The first manifestation of any principle is free from alien elements, and hence the primatively Infinite can have no infusion of limit, nor the first Limit of infinitude: therefore these characters exist primatively prior to the mixture (*E.T.*, 90; tr. Dodds).

There is no possibility of predicating any type of finitude of infinity-itself, just as there is none of ascribing infinity to limit-itself. As the primal cause of the infinite, it cannot be limited either to itself or to what is above it: it is absolutely infinite.

Infinity-itself is the cause of all infinite potency (and other types of infinitude) found on lower levels, where it is mixed with limit:

> *There are both finite and infinite potencies; but all finite potency arises from infinite potency, and this latter from the first Infinity* (*E.T.*, 91; tr. Dodds).

The first infinite potency in the hierarchy is true being, which is infinite both in potency and (derivatively) in having unfailing subsistence:

> For if its ⟨of all that perpetually is⟩ subsistence is unfailing, then the potency, in virtue of which it is what it is and is able to exist, is likewise infinite: since this potency of being, if it were finite, would one day fail; which failing, the existence of its possessor would also fail and that possessor would no longer be perpetual. Accordingly that potency in perpetual Being which maintains it in existence must be infinite (E.T., 84; tr. Dodds).

However, it is not infinite in size (since it is self-constituted, E.T., 47) or number (for it stands closest to the one, E.T., 62):

> Accordingly what renders it indivisible makes it also infinite; and a being is more infinite in proportion as it is more one and indivisible. For as a potency is divided it becomes weak and finite (prop. 61), and potencies completely divided are in every way finite: the last potencies, which are most remote from the One, are in every way finite because of their partition, while the first are infinite because they are without parts (E.T., 86; tr. Dodds; cf. E.T., 95).

True being is infinite only in potency.

As the above passage notes, there are degrees of power in things as they fall away from unity. Thus, in true being and the beings below it there can only be a relative infinity of power:

> All infinitude in things which have Being is infinite neither to the superior orders nor to itself.
>
> For to whomsoever anything is infinite, to him it is also uncircumscribed. But among things which have Being each is determinate both to itself and to all principles prior to it. It remains, then, that the infinitude in such things is infinite only to inferior principles, above which it is so supereminent in potency as to escape the grasp of any of them. For though they extend themselves toward it with whatsoever reach, yet it has something which altogether transcends them; though all of them enter into it, yet it has something which for secondary beings is occult and incomprehensible; though they unfold the potencies contained in it, yet it has something unattained in its unity, an unexpanded life which evades their explication. But containing and determining itself as it does, it cannot be infinite for itself; and still less for those above it, since it possesses but a parcel of the infinitude which is in them. For the potencies of the more universal terms are more infinite, being themselves more universal and nearer in rank to the primal Infinity (E.T., 93; tr. Dodds; cf. E.T., 95).

Infinity-itself is the only absolutely infinite power. All other powers that are infinite are so only relatively, as more universal than and incomprehensible to the powers that lie below them.

It should be noted that if there is an infinite potency in a finite body that potency must be incorporeal:

> For suppose the potency to be itself a body: if this body be infinite, the infinite will be contained in the finite. And if it be finite, the potency is not potency in that respect in which it is a body: for if it be finite qua body and infinite qua potency, in that respect in which it is body it will not be potency. Therefore infinite potency resident in a finite body must be incorporeal (E.T., 96; tr. Dodds).

Further, there can be no infinite potency in a sensible body infinite in size or number:

> But infinitude of size or number signifies a complete lapse from indivisibility and total privation of it: for the quantitative finite is nearest to the indivisible, and the quantitative infinite, which has completely escaped from unity, is the most remote. Hence infinitude of potency cannot reside in anything infinite in number or size, since infinite potency accompanies indivisibility, and the infinite in number or size stands furthest from the indivisible (E.T., 86; tr. Dodds).

The divisibility and consequent weakness of what is infinite in number or size precludes its having infinite power. The power is so low that it is not even infinite relative to its inferiors.

The four types of infinity also manifest themselves on nine other levels in the hierarchy of principles: (1) The power of being is relatively infinite in power as cause of eternal things, (2) Mind as cause of all the characteristics of the world, (3) Time as enduring perpetually, (4) Soul as perpetually in motion; (5) Heavenly bodies are infinite in variety and motion; (6) The material world is infinite because of its change and variety; (7) Individuals are infinite in their material aspect; (8) Unformed mass is infinite in divisibility; (9) Matter is infinite in potentiality to possess characteristics.[11] Of the four types of infinity described here, all but that of power and its consequent, perpetuity, are imperfect. Infinity of size and number and indetermination alike represent a falling-away from the one.

Infinity as a perfection, therefore, appears in Proclus as the power of the one, which is infinity-itself, and as a component of mixtures, in which it is infinite power or perpetuity resident in a principle without magnitude or in a finite magnitude. These dependent powers have only a relative infinity, infinity-itself alone possessing absolute infinity. As infinity-itself is separated from and located below the one, we do not find in Proclus the ascription of any type of infinity to the one.

Pseudo-Dionysius[12]

Like that of Plotinus, the universe of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite is composed of an ordered set of hierarchies. Beginning with God (the One, Good, Beauty, etc.), it extends through the angelic hierarchies, man, and the world to matter and evil. Since Dionysius was a Christian, he was faced with the problem of reconciling the God of Exodus 3, 14 with the neo-Platonic one, which was above being. The reconciliation took place through superlative theology: God is super-being and, therefore, non-being, but He can be called 'being' as the cause of the beings standing below Him. As in the Plotinian universe, matter and evil are non-being because they are below being.

References to infinity are spread throughout the volume Dionysius devotes to the divine names. The texts fall into two basic groups: (1) those relating to creatures, (2) those relating to God. The first group contains a series of texts which refer to infinity as present in the universe of creatures but give no clue as to the type of infinity referred to:

> It is not lawful to any lover of that Truth which is above all truth to celebrate It as Reason or Power or Mind or Life or Being, but rather as most utterly surpassing all condition, movement, life, imagination, conjecture, name, discourse, thought, conception, being, rest, dwelling, union, limit, infinity, everything that exists (De Div. Nom., I, 5; PG 3, 593C; tr. Rolt).[13]

What is clear is that God transcends the type of infinity to be found in the creaturely universe:

> Now God is called Great in His peculiar Greatness which giveth of Itself to all things that are great and is poured upon all Magnitude from outside and stretches far beyond it; embracing all Space, exceeding all Number, penetrating beyond all Infinity . . . . This Greatness is Infinite, without Quantity and without Number (Ibid., IX, 2; PG 3, 909C; tr. Rolt).[14]

Further, as the last text shows, the infinity associated with corporeal things is that belonging to continuous and discrete quantity. But there is a second type of infinity in the universe which is linked with the changeableness and dissension to be found there:

> And the perfect Peace guards each several individuality unalloyed by Its providential gift of peace, keeping all things without internal or mutual discord or confusion, and establishing all things, in the power of unswerving stability, so as to possess their own peace and rest. . . . In the first plase there is nothing in the world which hath utterly fallen away from all Unity; for that which is utterly unstable, boundless, baseless, and indefinite (apeiria) hath neither Being nor any inherence in the things that have Being (Ibid., XI, 3-5; PG 3, 952B-953A; tr. Rolt).[15]

Things are redeemed from this type of infinity by God, who imposes a unity upon them. The internal dissension giving rise to this infinity is associated with matter and evil:

> Through these ⟨rays of goodness⟩ all Spiritual Beings and faculties and activities (whether perceived or percipient) began; through these they exist and pos-

> sess a life incapable of failure or diminution, and are untainted by any corruption or death or materiality or birth, being separate above all instability and flux and restlessness of change (*Ibid.*, IV, 1; PG 3, 693C; tr. Rolt).
>
> Evil things are not immutable and unchanging but indeterminate and indefinite: the sport of alien influences which have no definite aim (*Ibid.*, IV, 31; PG 3, 732B; tr. Rolt).

Although matter is never explicitly called 'infinite' by Pseudo-Dionysius,[16] it certainly acts as a cause of the infinity associated with instability. Evil, on the other hand, is definitely linked with infinity:

> Evil is, then, a lack, a deficiency, a weakness, a disproportion, an error, purposeless, unlovely, lifeless, unwise, unreasonable, imperfect, unreal, causeless, indeterminate, sterile, inert, powerless, disordered, incongruous, indefinite (*apeiron*), dark, unsubstantial, and never in itself possessed of any existence whatever (*Ibid.*, IV, 32; PG 3, 732C-D; tr. Rolt).

The infinity present in evil seems to be connected with its status as infra-being.

The Dionysian universe, therefore, contains at least three types of infinity: (a) that of discrete and continuous quantity, which is probably associated with its material aspect,[17] (b) that of perpetual instability, caused by matter and evil, (c) that of evil, which is infinite as non-being.

The second group of texts refer to divine infinity. A number of these link God's infinity with His supersubstantiality and, hence, His status as non-being (because above being):

> That is why it also happens that these same writings praise the Thearchy in representing it . . . by means of images which do not resemble it in any way. They call it 'invisible', 'infinite', 'incomprehensible', not signifying what it is, but rather what it is not. In my opinion this second way of praising Him is more

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> suitable to His lordship, for . . . we say truly that it is not according to the order of being, and we are ignorant of this indefinable superessence which can neither be thought nor be spoken (De Coel. Hier., II, 3; PG 3, 140D-141A; tr. after de Gandillac).[18]

God is infinite inasmuch as He transcends the substance and being found in things. We are ignorant of the infinity of God, because non-being is of itself unintelligible. 'Infinite' need not indicate anything positive in the divine reality (i.e. some thing of which we are ignorant); it merely expresses a negation of the limitation to be found in beings. Thus, God is infinite because in terms of creaturely being He must be regarded as non-being.

Another set of texts on divine infinity predicate infinity of the divine power:

> Yea, He is Infinitely Powerful (apeirodunamos) not only in that all Power comes from Him, but also because He is above all power and is Very Power, and possesses that excess of Power which produces in infinite ways an infinite number of other existent powers; . . (De Div. Nom., VIII, 2; PG 3, 889D; tr. Rolt).[19]

God's power is identical with Himself. He is the cause of the whole series of powers and He is above every power. Since God is the cause of an infinite series of effects, His power must be infinite by extrinsic denomination. As was the case in Plotinus, the divine power is intrinsically infinite only inasmuch as it is identical with the divine reality, which is infinite as non-being. Simply as the cause of an infinity of existing things, it is infinite only by extrinsic denomination, for the infinitude belongs primarily to the effects and only derivatively to the cause.

The types of divine infinity found in Dionysius are, therefore, the same as those encountered in Plotinus. That is, the divine power is infinite by extrinsic denomination, and the divine reality is infinite as transcending being.[20]

John Damascene

The *Fons Scientiae* of John Damascene is a collection of views drawn mainly from the Greek Fathers. The third part, translated under the title *De Fide Orthodoxa*[22] in the twelfth century, contains numerous remarks concerning divine infinity which were quoted extensively in thirteenth-century discussions of infinity. The texts (some of which we shall draw from the *Dialectica* and the *De Recta Sententia*) fall into four basic groups.

The first group implies that God is infinite as exceeding all measure:

> That, then, which can be measured or counted is finite. On the other hand, that is infinite which by some degree of excessiveness exceeds all measure and number. And the terms *great* and *very great* are used in the sense of *infinite*, as when we speak of 'the very great compassion of God' or the 'great mystery of the dispensation of God the Word' (*Dialectica*, c. 49; PG 94, 628A; tr. Chase).

God is infinitely great by transcending all measure. This sort of infinity depends upon the measures imposed by the human intellect and, hence, is relative to human standards. That is, God might be finite with respect to Himself, while yet remaining "infinite" insofar as He exceeds any other standard of comparison.

Secondly, God is infinite as unbounded by the limitations imposed by place, time, and the created intellect:

> Now, to be circumscribed means to be determined by place, time, or comprehension, while to be contained by none of these is to be uncircumscribed. So that Divinity alone is uncircumscribed, who is without beginning and without end, who embraces all things and is grasped by no comprehension at all (*De Fide Orth.*,

> I, 13; PG 94, 853B; tr. Chase).[23]

God is here called 'infinite' because He is not circumscribed by external limitations. This type of infinity is also relative in character.

Further, the divine power is infinite:

> Therefore, we believe in One God: one principle, without beginning, uncreated, unbegotten, indestructible and immortal, eternal, unlimited, uncircumscribed, unbounded, infinite in power, simple, uncompounded, incorporeal, unchanging, . . (Ibid., I, 8; PG 94, 808B-C; tr. Chase).

> And He, while being perfect God, became perfect man and accomplished the newest of all new things, the only new thing under the sun, by which the infinite power of God was clearly shown (Ibid., III, 1; PG 94, 984B; tr. Chase).[24]

The infinite power of God seems to result from the infinity of the effect of which it is the source. As in previous authors, the divine power is infinite by extrinsic denomination.

Lastly, the divine reality is called 'infinite' and 'incomprehensible' because it is above every created reality:

> The Divinity, then, is limitless and incomprehensible, and this His limitlessness and incomprehensibility is all that can be understood about Him. All that we state affirmatively about God does not show His nature, but only what relates to His nature (Ibid., I, 4; PG 94, 800B; tr. Chase).

The only thing we can comprehend about God is His infinity and incomprehensibility. Other predicates applied to Him must be derived from His effects. Moreover, John Damascene's God is Being, but just as "Being" He transcends all limited and created beings and so is above being:

> One God and one beginning of all things and not two; one Deity above every god, one essence above every essence, a goodness superior to every good, a sea of

> substance infinite and unbounded, cause of all good things, efficient power of substance, without beginning, indestructible, eternal, and uncircumscribed (De Recta Sent., 1; PG 94, 1424B-C).
>
> Now, it seems that of all the names given to God the more proper is that of He Who Is, as when in conversing with Moses on the mountain He says: 'Say to the children of Israel: He Who Is hath sent me.' For, like some limitless and boundless sea of essence, He contains all being in Himself (De Fide Orth., I, 9; PG 94, 836A-B; tr. Chase).

Since God is above being (as its source), He is an infinite sea of substance comprehending all substances within Himself. God is not an infinite sea of substance because He is pure substance, but only inasmuch as He transcends substance. His superentitative status thus gives rise to His infinity. As in the case of Plotinus, this type of infinity may well be regarded as an absolute attribute, for, since He is super-being, God is in His reality removed from the form and limitation present in created beings.[25]

The contributions of the neo-Platonists to the history of infinity are numerous. The one, good, and god are established as infinite in their realities inasmuch as they transcend the form and limitation found in the created world. God is infinite as transcending being and, hence, as non-being in much the same way that the God of Aquinas will be infinite as pure, unreceived esse. Hand in hand with this notion of infinity goes the relative infinity predicated of God as transcending His effects. The infinity of non-being is applied to matter and evil as below being and to the material world itself (by Dionysius) because of its unstable and disjointed character. Lastly, the power of God is established as infinite by extrinsic denomination. In most authors (except Proclus), this power is identified with God and, hence, is also infinite intrinsically, inasmuch as the divine reality is infinite as transcending being.

Early Middle Ages, 350-1240

Augustine[26]

The writings of Augustine contain remarkably few references to infinity. It is not usually mentioned in the lists of God's attributes,[27] and it hardly ever is discussed at length. The series of texts that we do possess has been divided by Gilson[28] into two groups, Manichean (which give Augustine's position before his conversion to Christianity) and post-Manichean (which state his Christian conception of infinity). In the first group God is viewed as spatially infinite because He is a material substance penetrating all created things:

> ita etiam te, uita uitae meae, grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi molem et extra eam quaquauersum per inmensa sine termino, ut haberet te terra, haberet caelum, haberent omnia et illa finirentur in te, tu autem nusquam. sicut autem luci solis non obsisteret aeris corpus, aeris huius, qui supra terram est, quominus per eum traiceretur penetrans eum non dirrumpendo aut concidendo, sed implendo eum totum, sic tibi putabam non solum caeli et aeris et maris, sed etiam terrae corpus peruium et ex omnibus maximis minimisque partibus penetrabile ad capiendam praesentiam tuam, occulta inspiratione intrinsecus et extrinsecus administrante omnia, quae creasti (*Conf.*, VII, 1, 2; CSEL 33, 141-42).

> et feci unam massam grandem distinctam generibus corporum creaturam tuam, siue re uera quae corpora erant, siue quae ipse pro spiritibus finxeram, et eam

> feci grandem, non quantum erat, quod scire non poteram, sed quantum libuit, undiqueuersum sane finitam, te autem, domine, ex omni parte ambientem et penetrantem eam, sed usquequaque infinitum, tamquam si mare esset ubique et undique per inmensa infinitum solum mare et haberet intra se spongiam quamlibet magnam, sed finitam tamen, plena esset utique spongia illa ex omni sua parte ex inmenso mari: sic creaturam tuam finitam te infinito plenam putabam et dicebam: . . (*Ibid.*, v, 2; CSEL 33, 146).

Augustine, while still a Manichean, thought of God as an immense corporeal sea, spatially extended so as to include all things; the world, like a sponge, is made finite by being contained by Him. Thus, God is a huge material substance quantitatively infinite, like the first principles of some of the pre-Socratics.

This view was repudiated by Augustine at the time of his conversion, which was also the occasion of his contact with neo-Platonism:

> et evigilaui in te et uide te infinitum aliter, et uisus iste non a carne trahebatur (*Ibid.*, xiv, 20; CSEL 33, 160).

The notion of God that arose in Augustine's mind after he ceased to be a Manichean was that of an incorporeal substance transcending all limitations of place:

> et aliter dicitur totum, quod incorporeum est, quia sine finibus locorum intellegitur, ut et totum et infinitum dici possit: totum propter integritatem, infinitum, quia locorum finibus non ambitur (*Ep.* 118, iv, 24; CSEL 34, 688).
>
> Sed tunc lectis Platonicorum illis libris posteaquam inde admonitus quaerere incorpoream ueritatem inuisibilia tua per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspexi et repulsus sensi, quid per tenebras animae meae contemplari non sinerer, certus esse te et infinitum esse nec tamen per locos finitos infinitosue diffundi et uere te esse, qui semper idem ipse esses, ex nulla parte nulloque motu alter aut aliter, cetera uero ex te esse omnia, hoc solo firmissimo documento, quia sunt, certus quidem in istis eram, nimis tamen

> infirmus ad fruendum te (*Conf.*, VII, xx, 26; CSEL 33, 165-66).[29]

God, no longer spatially extended, is infinite as transcending place.

A second use of 'infinite' appears to relate to the human inability to conceive of God:

> Cogita quantum uis. Quando autem potest cogitari, qui capi non potest? *Laudabilis* est *ualde*; *et magnitudinis eius non est finis*. . . . Verumtamen, quia *magnitudinis eius non est finis*, et eum quem non capimus, laudare debemus (si enim capimus, magnitudinis eius est finis; si autem magnitudinis eius non est finis, capere ex eo aliquid possumus; Deum tamen totum capere non possumus); tamquam deficientes in eius magnitudine, ut reficiamur eius bonitate, ad opera respiciamus, et de operibus laudemus operantem, de conditis Conditorem, de creatura Creatorem (*Enarr. in Ps.* CXLIV, iv, 5-6; CC 40, 2091-92).

We are unable to comprehend the spiritual magnitude of God, which is then infinite because it is unknowable to us.

Thirdly, the divine power is infinite, again as transcending human cognition:

> manifestum est enim omnium rerum descriptionem et modum ab illa ⟨sapientia⟩ fieri eamque non incongrue dici infinitam non per spatia locorum sed per potentiam, quae cognitione humana comprehendi non potest, . . (*Ep.* 118, iv, 24; CSEL 34, 687).

Incomprehensibility to the created mind seems to be the ground for attributing infinity to the power of God, though, in another work, Augustine hints that some relationship can be established between the quantity of God's effects and His power:

> Deus itaque supra omnem creaturae modum est, supra omnem speciem, supra omnem ordinem: nec spatiis locorum supra est, sed ineffabili et singulari potentia, a quo omnis modus, omnis species, omnis ordo (*De Nat. Boni*, I, 3; PL 42, 553).

Immediately after asserting that the divine wisdom is infinite in power, Augustine goes on in Ep. 118 to assure us that the divine wisdom is not infinite as lacking form:

> . . . neque quod informe aliquid sit ipsa sapientia; hoc enim corporum est, ut, quaecumque infinita fuerit, sint et informia (loc. cit.).

Augustine does not side with Plotinus in asserting that the divine wisdom is infinite as above form and being: Augustine's God is Being.

A fourth type of infinity appears in Augustine's discussion of the Trinity:

> In illa enim Trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium, et perfectissima pulchritudo, et beatissima delectatio. Itaque illa tria, et ad se invicem determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt. Sed hic in rebus corporeis, non tantum est res una quantum tres simul, et plus aliquid sunt duae quam una res: caeterum in illa summa Trinitate tantum est una quantum tres simul, nec plus aliquid sunt duae quam una. Et in se infinita sunt. Ita et singula sunt in singulis, et omnia in singulis, et singula in omnibus, et omnia in omnibus, et unum omnia (De Trin., VI, x, 12; PL 42, 932).

Sweeney has argued convincingly that 'infinite' in such texts means indistinct according to essence and not merely incorporeal.[30] Thus, this use probably represents a fourth (technical) meaning of 'infinite' in Augustine.

In his post-Manichean period, Augustine uses 'infinity' in at least four ways: (1) God is infinite as transcending place; As incomprehensible, God is infinite (2) in His reality and (3) in His power; (4) Since the persons of the Trinity are identical with the divine nature, the persons are infinite as indistinct in essence. Notably absent from the list, considering Augustine's acquaintance with neo-Platonism, are arguments supporting the infinity of the divine power from the infinity of its effects, and the attribution of absolute infinity to the divine being.

Peter Lombard[31]

In a survey of the important writings of the second half of the twelfth century, Sweeney has discovered remarkably few occurrences of the term 'infinite': It is absent or mentioned only in passing by the author of the *Ysagoge in Theologiam*, Robert of Melun, Peter of Poitiers, and Stephen Langton.[32] The *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, however, do contain at least six references to infinity.

The first two texts are drawn from Hilary of Poitiers. In *I Sent.*, d. 9, c. 4, "Utrum debeat dici: Semper gignitur Filius, vel semper genitus est", Peter quotes the following from Hilary's *De Trinitate*:[33]

> Si quid igitur ei, qui ab aeterno Patre natus est, ex aeternitate defuerit, id ipsum auctori non est ambiguum defuisse, quia si gignenti est infinitum gignere, et nascenti etiam est infinitum nasci (Quaracchi, I, 71-72).

The word 'infinite' here quite clearly means 'eternal', a usage that is usual for Hilary[34] and seems also to appear in his *De Trinitate*, VIII, quoted by Lombard in *I Sent.*, d. 8, c. 8:

> Idem ⟨Hilarius⟩ in VIII libro *De Trinitate*:[35] «Non humano modo ex compositis Deus est, ut in eo aliud sit quod ab eo habetur, et aliud sit ipse qui habeat, sed totum vita est, natura scilicet perfecta et infinita et non ex disparibus constituta, sed vivens ipsa per totum» (Quaracchi, I, 64).

Secondly, infinity is predicated of the divine power:

> Quidam tamen ⟨de suo sensu gloriantes, Dei potentiam coarctare sub mensura conati sunt. Cum enim dicunt: Hucusque potest Deus et non amplius, quid est hoc aliud, quam eius potentiam, quae infinita est, restringere et

> concludere ad mensuram? Aiunt enim: Non potest Deus aliud facere, quam facit, nec melius facere id quod facit, nec aliquid praetermittere de his quae facit» (*Ibid.*, d. 43, c. un.; Quaracchi, I, 263).[36]

At the end of the previous distinction, Lombard argued that, since God is able to do whatever He wishes, He is all-powerful:

> Ideo igitur vere ac proprie Deus Trinitas omnipotens dicitur, quia per se, id est naturali potentia, potest quidquid vult fieri, et quidquid vult se posse (d. 42, c. 3; Quaracchi, I, 263).

The infinite power attributed to Him in distinction 43, then, probably follows from the infinity of His effects: God has infinite power because He can do whatever He wishes--hence, by extrinsic denomination.

Infinity is also attributed to the wisdom of God:

> Si enim ibi ⟨in Trinitate⟩ deesset potentia, vel sapientia, vel bonitas, non esset summum bonum. Sed quid ibi est perfecta potentia, infinita sapientia, incomprehensibilis bonitas, recte dicitur et creditur summum bonum (*Ibid.*, d. 34, c. 3; Quaracchi, I, 218).

Unfortunately, no explanation is given of the attribution, but we may suppose that it follows from the divine wisdom's comprehension of all things[37] and, hence, that it is made by extrinsic denomination.

Lastly, Lombard quotes two passages from Augustine's *De Trinitate*, VI, 10, in which the divine persons are said to be infinite in themselves but determinate with respect to each other:

> «In rebus corporeis non tantum est una, quantum tres simul, et plus sunt duae quam una res; in Trinitate vero summa tantum est una persona, quantum tres simul, et tantum sunt duae, quantum una, et in se infinitae sunt», quia *non est finis magnitudinis* earum (*Ibid.*, d. 19, c. 12; Quaracchi, I, 137).

> Itaque illa tria ⟨*sc.* personae⟩ et a se invicem determinari videntur, et in se infinita sunt (*Ibid.*, d. 31, c. 2; Quaracchi, I, 193).

As we conjectured in the preceding section, 'infinite' probably means 'undistinguished in nature' in the Augustinian text. However, the additional explanation (quia non est finis magnitudinis earum) added to the first text suggests that Lombard may here be giving 'infinite' the meaning of 'not understandable or limited by place', which is the interpretation he gives to the scriptural text in another work: ". . . magnitudinis ejus non est finis, quia incomprehensibilis est cognitione vel loco" (Comm. in Ps. 144, 3; PL 191, 1263A). The second text causes more difficulty, as no interpretation of it is offered by Lombard. It may mean 'indistinguished in nature' (as in Augustine), 'incomprehensible in thought or place' (as in d. 19, c. 12), or simply 'eternal' (as in d. 9, c. 4 and d. 8, c. 8).

The texts discovered in Peter Lombard's Sentences reveal three or four types of divine infinity: (1) Applied to the nature and wisdom of God it is equivalent to 'eternity'; (2) The divine power and wisdom are infinite by extrinsic denomination; Predicated of the Trinity, it means (3) 'incomprehensible by thought or place' and possibly also (4) 'undistinguished in nature'. In none of the texts does it indicate an absence of internal limitation (as it did for the neo-Platonists), nor is it applied absolutely to the divine reality.

William of Auvergne

The first thirteen chapters of William of Auvergne's De Trinitate[38] contain a proof for the existence of God based upon the distinction between essence and existence and their positions as principles in God and creatures. God is conceived as having an *esse* that is the same as His essence[39] and (with Avicenna) as *necesse esse*, standing in opposition to the *possibile esse* received by creatures. Though God is *esse* itself, His *esse* is not called 'infinite' by William.[40] Nor is the power of wisdom of God held to be infinite in any sense.[41]

In Part II of the *De Universo*[42] William takes up divine infinity in its relation to agents and passions. There is an infinite distance between the power, wisdom, goodness and beauty of the creature and those of the creator:

> Quaelibet enim rerum creatarum quantumcumque propinqua sublimitate sua et nobilitate videatur creatori, in infinitum tamen remota est ab eo, et distans ab eodem distantia infinita, cujus distantiae exempla sunt, quae ponam. Haec autem sunt infinita minoritas sive minoritatis incomparabilitas. Non enim dicendum est nec dici vere potest de quacumque ex creaturis quod duplo vel triplo minor est ejus potentia quam potentia creatoris, vel quod, si cresceret in centuplum vel milletuplum, perveniret ad aequalitatem potentiae creatoris, et ita in infinitum, Atque eodem modo de sapientia, bonitate, et pulchritudine, quantumcumque sublimis atque nobilis creaturae (II *De Universo*, II, lxv; Paris, 1674, I, 915aA-B).

The creature's power, wisdom, goodness, and beauty are infinitely removed from those of the creator; they are incomparable, and the one could never attain to the other. It is clear from this, William thinks, not only that the creator is infinite, but also that He is super-infinite:

> Apparet etiam tibi per vias istas infinitas et immensitas creatoris et insuper excellentia illa, qua dixit eum Avicenna super finitum et infinitum, super perfectum et imperfectum, super completum et diminutum. Jam enim alibi[43] didicisti, quia aggregatum ex infinitis suae speciei, vel sui generis, necesse est esse infinitum, quemadmodum lineam rectam ex infinitis tantis lineis rectis aggregatam necesse est infinitam esse, . . (*Ibid.*, B-C).

The creator Himself is super-infinite as the aggregate of infinite power, wisdom, and beauty. The argument is related to the infinity of the virtues at the end of the chapter:

> Jam etiam declaravi tibi in tractatu singulari De Virtutibus,[44] tam naturalibus quam gratuitis quam etiam consuetudinalibus, quod virtutes gratiae in infinitum majores sunt quam virtutes naturae et etiam quam vitia. Quanto fortius igitur virtutes gloriae in infinitum majores erunt et illis quae sunt naturae et illis quae sunt gratiae? Non enim possibile est minus supereminere gloriam gratiae quam gratiam naturae. Cum igitur, sicut apparet tibi ex his, omnia quae sunt gloriae infinita sint ad omnia quae citra vel infra sunt, quanto fortius gloriosus creator erit infinitus et etiam supra infinitum ad omnia illa quae sunt gloriae. Infinitus enim ad infinita non tantum infinitus est, sed supra infinitum et plusquam infinitus (Ibid., 916bE).

Just as the virtues of grace were said elsewhere to be infinite with respect to the virtues of nature, so also are the virtues of glory infinite to the virtues of grace and the creator infinite--and even super-infinite--with respect to them.

But are God, His power, wisdom, goodness, and the virtues of grace and glory absolutely infinite? The question is raised in an objection at the beginning of the next chapter. William replies:

> Respondeo, quia revera non ex hac causa, quia infinitum est aliquid ad aliud, necesse est ipsum esse infinitum simpliciter. Hujus exemplum evidentissimum est ab omni linea et quolibet suo puncto, et in angulo recto et in angulo contingentiae. Tu enim scis quantitates hujusmodi diversarum esse manerierum. Verum si scientia de una re ad aliam scientiam de eadem est infinita, dico quia necesse est ipsam esse infinitam; quemadmodum si linea una recta ad aliam quamcumque rectam infinita est, necesse est ipsam esse simpliciter infinitam (c. lxvi, p. 916bF-G).

The distinction drawn between absolute and relative infinity is as follows: If something is infinite with respect to some member of the same species, it is absolutely infinite. If it is infinite only with respect to what belongs to another species, it is only relatively infinite. On this account, of course, wisdom, the virtues, etc. are absolutely infinite (infinite with respect to things of the same species below them) and God is super-infinite (infinite with respect to the infinite wisdom, virtues, etc.). Absolute infinity defined in this way remains entirely dependent upon what lies below; it is really what we have been calling 'relative infinity'.

In chapter 7 of his De Anima,[45] William considers the question whether the human soul can acquire all perfections, arts, and knowledge. It cannot do so, according to William, because this would require an infinite time:

> Quapropter manifestum est quia si finita est virtus intellectiva animae humanae quantum ad suum esse, sive vitam sive existentiam, impossibile est ut sit eidem infinita virtus et potentia naturaliter ac infinitus profectus quales praedixi (Ibid., pars III; Paris, 1674, II, 158b).

The human soul cannot have an infinite power, because it is limited "ad suum esse, sive vitam sive existentiam". What is to be understood by the infinite power and the infinite esse, life, and existence it necessitates? Strength of power is connected with unity:

> Amplius unaquaeque substantia impartibili nihil possibile est esse fortius et potentius de his quae ejus sunt quam ipsa sit (Ibid.).

As in neo-Platonism, the efficacy of a power follows from the unity of the substance in which it is contained: powers diminish as things fall away from the One. An infinite power is precisely one to whose operations there is no limit:

> Debes autem scire et intentionem potentiae infinitae in parte ista: potentia namque est infinita in operatione sua quae non habet ultimum in operationibus (Ibid., 159a).

The infinity of the power is connected with the eternity of the substance possessing it: only an eternal substance can last long enough to produce effects without end. Thus, only a substance without parts can possess infinite power, because it alone is not susceptible to disintegration:

> Similiter nihil esse durabilius aut longioris existentiae quam ipsa ⟨substantia impartibilis⟩ vel suum esse. Quapropter impossibile aliquid ipsius infinitum esse ipsa existentia finita. Necesse igitur est operationes ipsius finitas esse secundum utrumque modum, quod est dicere et numero et tempore, si ipsa finita est secundum vitam suam vel tempus (Ibid., 158b-59a).

Infinitude of substance, life, esse, and existence seems to be freedom from temporal limitations. Infinitude of power is clearly stated to be ability to produce effects without end. The connection between the two is obvious if the texts are interpreted in this way.

Divine infinity in William of Auvergne thus seems to have three basic senses: (1) The divine goodness, beauty, wisdom, and power are infinite as above members of their species on lower levels, while God is super-infinite, as the aggregate of His infinite attributes and as above the virtues of glory; (2) The divine power is infinite because it is able to produce an endless number of effects (if we interpret the De Anima text as applying to God); (3) The divine substance, esse, existence, and life are infinite as eternal. All three uses of 'infinite' are relative--the first to finite substances, the second to the infinity of effects, the third to temporal limitations. William of Auvergne, although he has developed a metaphysics of being, has not gone beyond the twelfth-century doctrine of divine infinity.[46]

Thirteenth Century, 1240-1300

Richard Fishacre[47]

The Commentary on the Sentences of Richard Fishacre, written at Oxford about 1245, takes up divine infinity in commenting on distinction 2, c. 1 of Lombard's text. The problem is considered in four questions: (1) Whether God is infinite; (2) In how many ways He is called 'infinite'; (3) How infinity and "numerosity" are compatible with highest simplicity; (4) How the rational creature, with its finite power, can attain to the divine infinite.[48]

Three ways in which God is infinite are set out in the first question:

> Quod sit infinitus patet, tum in potentia, tum in sapientia, tum in bonitate.
>
> ⟨1⟩ In potentia, quod patet sic. Quantum distant quod fit et ex quo fit, tanta est potentia facientis. Sed cum facerit materiam primam de nihilo, inter factum et id ex quo fit est distantia infinita, sicut inter aliquid et nihil, quae distant sicut affirmatio et negatio. Ergo potentia facientis est infinita. Unde Ps.: "Et magnitudinis eius non est finis" (ed. Ermatinger, ll. 8-15).

God is infinite in power, wisdom, and goodness. The infinity of the divine power is defended with an appeal to the infinite distance that separates nothing from what is, and the infinite power required to bridge such a gap. By this argument, one can arrive only at an infinity relative to the distance between nothing and something, Hence, infinity is here predicated of the divine power only by extrinsic denomination. A second argument for the infinity of God's power depends on that power's being infinitely greater than any creaturely power:

> Item, potentia cuiuscumque creaturae non potest aequari potentiae creatoris simpla; item, nec duplicata; item, nec triplicata, et sic in infinitum: quia haec quantumcumque multiplicata, potest esse potentia creaturae. Ergo potentia creatoris est infinita (*Ibid.*, ll. 16-19).

The power of the creator infinitely exceeds that of the creature and, hence, must itself be infinite. The infinity of the divine power is again relative and predicated only by extrinsic denomination.

The arguments for the infinity of God's wisdom and goodness are likewise dependent upon something foreign to God:

> ⟨2⟩ In sapientia, quod patet sic. Figurae et dispositiones artificiati indicant sapientiam artificis. Sed in minima atomo sunt figurae infinitae. Ergo et sapientia artificis divini, a qua haec sunt, est infinita. Unde Ps.: "Sapientiae eius non est numerus."
>
> ⟨3⟩ In bonitate, quod patet sic. Bonitatis est nudum indigentem vestire et egenti id quo indiget exhibere; et infinitae bonitatis egenti infinitis infinita quibus indiget conferre. Sed materia prima nuda appetit et indiget infinitis vestiri formis, ut figuris in atomo. Ergo infinitae bonitatis est Deus, qui eam infinitis vestivit. Eccl. 2: "Secundum magnitudinem illius, sic et misericordia eius cum ipso est." Sed magnitudo, ut praediximus, est infinita; ergo et misericordia (*Ibid.*, ll. 20-30).

God's wisdom is infinite because it must contain infinite shapes that are imposed upon matter by God. His goodness is infinite because He has conferred infinite forms and shapes upon prime matter, which stands in need of them. Both of these predications of 'infinite' occur by extrinsic denomination. Further, they are both dependent upon the infinity of the divine power. For, if there are infinite forms in prime matter, these forms must be conferred upon matter by an infinitely good God, who must also have infinite wisdom containing this infinity and infinite power to impose them.

In the *solutio* to the first question,[49] Richard concedes that these arguments are correct. His solution to the second question[50] affirms that God is infinite in intension (as having infinitely intense power), extension (as omnipresent), duration (as eternal), and numerosity (as having an infinite number of truths), though all of these are ascribed to God in an improper way. Richard denies that God is infinitely divisible in any sense.

The solutio to the third question takes up the arguments that numerosity is in conflict with the divine simplicity, but it treats them rather from the point of view of the relation between infinity and simplicity. First of all, quantitative infinity is clearly precluded by the divine simplicity, though infinity of power is not.[51] But infinity of power can be considered in two ways: (1) A power may be infinite by infinite addition of power, and this cannot be in God;[52] (2) A power may be infinite on account of being infinitely distant from impediments, i.e. matter:

> Aliter autem intelligitur plus de virtute non facta additione ad virtutem, sed potius ea elongata ab impediente et faciente eam in potentia et minus in actu; et hoc est a materia (Ibid., ll. 298-300).

The case is similar to light, which is more powerful because it is incorporeal, and to the rational soul, which is more simple and more removed from the body and, hence, more powerful than the sensitive soul.[53] Therefore, an infinite power will be one that is infinitely removed from matter and most simple:

> Si ergo dicatur infinitum virtualiter non propter infinitam additionem virtuti, sed propter infinitam elongationem ab impedimentis et a materia, patet quod sic infinitum virtualiter non repugnat, immo congruit magis simplicitati. . . .
>
> Quia ergo Deus in se simplex est et carens compositione cum alio, ut sit pars compositi, patet quod est infinitus virtualiter, non propter additiones virtutis

> factas in infinitum, sed potius quia in infinitum elongatus est ab impedimentis et materia, cum sit substantia omnino separata (Ibid., ll. 322-331; italics added).

God has infinite power precisely because He is totally separated from every other substance and, hence, is without composition. As completely simple, He has infinite power.

The solution to the third question takes us beyond the realm of infinity by extrinsic denomination. For the first time, so far as is now known, an author has predicated infinity of God absolutely on account of the simplicity of His being and without reference to anything extrinsic to it. The writings of Richard Fishacre were known to Richard Rufus, Simon of Hinton, Kilwardby, St. Bonaventure, and Gerard of Abbeville.[54] In the two of these (Bonaventure, Gerard) that have already been investigated, we find a doctrine of absolute infinity. Whether Richard was actually the first master who taught absolute infinity, or whether one of his predecessors at Oxford is responsible for the innovation is still in doubt, but Richard's influence on Bonaventure and Gerard is quite clear.[55]

Albert the Great[56]

The Commentary on the Sentences of Albert of Cologne contains a large number of passages on infinity. These texts apply infinity to the divine power and wisdom as well as to the Trinity and God.

At In I Sent., d. 1B, the power of God is said to be infinite:

> Ad aliud dicendum, quod infinitum attingi quidem potest, sed aliquid ejus semper manet extra attingentem: et ideo in eo quod est infinitum dicitur non attingi: et hoc sic patere potest: Infinitum in quantitate est (ut dicit Philosophus) cujus partes accipienti semper est aliquid extra accipere. In spirituali autem natura increata non

> est infinitum in quantitate molis, sed quantitas virtutis dividitur ad extra, secundum ea in quae potest: et ideo intellectus attingens Deum attingit ipsum, ita quod multum et infinitum virtutis semper est extra ipsum: et quia virtus sua est essentia sua, ideo etiam immensitas essentiae est extra intellectum((a. 15, ad 8; Borgnet, 25, 36b).

God is infinite in power because He has an infinite number of effects. Further, inasmuch as the divine power is identical with the divine essence, both of these, as infinite, must be outside the comprehension of the human intellect. (The created intellect is able to comprehend the divine essence under the aspect of simplicity, see ad 10; Borgnet, 25, 37a.) The power of God is thus called 'infinite' by extrinsic denomination, from the multitude of its effects.

Distinction 9A of the same book applies infinity to God Himself:

> Aeternitas est quodammodo infinita, et quodammodo non infinita, et similiter Deus vel durans esse divinum. Si enim accipiatur esse divinum infinitum privative, scilicet quod aptum natum est habere finem et non habens: sic nec Deus nec aeternitas sunt infinita. Si autem accipiatur negative, id est, non finitum: iterum potest accipi dupliciter, scilicet quod non finitur, eo quod sit in partibus sine fine protensum: et hoc modo non dicitur infinitus Deus vel aeternitas ejus. Sed dicitur infinitus Deus et aeternitas ejus, eo quod utrumque totum simul existens, non defuit, nec deest, nec deerit, et hoc est infinitum quod conficitur statu perfectissimi quod nihil a se abjicit, nec aliquid accipit: et hoc infinitum non contrariatur rationi mensurae et mensurati, sed infinitum primo et secundo modo acceptum (a. 2, sol.; Borgnet, 25, 273a).

Eternity is infinite, not privatively, but negatively, for it is not naturally constituted to end. Both God and His eternity are infinite as existing at the same time and absent in no time. 'Infinite' is here equivalent to 'eternal'.

Since it is beyond any limitation by a creature, the divine power is infinite. Moreover, the powers of the persons of the

Trinity must all be infinite:

> Cum dicitur virtus Patris esse infinita, non intelligitur infinita, quia sic virtus sua excederet ipsum: sed intelligitur infinita, eo quod non finitur extrinseco aliquo: et hujus ratio supra est explanata: et hoc modo infinitum quod sibi finitissimum est, habet aequale, licet non habeat aequale extra suam essentiam: unde sic virtus Filii aequatur virtuti Patris, et e converso (Ibid., d. 19A, a. 1, ad 4; Borgnet, 25, 512a).[57]

The essences of the Father and Son are identical. If God's essence is the same as His power, the power of the Son must also be infinite. Infinity by extrinsic denomination is thus extended to the powers of the persons of the Trinity. One peculiarity of this text should be noted: although God's power is infinite with respect to everything outside Himself, He is "most finite" with respect to Himself. This further emphasizes the relative nature of divine infinity in Albert.

Infinity is also ascribed to the divine wisdom:

> Et sua scientia hoc modo infinita est: quia nihil potest cogitari vel esse, quod si esset, non esset in scientia ipsius, et modo secundum quod est in scientia sua: quia ipse intelligendo se infinita posse, intelligit infinita secundum quod sunt infinita in potentia (Ibid., d. 39A, a. 4, sol.; Borgnet, 26, 296b-97a).[58]

God has power over an infinite number of things inasmuch as none of His effects puts an end to His power.[59] Therefore, God's knowledge of His power is infinite, because He thereby knows an infinite number of things. Both the divine wisdom and the divine power are infinite by extrinsic denomination.

God Himself is infinite because He is uncomprehended by any place, time, or intellect:

> Si vero dicatur infinitum in genere extrinseci, hoc est, quod nihil est extra ipsum quod finiat ipsum: sic Deus est infinitus: eo quod nec loco, nec tempore, nec comprehensione intellectus finitur (Ibid., d. 2A, a. 2, ad 2; Borgnet, 25, 56b).

As uncircumscribed by place and time and uncomprehended by the created intellect, God is infinite. God comprehends Himself, however, and therefore must be finite to Himself:

> Infinitatem enim Dei quae non mensuratur aliquo extrinseco claudente ipsam, . . , ipsa anima Christi non claudit comprehendendo: sed solus Deus comprehendit se, quia sibi soli ipse finitus est, eo quod nihil de se est extra seipsum (In III Sent., d. 14A, a. 1, sol.; Borgnet, 28, 255a).

Infinite to everything else, God is finite with respect to Himself, for He comprehends Himself as a whole. According to this account, God can only be relatively infinite, with respect to something extrinsic to Himself.

The Commentary on the Sentences adheres to the traditional twelfth-century uses of 'infinite': (1) The divine wisdom and power are infinite by extrinsic denomination; (2) The divine essence is infinite as eternal; (3) God is infinite as beyond the limitations of place, time, or the created intellect, though inasmuch as He comprehends Himself, He is most finite to Himself. In the Commentary on the Sentences, infinity remains dependent on and relative to things external to the reality of God.

In a later work, Albert seems to ascribe absolute infinity to the divine being. Replying to an objection that if God is infinite He is unknowable, Albert distinguishes three types of infinity: (1) that which is potential only, i.e. the infinite in size, (2) that which is potential and actual, i.e. the infinitely divisible, (3) that which is in act only.[60] Of the third he writes:

> Infinitum autem quod est actus nihil habens potentiae passivae, non dividitur ad intra, sed ad extra, ut sic dicam, potest in unum, potest in duo, potest in tria, et sic de aliis. Et si infinitum est, non est accipere in

> tali processu ultimum in quo stat virtus ejus, ita quod non posset in amplius. Et tale infinitum quia actus est purus in se, et non est in potentia nisi id quod est extra se, secundum se est maxime intelligibile, nobis autem incomprehensibile propter infinitatem potentiae et essentiae, quibus excellit ea in quae potest: hoc autem attingi potest per intellectum, sed non comprehendi (*In I P. Sum. Theol.*, tr. 3, q. 14, m. 1, ad 2; Borgnet, 31, 71a).

A power infinite in act is one that never fails to have power over anything further. The infinity of such a power is linked to its pure actuality and lack of internal potency. Further, the power and essence of such a cause are identical, and hence both are infinite as pure act. In this text we seem to have the same view of the infinity of the divine essence and power that is present in Fishacre's *Commentary on the Sentences*: God is infinite as without any internal limitations of potency, and so is absolutely infinite.

Bonaventure[61]

The *Commentary on the Sentences* of Bonaventure contains what is quite clearly a doctrine of absolute infinity. Infinity is to be applied to both power and essence, according to Bonaventure:

> In deo idem est essentia quod virtus, et utraque est infinita.
>
> Ideo dicendum quod duplex est infinitum: unum, quod se habet per oppositionem ad simplex; et tale non capitur a finito, quale est infinitum molis; aliud est, quod habet infinitatem cum simplicitate, ut Deus; et tale infinitum, quia simplex, est ubique totum, quia infinitum, in nullo sic est, quin extra illud sit. Sic intelligendum est in cognitione Dei. Et ideo non sequitur, quod si cognoscitur totus quod comprehendatur, quia intellectus eius totalitatem non includit, sicut nec creatura immensitatem (*In I Sent.*, d. 3, p. 1, a. un., q. 1, ad 3; Quaracchi, I, 49b-50a).

In God essence and power are identical and, hence, both are infinite.

God is infinite in a way different from quantity, for His infinity follows from His wholeness and simplicity, not from His lack of something (as is the case in creatures). The simplicity that implies infinity in God is that which belongs to a pure form:

> Ad illud quod obicitur ad infinitate, dicendum, quod est infinitas ex defectu perfectionis, et haec competit materiae sed non Deo; et est infinitas ex privatione limitationis, et haec Deo et formae liberrimae, non materiae competit; et ita patet illud (*Ibid.*, d. 19, p. 2, a. un., q. 3, ad 4; Quaracchi, I, 289b).

Infinity in God is not the privation of limitation but the highest perfection, following upon uncreated, uncomposed, and unlimited being:

> Infinitas autem per excessum non potest simpliciter esse in creatura, quoniam habet esse creatum et compositum et limitatum; Deus autem nihil horum habet, et ideo habet infinitatem, et haec est summae perfectionis (*Ibid.*, d. 35, a. un., q. 5, ad 4; Quaracchi, I, 488a).[62]

The divine being is infinite because it is removed from all imperfection resulting from composition with matter and potency; it is infinite as simple. This type of divine infinity does not depend on comparison with anything--it is ascribed to the divine being because of its lack of internal limitation; hence, absolutely.

Distinction 43 treats the infinity of the divine power. Bonaventure knows and uses the arguments for infinity of power by extrinsic denomination. For, in the first question of the distinction, he shows that the divine power is infinite because there is no limit to its capability or to the number of its effects, and because it can conserve creatures over an infinite time and bridge the infinite gap between nothing and something.[63] But Bonaventure also argues from the simplicity of the divine power to its infinity. God has a power that is identical with His essence:

> Item, omnis potentia, quae omnino indifferens est ab essentia, est infinita; sed divina potentia est huiusmodi: ergo, etc. Probatio primae: quandocumque aliqua duo sunt omnino indistantia, ubicumque est unum, et reliquum: ergo si potentia est omnino indifferens ab essentia, ubicumque est potentia, et essentia. Sed ubi est essentia, ibi est centrum potentiae: ergo ubicumque potest potentia talis, potest ut in centro: ergo cum nulla potentia limitetur in centro suo, sed amplius possit, aut divina potentia nihil potest aut potest quantum vult, et sic in infinitum: ergo, quantum est de se, potentia illa potest in infinitis operari. Sed potentia illa omnino est indifferens et simplex: ergo idem est ibi latum et intensum: ergo si extensive est infinita, et intensive: ergo omnino est infinita. Et hoc est, quod dicit Philosophus, in libro De causis, quod «virtus quanto magis unita, tanto magis infinita». Cum ergo divina potentia sit unitissima, quia est omnino idem cum sua origine, ubique potest tamquam in sua origine: ergo numquam invenit non posse (*Ibid.*, a. un., q. 1, arg. e; Quaracchi, I, 605b-606a).[64]

The power of God is infinite both intensively and extensively, because He and His power are identical. For, since His power is one in the highest degree, it must also be infinite, in accordance with the neo-Platonic principle (*De Causis*, prop. 16). The infinity of the divine power thus follows from the simplicity and unity of the divine essence. Infinity of power is predicated of God by intrinsic denomination in this text.

In the second question of the same distinction, Bonaventure again treats the question whether the divine essence is infinite. It can be shown to be infinite, because it is equal to and identical with the infinite divine power, because it is that than which a greater cannot be thought, or because it is not like the finite good in being made better by addition of goods or in having the possibility of being equal to another good.[65] But further the proofs advanced for the infinity of God's power will also apply to His essence:

> Sed iterum ista positio non potest stare, quoniam, sicut supra probatum est de potentia, quod ipsa non habet statum in possendo, et iterum, est omnino actu, et ideo ponitur vere infinita, sic etiam probari potest de essentia (Ibid., q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 609b).

The unfailingness and pure actuality of the divine essence imply its infinity, just as these characteristics led to the infinity of the divine power.

For Bonaventure, then, God is absolutely infinite in power and essence. Does this infinity represent something positive or only negative? At the end of the responsio to q. 2, he divides the meanings of 'infinite' from the side of the end and from the side of the negation, for "infinitum dicitur per abnegationem finis" (Ibid., p. 610a):

1. A parte finis
    - a. Finis is completion; 'infinite' is predicated through privation of completion.
    - b. Finis is boundary: 'infinite' is predicated through lack of boundary.
2. A parte negationis
    - a. Privation of completion.
    - b. Negation of boundary (Ibid.).

Of (2b), he writes:

> Alio modo negative, quod non habet terminum nec est natum habere; et hoc modo ponitur in Deo propter summam immensitatem (Ibid.).

'Infinite' is predicated of God by way of negation of an end that He is not naturally constituted to possess, although it is predicated on account of His supreme immensity. Further, this immensity seems to be something positive on the real level:

> Quod ultimo obicitur, solutum est; obicit enim de infinito, secundum quod dicitur privative; sed prout dicitur de Deo, non dicit privationem secundum rem, sed solum quantum ad modum significandi; et respondet ei summa positio. Nihil enim dicitur immensum nisi quod habet summam et perfectissimam actualitatem et nihil coarctans et determinans. Unde etsi videatur dici privative, tamen secundum veritatem excludit omnem privationem (Ibid., ad 6; Quaracchi, I, 611a).

'Infinite' is said privatively only by the mode of signifying. What corresponds to it on the real level is a "supreme position", perfect in the highest degree. Bonaventure does not develop the idea of infinity as a position, but uses it only to destroy the objection that 'infinite' is said privatively in God. The explanation of the doctrine does not occur until later in the century.

Thomas Aquinas[66]

Distinction 43 of the first book of Thomas' Commentary on the Sentences contains an article devoted to the question "Utrum potentia Dei sit infinita".[67] The solution of the article opens with the usual distinction of the meanings of 'infinite' into privative and negative; only in the latter way can 'infinite' be predicated of God.[68] Further, 'end' or 'terminus' has two meanings that must be distinguished: (1) On the one hand, it may indicate the terminus of a quantity, and in this way it is asserted of a quantity by position and denied of it by privation; (2) On the other, it may apply to the essence of a thing:

> Unde illud quod significat essentiam rei vocatur definitio vel terminus; et sic dicitur unumquodque finiri per illud quod determinat vel contrahit essentiam suam;
>
> sicut natura generis, quae de se est indifferens ad multa, finitur per unam differentiam;
>
> et materia prima, quae de se est indifferens ad omnes formas, unde et infinita dicitur, finitur per formam;

> et similiter forma, quae, quantum in se est, potest perficere diversas partes materiae, finitur per materiam in qua recipitur.
> Et a negatione talis finis essentia divina infinita dicitur (Ibid., q. 1, a. 1, sol.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 1003).

The nature of a genus is normally contracted by the last differentia, matter by form and form by matter. In the absence of their perfecting principles, each of these is to be called 'infinite'. It is by the negation of such a limit that God is infinite. However, His infinity follows not from His being an unreceived form (nor, of course, prime matter or a genus), but from His having an unreceived esse:

> Et ideo illud quod habet esse absolutum et nullo modo receptum in aliquo, immo ipsemet est suum esse, illud est infinitum simpliciter; et ideo essentia ejus infinita est, et bonitas ejus, et quidquid aliud de eo dicitur; quia nihil eorum limitatur ad aliquid, sicut quod recipitur in aliquo limitatur ad capacitatem ejus (Ibid.).

God is infinite because He is identical with His esse, which is received in nothing. As totally unreceived, His attributes must also be infinite. Clearly, this type of infinity, since it follows upon unreceived and subsistent esse, belongs absolutely to God. Moreover, the infinity of the divine attributes, which follows upon pure esse, is also absolute. No hint of infinity by extrinsic denomination is present in the text. The view is reiterated in the third book of the Commentary:

> Limitatur autem aliquid ex capacitate recipientis; unde illud quod non habet esse receptum in aliquo, sed subsistens, non habet esse limitatum, sed infinitum, sicut Deus (In III Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2; ed. Moos, III, 402, no. 46).[69]

The text of In I Sent., d. 43 states explicitly that God is to be termed 'infinitus simpliciter'. In the disputed question

De Veritate, Thomas explains the phrase:

> Et *ideo aliter dicendum*, quod in rebus invenimus aliquid quod *simpliciter* est et *modis omnibus infinitum*, sicut Deus; aliquid autem quod est *modis omnibus finitum*, sicut res materiales; aliquid autem quod est *modo quodam finitum*, et *modo quodam infinitum*: sicut quaelibet substantia immaterialis, est quidem *finita* in quantum habet esse limitatum ad propriam naturam, eo quod nulla creata substantia, quamvis immaterialis, est esse suum, sed esse participat: et tamen infinita per remotionem illius terminationis secundum quam forma terminatur ex hoc ipso quod in materia recipitur, cum omne receptum sit in recipiente per modum recipientis (q. 20, a. 4, ad 1; ed. Spiazzi, I, 370, no. 166).

God is in all ways infinite, and material things are in every way finite. But standing between God and material things are angels, which are infinite in one respect and finite in another. That is, they are not received in matter and, hence, are infinite in this respect, but their *esse* is received from God, so they remain finite with respect to *esse*. God alone can be *infinite simpliciter*, because He alone is subsistent *esse*.

The ways in which God is infinite as having nothing that is received are enumerated in the arguments Aquinas gives to convince the gentiles that God is infinite. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, c. 43, he argues that God is infinite as undetermined by genus, matter,[70] potency, efficient cause, or imperfection.[71] All of these follow from His *esse subsistens*.

In I Sent., d. 43 proves the infinity of the divine power from the intrinsic nature of the divine essence. The *De Potentia* distinguishes from this mode of proof two kinds of infinity that are predicated of the divine power by extrinsic denomination, i.e. from its effects:

> Sed sciendum quod quamvis potentia habeat infinitatem ex essentia, tamen ex hoc ipso quod comparatur ad ea

> quorum est principium, recipit quemdam modum infinitatis quem essentia non habet. Nam in obiectis potentiae, quaedam multitudo invenitur; in actione etiam invenitur quaedam intensio secundum efficaciam agendi, et sic potest potentiae activae attribui quaedam infinitas secundum conformitatem ad infinitatem quantitatis et continuae et discretae. _Discretae_ quidem secundum quod quantitas potentiae attenditur secundum multa vel pauca obiecta; et haec vocatur quantitas extensiva; _continuae_ vero, secundum quod quantitas potentiae attenditur in hoc quod remisse vel intense agit; et haec vocatur quantitas intensiva. Prima autem quantitas convenit potentiae respectu obiectorum, secunda vero respectu actionis. . . .
>
> Utroque autem modo divina potentia est infinita (q. 1, a. 2, resp.; ed. Pession, II, 11b-12a, no. 2).

God's power is extensively infinite because it has power over innumerable objects; it is intensively infinite because of its ability to produce an infinite action on something outside itself. In both of these ways, the divine power is infinite by extrinsic denomination, and not on account of the intrinsic nature of the divine essence.

In the _Prima Pars_, Thomas again treats divine infinity. In answering the question "Utrum aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse infinitum per essentiam", he returns to the discussion of _infinitus simpliciter_ taken up in the _De Veritate_, adding that matter, like subsistent forms, is infinite _secundum quid_:

> Si enim loquamur de infinito, secundum quod competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet aliquam formam, et sic materia eius est determinata per formam. Sed quia materia, secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet in potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid, utpote lignum est finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum secundum quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas (q. 7, a. 2, resp.; Ottawa, I, 38a).

Matter is finite with respect to its substantial form, but it remains infinite as potential to an infinite number of accidental forms.

Aquinas knows several types of negative infinity: (1) absolute infinity, which is found in the divine essence and attributes, (2) infinity secundum quid, found in angels (as not received in matter) and matter (as potential to an infinity of accidental forms), (3) infinity of God's power by extrinsic denomination, which may be either extensive (following from the infinitude of its effects) or intensive (following from its capacity for producing an infinite effect). Does Aquinas have a doctrine of positive infinity? The texts we have been examining nearly all distinguish privative from negative infinity, but none draws the conclusion that infinity has a positive aspect.

Richard of Middleton

Richard of Middleton's Commentary on the Sentences treats divine infinity in d. 43. In a. 1, q. 1, he argues that God's essence must be infinite because it is simple in the highest degree:

> Divina essentia est infinita, quod sic patet: sicut declaratum est supra, 8 dist., deus est summe simplex, ex quo sequitur quod non componitur ex aliis, nec est componibilis, alii nec aliud componibile sibi.
>
> Cum ergo non sit componibilis alii, non est ejus essentia terminabilis per aliquod in quo recipiatur;
>
> et quia non est aliquod componibile sibi, non est terminabilis per aliquid quod recipiatur in ipso;
>
> et cum non sit compositus ex aliis non potest dici quod in ipso sit pars et pars, ita ut una sit terminata per aliam. Quod enim non est ex aliis componibile non habet partem et partem (Brescia, 1591, I, 380b-81a).

The divine essence is infinite because it (1) is not received in anything (as form is in matter), (2) does not receive anything (as matter does form, and (3) is not composed of parts that could limit one another (as form and matter do). Since God's essence has no intrinsic limitations whatever, it is absolutely infinite.

If the divine essence is simple, God's power must be identical with it and, hence, is infinite as well:

> Potentia dei est infinita secundum illud quod est, quia ut supra probatum est, dist. 8, divina essentia summe simplex est; ergo idem est secundum rem cum sua potentia. Cum ergo probatum sit quaestione praecedenti quod divina essentia est infinita, sequitur de necessitate quod divina potentia secundum id quod est, est infinita, . . (*Ibid.*, q. 2; Brescia, 1591, I, 381b).

The infinity of the divine power is proved by its identity with the infinite essence of God. The infinity manifests itself in the duration, extension,,and "vigor" of the divine power:

> Potentia dei etiam est infinita secundum illud quod est, et secundum durationem et extensionem et vigorem (*Ibid.*).

Since the power of God is limited in no way, it is certainly not limited in duration. But, further, inasmuch as the divine power reaches infinitely numerous objects, it is infinite in extension. Because God requires no materials or helpers to produce an effect, He is also infinite in vigor.[72] These three extrinsic types of infinity are distinct from the infinity *secundum quod est* (absolute infinity), which was proved in the first part of the question to belong to the divine power.

The third question considers "Utrum infinitas ponat aliquid in Deo". Richard answers that it most certainly does:

> Infinitas est in divina essentia, potentia, et duratione, et in quolibet istorum ponit spiritualem magnitudinem transcendentem omne futurum, quod est vel esse potest intelligi. Transcendere autem omne finitum, quod positivum est, quid positivum est cui tamen annexa est negatio finis. Et quia hoc nomen 'infinitum', secundum quod dicitur de deo, imponitur ad significandum ipsam magnitudinem transcendentem omne finitum, imponitur ad significandum a negatione finis. Ideo bene dicitur quod ratione hujus ad significandum imponitur, importat

> nobilissimam positionem. Et ratione hujus a quo significandum imponitur, importat finis negationem, hoc est, quod alii dicunt quod significat rem positivam modo negativo (Ibid., resp.; Brescia, 1591, I, 382b).

When applied to God, infinity signifies His transcendence of everything finite, or, better, the "abundantia omnium perfectionum in deo" (Ibid., ad 2; Brescia, 1591, I, 382b). This is clearly something positive in God. But the transcendent fullness of perfections is named by the word 'infinite', which is composed of the words 'in' and 'finite' and, hence, is negative in form. As signifying by means of the negation of an end, 'infinite' is negative, but, with respect to the thing signified, the term indicates the highest position. Thus, Richard agrees with the "others", who say that 'infinite' signifies a positive thing in a negative way.

This account of infinity, written after 1284, shows that Richard was aware of a rather sophisticated positive interpretation of infinity, which is not to be found in the writings of Thomas Aquinas, though it is suggested by Bonaventure. Some of Richard's contemporaries had a notion of positive infinity, as Richard attributes the doctrine to alii. Who the alii are is unknown, but it is extremely likely that Henry of Ghent is one of them.

CHAPTER III

HENRY OF GHENT, SUMMA, ARTICLE 44 (I)

Article 44 of the Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum is Henry of Ghent's major text on divine infinity. There are other passages in the Summa relating to the topic, but, because of the extensive nature of this text, it seems best to make it the subject of a detailed analysis of Henry's views on divine infinity. Of course, other texts from the Summa and the Quodlibeta will be freely employed both to aid in the elucidation of difficult sections of a. 44 and as confirmatory evidence for the interpretations of certain passages.

Location in the Summa

The Summa may be divided into three major sections:

I. aa. 1-20, on the science of theology,
II. aa. 21-72, on what can be understood of God,
    A. aa. 21-52, on God,
    B. aa. 53-72, on the Trinity,
III. aa. 73-75, on what can be said of God.[1]

The first and third divisions contain no information specifically relevant to the doctrine of infinity, though the second often deals directly with the problem. Section II, A, which contains the major text on infinity, may be divided in greater detail as follows:

1. aa. 21-27, on God as a substance in Himself,
2. aa. 28-52, on the substantial properties of God,[2]
    a. aa. 28-31, on properties found in God alone,
    b. aa. 32-52, on properties common to God and creatures,[3]
        (1) a. 32, on the properties in general,
        (2) aa. 33-50, on the properties in particular,[4]
            (a) aa. 33-40, on those that pertain to the intellect,
            (b) aa. 41-47, on those that relate to the will,
            (c) aa. 48-50, on the interaction of intellect and will and its results,
        (3) aa. 51-52, on the relations between the attributes.

A. 44 is thus concerned with infinity as one of the substantial properties common to God and creatures. These properties fall into three groups, according to the relation they have to the intellect, to the will, or to both. As Henry explains in the prologue to a. 41; II, 1^r, the structure of the first two groups is essentially the same:

> Et quia secundum quatuor praedeterminata pertinentia ad intellectum, quae sunt
>
> ⟨1⟩ intelligibile ⟨aa. 33-34⟩,

⟨2⟩ intellectus ⟨a. 36⟩,[5]

⟨3⟩ intelligendi habitus ⟨a. 38⟩,[6]

⟨4⟩ et intelligendi actus ⟨a. 40⟩,[7]

quatuor sunt similiter pertinentia ad voluntatem illis respondentia, scilicet

⟨1⟩ volitum, ut ipsum volibile sive appetibile, tamquam objectum voluntatis ⟨aa. 41-44⟩,

⟨2⟩ ipsa voluntas, tamquam potentia volendi ⟨a. 45⟩,

⟨3⟩ et volendi habitus ⟨a. 46⟩,

⟨4⟩ et volendi actus ⟨aa. 47⟩.

When we examine the supposed parallel between 'intelligibile' and 'volitum', we find that the former is discussed in two articles, a. 33, on the signification of 'intelligibile' in God, and a. 34, on truth, whereas the latter is dealt with by considering the four properties goodness (a. 41), perfection (a. 42), totality (a. 43), and infinity (a. 44) in God, and no article is devoted to the signification of 'volitum'. Hence, the omission of an article on 'volitum' and the relation of perfection, totality, and infinity to goodness (which is obviously parallel to truth) require explanation. The prologue to a. 41 accounts for the omission in the following way:

> Sed quia deus habet rationem volibilis sive amabilis inquantum habet rationem finis et boni, quemadmodum habet rationem intelligibilis inquantum habet rationem formae et veri; ideo de istis tribus quaestionibus tractandis ⟨sc. 'Utrum deus sit volibilis sive amabilis', 'Utrum deus seipso est amabilis', 'Utrum ratio amabilitatis in

> deo sit ratio amabilitatis circa omnia ab ipso') supersedendum est, quia earum determinatio patet juxta determinationem illarum trium eis respondentium de dei intelligibilitate. Et sequuntur quaestiones de bonitate dei. Utrum autem dicatur 'bonus' essentialiter tantum, an etiam personaliter, patet ex determinatis in consimili quaestione de dei veritate (II, 1^r).

The exact parallel between the two groups itself explains the omission of an article "De Volito", because the relation between the willable and the end and the good and that between the intelligible and form and truth is the same. Hence, we can proceed immediately to the consideration of goodness in God, even here omitting (on the same ground) the question parallel to a. 34, q. 2, "Utrum duplex veritas sit in deo, essentialis et personalis".

The relation between goodness, perfection, totality, and infinity that accounts for their inclusion under properties relating to the will is briefly explained in the same place:

> Et quia bonitas habet rationem finis, quem cum res ultimate attingit habet rationem perfecti; et perfectum habet rationem totius, ex eo quod omnia continet quae ad ejus perfectionem requiruntur; et ex hoc quod haec continet absque limitatione et termino dicitur 'infinitum'; ideo circa haec quaerenda sunt quatuor:
>
> Primum, de dei bonitate,
> Secundum, de ejus perfectione,
> Tertium, de ejus totalitate,
> Quartum, de ejus infinitate.

Undoubtedly depending on Aristotle's assertion of the identity of the end and the good,[8] Henry concludes that goodness has the intelligible structure of the end. In one of the Aristotelian meanings, 'complete' is applied to "things which have attained their end, this being good . . ."[9]; hence, when something has attained its end, it is perfect or complete. But the whole is "that of which nothing is outside,"[10] so that what has attained its end in such a way as to lack nothing is whole as well as perfect. But if the whole possesses completion is such a way that it is not limited, it is infinite. This last statement goes beyond the Aristotelian material infinity and must be considered in detail when we come to comment on a. 44.

This brief analysis of the general structure of the *Summa* has enabled us to locate the discussion of divine infinity in the context of the work as a whole. It has been shown to be one of several substantial properties relating to God as unity. More specifically, it is an attribute taken from creatures and applied to God that pertains to the divine will inasmuch as it (infinity) follows upon totality, which in turn is consequential with respect to goodness and perfection.

Date

As has already been noted in Chapter II, Richard of Middleton presents a doctrine of positive infinity in his *Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences*, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3; Brescia, I, 382a-b.

Although the doctrine is very briefly stated, the basic argument as well as the language in which it is formulated is strikingly like that found in Henry's *Summa*, a. 44.[11] One might immediately conclude that the two authors had a common source for the positive notion of infinity, were it not that no such common source has been found and that Richard knew Henry's work.[12] If we assume, as seems likely, that one of them has borrowed the doctrine from the other, it becomes a concern to us to establish, if possible, which of the discussions is the earlier.

E. Hocedez, in a long discussion in his *Richard de Middleton*, has given 1285-1295 as the probable dates for the *Commentary on the Sentences*.[13] Cross-references between Henry's *Summa* and *Quodlibeta*,[14] as well as the full title of the *Summa*, lead us to believe that the *Summa* represents a collection of his ordinary disputations, of the lessons given by him, which was produced nearly concurrently with the *Quodlibeta*.[15] However, it should be noted that *Summa*, aa. 1-20 make no reference at all to the *Quodlibeta*, and hence, as Caffarena conjectures (pp. 129-130), they probably antedate *Quodl.* I. P. Glorieux's dates for the *Quodlibeta*,[16] together with cross-references between the two works, enable Caffarena to date *Summa*, aa. 21-75 between 1276 and 1292, the dates of *Quodlibeta* I and XV.[17] Thus, Richard's *Commentary* and Henry's *Summa* overlap by about eight years.

Since we have no external evidence that would enable us to date specific parts of the *Commentary* or the *Summa*, the only way to establish which of the two discussions of divine infinity precedes the other is to demonstrate through cross-references that *Summa*, a. 44 must have been written before 1285, the *terminus a quo* of *In I*

Sent., d. 43. Two important assumptions must be made if we are to employ this method: (1) The lessons of the Summa were written in the order in which they finally appeared; (2) The cross-references were not added at a later date. The character of the cross-references themselves makes these assumptions quite reasonable. For example, Summa, a. 51, q. 1; II, 52^{v}B cites Quodl. V, q. 1 with the words 'Quaestionem istam determinavimus anno praeterito in quadam quaestione de quolibet, . . .'.' Further, certain Quodlibeta announce points to be taken up later in the ordinary questions. For example, Quodl. V, q. 12; I, 171^{r}Z anticipates Summa, a. 21, q. 2 with 'ut alibi habet declarari'. Bearing these assumptions in mind, we can procede to establish dates for a. 44.

Terminus a quo: Quodl. V (Christmas 1280 or Easter 1281), q. 3; I, 156^{v}V announces Summa, aa. 44 and 42 with the words 'Solus deus dicendus est simpliciter infinitus et perfectus, ut alibi debet declarari'. A. 44 could not then have been written before Christmas 1280, and we are safe in taking this as terminus a quo.

Terminus ad quem: Quodl. VI (Christmas 1281 or Easter 1282), q. 1; I, 216^{v}E cites Summa, a. 46, q. 1 with 'Amor magis proprie est nomen habitus quam actionis, . . alias diximus'.[18] We may, therefore, accept Easter 1282 as the terminus ad quem for a. 44.

Dating a. 44 sometime between Christmas 1280 and Easter 1282, it is clear that it considerably precedes 1285, the terminus a quo of Richard's Commentary. Hence, unless an earlier author with a notion of positive infinity is discovered, we must accept Henry's work to be an original contribution.

One other piece of evidence confirms this conclusion. Summa, Sent., d. 43. Two important assumptions must be made if we are to employ this method: (1) The lessons of the Summa were written in the order in which they finally appeared; (2) The cross-references were not added at a later date. The character of the cross-references themselves makes these assumptions quite reasonable. For example, Summa, a. 51, q. 1; II, 52^{v}B cites Quodl. V, q. 1 with the words 'Quaestionem istam determinavimus anno praeterito in quadam quaestione de quolibet, . . .'.' Further, certain Quodlibeta announce points to be taken up later in the ordinary questions. For example, Quodl. V, q. 12; I, 171^{r}Z anticipates Summa, a. 21, q. 2 with 'ut alibi habet declarari'. Bearing these assumptions in mind, we can procede to establish dates for a. 44.

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Dating a. 44 sometime between Christmas 1280 and Easter 1282, it is clear that it considerably precedes 1285, the terminus a quo of Richard's Commentary. Hence, unless an earlier author with a notion of positive infinity is discovered, we must accept Henry's work to be an original contribution.

One other piece of evidence confirms this conclusion. Summa,

a. 32[19] contains a general argument for the positive signification of divine names, in which 'incorporeal', 'immaterial', etc. are held to signify something positive in God, though the words are certainly negative in form. No mention is made of 'infinite', but it is clear that the positive signification given to 'infinite' in a. 44 represents a further application of this general doctrine. Employing the assumptions noted above, we can date a. 32. Summa, a. 30, q. 2; I, 179^{r}F cites Quodl. III (Easter 1278 or 1279), q. 9[20] and so could not have been written before Easter 1278.[21] Quodl. IV (Christmas 1279 or Easter 1280), q. 16; I, 131^{r}B cites Summa, a. 32, q. 5,[22] which must, then, have been written before Easter 1280.[23] Therefore, a. 32 has a terminus a quo of Easter 1278 and a terminus ad quem of Easter 1280. The general doctrine of the positive signification of seemingly negative divine names appears in Henry's ordinary questions nearly five years before Richard's Commentary on the Sentences was begun.

Having established the location of a. 44 within the context of the Summa and having shown it to have preceded the account of divine infinity given by Richard of Middleton, we can proceed to the detailed analysis of the text itself.

Prologue

The prologue to the article "De Infinitate Dei" begins with a brief justification for including an article on divine infinity at this place in the Summa:

> Quia in exuberanti perfectione et totalitate dei consistit ratio infinitatis substantiae ejus, ideo post

> quaestiones de dei perfectione et totalitate recto ordine sequuntur quaestiones de ejus infinitate (II, 11^{v}).

The argument is actually a short statement of the justification given in a. 41, prol.; II, 1^{r},[24] where Henry asserts that a thing is called 'perfect' or 'complete' from the fact that it is in contact with its end, 'whole' because it includes all those things that are required for its perfection, and 'infinite' because it contains them without any limit or end. Here the superabundant perfection and totality are held to imply the infinity of the divine substance. The emphasis is to be placed on 'exuberanti', for, as is clear from a. 41, prol. and is explained in detail in a. 44,[25] the aspect of infinity represents something over and above the simple aspects of wholeness and perfection. That is, to say that God is whole and perfect does not commit us to regarding Him as infinite. But if God is superabundantly perfect and whole, He must have the attribute of infinity, for superabundant perfection and wholeness are precisely perfection and totality without limit. The intimate connection of these attributes as they exist in the divine substance is the justification for locating the article on infinity after those on perfection and totality.

Next, Henry notes that he is concerned here with God's substance, not with His power:

> Non dico adhuc in potentia, de qua erat sermo superius,[26] sed in substantia et essentia (Ibid.).

It is clear that God is not going to be held to be infinite on account of having infinite power. That is, the infinity of the divine substance does not depend on anything extrinsic to it--a doctrine that we find prevalent among early authors. Rather the infinity of God will follow directly upon the nature of His substance and essence.

The prologue closes with the division of the article into two questions:

> Et sunt quaestiones duae:
>
> Prima: Utrum deus sit infinitus.
>
> Secunda: Utrum 'infinitas' significat circa deum aliquid positiv[a]e an privativ [a]e sive negativ [a]e[27] (*Ibid.*).

Question I

Objections and sed contra

The six objections that follow are all drawn from the Aristotalian *Physics* and, therefore, apply primarily to quantitative infinity:

> Circa primum arguitur quod deus non sit infinitus.
>
> Primo sic: Philosophus dicit, i *Physicorum*,[28] infiniti ratio quantitati congruit et non substantiae. Deus substantia est et non quantitas, ut patet ex praedeterminatis.[29] Ergo, et cetera (*Ibid.*, A).

This argument is employed by Aristotle in refutation of Melissus, as one of those who held that all things are one: It is absurd for anyone to hold that only quantity or quality exists, for substance alone can exist independently. But if being is one, then there can be no quantity or quality, since, even if these inhered in substance, still being would be many. Now Melissus, in particular, says that being is infinite. It must, therefore, be quantity as well as substance and, hence, many. For nothing can be infinite unless it is quantity or has quantity as a concomitant attribute, because any definition of the infinite must contain some reference to quantity.[30] The objection applies the argument to God, who, as has already been shown, does not fall under the category of quantity.[31]

(Here one should take note of the translations of Aristotle's *Physics* used by Henry. The quotations follow nearly exactly the first version which appears in the Juncta edition of Averroes' *Commentary*.[32] This translation seems to be that of William of Moerbeke with the revisions of Argyropule.[33] Though he usually follows the first version, Henry occasionally seems to be paraphrasing the second[34] and in one instance makes explicit reference to it with the phrase 'alia translatio'.[35])

The second objection is drawn from an argument Aristotle uses against Anaxagoras:

> Secundo sic: Ibidem dicit Philosophus,[36] infinitum inquantum infinitum incognitum.[37] Deus inquantum deus maxime cognitus est, quantum est de se, quia est summa veritas. Ergo, et cetera (*Ibid.*).

Since knowledge of anything is knowledge of the nature and number of its components, what is infinite in kind is unknowable with respect to quality, and what is infinite in number or size of its parts is unknowable with respect to quantity. Anaxagoras holds that the first principles are infinite in kind and number. It is therefore impossible to know the first principles or anything composed of them. Anaxagoras is forced to conclude that nothing whatever is knowable.[38] The argument, as applied to God, takes a rather different turn: God is the highest truth,[39] which is intelligible of itself.[40] And since truth does not inhere in God as an accident, but rather is identical with God,[41] God _qua_ God is known in the highest degree. But if God is infinite, it would appear that this is impossible, for the Aristotelian argument seems to apply to divine infinity just as it does to the quantitative infinity of Anaxagoras' first principles. Therefore, one must deny the infinity of God.

A. 33, q. 1, obj. 1 states the converse of this argument in support of the contention that God is not intelligible:

> Infinitum inquantum infinitum incognitum est, secundum Philosophum, i _Physicorum_.[42] Incognitum inquantum incognitum non est intelligibile, quia intelligibile inquantum intelligibile est cognoscibile. Deus autem simpliciter et omnino infinitus est, ut infra[43] videbitur. Ergo, et cetera (I, 204^{r}K).

If God is infinite and the Aristotelian formula applies to Him, then, naturally, He is unknown and unintelligible.

In the third of the _Physics_, Aristotle gives numerous arguments against the actual existence of an infinite sensible body.[44] Noting that it would entail absurdities if the infinite existed in no way at all, he concludes that the infinite exists potentially only, as matter exists, not as any finite whole exists. That is, there is no infinite magnitude or number, but magnitudes, because they are continuous, are susceptible of division in infinitum, and number, since it is discrete, can be increased infinitely, though one never arrives at an infinite number in the process.[45] Hence, the whole being of the infinite consists in its susceptibility to further division or increase and, consequently, in its potentiality. The case is similar to that of matter, which has being only inasmuch as it is potential to form. Form and the end are the principles that actualize matter and the infinite and, therefore, are themselves in act. In the third objection, this notion of the infinite is contrasted with the formality and actuality of God:

> Tertio sic: Idem, iii *Physicorum*,[46] infinitum inquantum infinitum in potentia est, sicut materia, ubi dicit Commentator,[47] entitas enim materiae et infiniti est in potentia; forma autem et finis sunt in actu. Deus autem summe formalis est et in actu, et summe remotus a natura potentiae et materiae. Ergo, et cetera (II, 11^{v}A).

In contrast to the infinite, God is in the highest degree formal and in act and, consequently, removed from potency and matter.[48] The Aristotelian argument, in associating matter and potency generally with the infinite, seems to forbid the application of 'infinite' to God.

The fourth and most serious objection recognizes the distinction between the Aristotelian quantitative infinity and infinity with respect to substance. However, it asserts an analogy of proper proportionality between quantitative infinity and quantity and substantial infinity and substance:

> Quarto sic: Sicut se habet infinitum in quantitate ad quantitatem, sic infinitum secundum substantiam ad substantiam. Sed unum infinitum secundum quantitatem non compatitur aliud quantum, secundum Philosophum.[49] Ergo infinitum secundum substantiam secum non compatitur aliam substantiam. Deus autem secum compatitur substantias plurimas creaturarum. Ergo, et cetera (Ibid.).

The relation common to the substantial and the quantitative infinite is that of not admitting another quantity or substance to exist. Aristotle argues that an infinite quantity is incompatible with other quantities in order to rule out the possibility of an infinite body that is compound: If the infinite is compound, it must be composed of more than one element. No one of the elements can be infinite, for then, whether or not the finite element exceeds the infinite element in power, the infinite element will nevertheless destroy the finite by its size. Nor can all the elements be infinite, since each will then be infinitely extended in all directions, which is obviously impossible.[50] In the case of God and creatures, a substantial infinite is thought to coexist with many finite substances. But if substantial and quantitative infinity are similar, the divine substance will destroy all finite substances. Since creaturely substances exist in fact, the divine substance cannot be infinite.

The converse of this objection appears in a. 21, q. 1, obj. 2:

> Si deus est, tale quid est quod habet in se omnis boni et nobilis infinitatem. Sed unum infinitum nullum

> aliud secum compatitur, vel sui generis, quia totum quod sui generis est occupat, vel contrarii multo fortius, quia unum contrariorum non compatitur secum suum contrarium, sed destruit ipsum. Ergo si deus est, nullum erit malum in rebus, cum sit ipse bonus, nullumque aliud erit in rebus bonum et nobile. Consequens est manifeste falsum, ergo et antecedens (I, 123^{r}-^{v}A).

Unlike a. 44, obj. 4, this objection does not contain a distinction between substantial and quantitative infinity. Further, the objection only considers God as infinite in goodness or nobility: If God is infinite, He must contain everything good and noble, so that nothing else that is either good or noble can exist. Nor can there be anything that is bad or evil, because this would be destroyed. The principle, however, is the same in the two objections: The infinite in any category rules out anything else in that category, whether of the same sort or of the sort contrary to the putative infinite, with the result that an infinite God is incompatible with anything else in the category in which He is infinite and even more so with anything that must be counted His contrary.[51]

The last two objections depend on the contrast expounded by Aristotle between the whole and perfect and the infinite:

> Quinto sic: Ibidem,[52] non cujus nihil extra, sed cujus semper aliquid est extra, hoc infinitum est; ut autem dicit ibidem,[53] totum et perfectum est cujus nihil est extra, cujusmodi est deus, ut habitum est supra.[54] Ergo, et cetera (II, 11^{v}A).

From the argument that the whole being of the infinite consists in potentiality to further division (in the case of continuous quantities) or increase (in the case of discrete quantities), it follows that the infinite is such that a part can always be taken outside any part previously taken. Hence, the infinite always has something outside itself. The whole, however, is precisely that to which nothing is lacking, and, as a result, the whole has nothing outside itself. But the terms 'whole' and 'perfect' either are or are nearly synonymous, for what is perfect is completed by an end.[55] In this way, Aristotle contrasts the whole and perfect with the infinite. God is whole and perfect and, therefore, not infinite:

> Sexto sic: Philosophus ibidem,[56] perfectum non est nisi illud quod habet complementum, et complementum est finis. Deus est perfectus, ut habitum est supra.[57] Ergo habet complementum et finem. Ut autem dicit Commentator ibidem,[58] quidditas infiniti est privatione finis. Ergo, et cetera (Ibid.).

If the perfect is that which is completed by an end, God, as perfect, must have completion and end. But the perfect, like the whole, is contrasted with the infinite, whose being consists in privation of an end. Hence, God cannot be infinite.

All six arguments opposing the infinity of God are drawn from the Physics of Aristotle. As Aristotle states explicitly that the discussion of Phys., III, 5-8 treats only the existence of the infinite among sensible bodies,[59] it was expected that the objections drawn from Phys., III would be based on quantitative infinity. The expectation has been borne out: Objections 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 are actually arguments against God's being quantitatively infinite. In implying that God is substantially but not quantitatively infinite, objection 4 is far more sophisticated and presents a greater threat to the position to be defended by Henry of Ghent. But this realization does not bring the objection far from the Aristotelian sphere, for the infinite in substance is held to be parallel to the infinite in quantity. As we can anticipate that in the refutation of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 Henry will deny quantitative infinity of God, we can also expect him to reject the analogy between substantial and quantitative infinity, which is the strength of the fourth objection.[60]

Surprisingly enough, the *sed contra* also borrows its argument from Aristotle's *Physics*:

> In contrarium est, quoniam dicit Philosophus ibidem[61] quod est omnia continens et in seipso habens est infinitum. Deus est hujusmodi, ut habitum est supra.[62] Ergo, et cetera (*Ibid.*).

The passage of the *Physics* that is referred to is rather confusing. Aristotle holds Parmenides in greater favor than Melissus because the former argues that the whole is finite, whereas the latter says it is infinite. The dignity (*semnotēs*) of containing all things in itself can be attributed to the infinite only because it is in some respect similar to the whole. In fact, the infinity of the whole comes from its matter (the things it contains), by which it is only potentially whole. The wholeness of the infinite (its containing all things) does not arise from its infinity, but rather from its completion by an end. Hence, the infinite *qua* infinite does not

5, and 6 are actually arguments against God's being quantitatively infinite. In implying that God is substantially but not quantitatively infinite, objection 4 is far more sophisticated and presents a greater threat to the position to be defended by Henry of Ghent. But this realization does not bring the objection far from the Aristotelian sphere, for the infinite in substance is held to be parallel to the infinite in quantity. As we can anticipate that in the refutation of 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 Henry will deny quantitative infinity of God, we can also expect him to reject the analogy between substantial and quantitative infinity, which is the strength of the fourth objection.[60]

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Body

The body of the question opens with a brief summary of pre-Socratic opinions concerning the first principle:

> Dicendum ad hoc quod, etsi multi philosophantium errabant in natura et substantia primi principii, in hoc tamen fere omnes concordabant, quod primum principium omnium esset infinitum in substantia sua (_Ibid._, B).[66]

Most of the early philosophers were in error regarding the nature of the first principle, but they were right on at least one point: the first principle is infinite in its substance. The sentence in the _Physics_ that Henry is paraphrasing states rather that everyone who thought about the infinite at all identified it with the first principle. According to Aristotle, these philosophers fall into two groups: (1) the Pythagoreans and Plato, who made the infinite a self-subsistent substance, (2) Anaxagoras and Democritus, who attributed the property of infinity to some nature underlying substance (the homoeomerous parts of Anaxagoras or the atoms of Democritus).[67] Henry divides the philosophers into two groups similar to those of Aristotle, accordingly as they had different views about the first principle:

> Et hoc diversimode ponebant diversi secundum quod diversa sentiebant de natura primi principii.
>
> Dicentes enim primum principium materiam esse (secundum quod supra determinatum est[68]) attribuebant primo principio infinitatem materialem et esse chaos quoddam in infinitum extensum[69] (Ibid.).

The first group of pre-Socratics thought that the first principle was matter. In a. 29, q. 2; I, 172^rK, Henry hesitatingly assigns the view to the Pythagoreans and "Achilleans",[70] quoting Metaphysics, Λ, 7:

> Fatua in rei veritate est ista quaestio ⟨sc. utrum habeat componi cum alio ut materia cum forma . . .⟩, nec esset proponenda in serie quaestionum de deo, nisi quia aliqui deum esse primam materiam sicut fatuissime posuerunt, quos videtur tangere Philosophus cum eorum ratione in xii Metaphysicae.[71] Dicit enim ibi quod quidam, qui aestimabant aestimationem Pythagorici et Achillei, dicebant quod bonum et nobile non est in primo, cujus rationem assignabant quia principia semper imperfectiora sunt

> principatis.

The quotation is taken from the translation of Michael Scot, but in the Juncta edition we find not 'Achillei' but 'Leucippici'.[72] Later in the question the Pythagorici and Achillei are again referred to, so that 'Achillei' is not a misprint.[73] In any case, the doctrine does not belong to Leucippus, but to Speusippus, who wrote a book on the Pythagoreans.[74] One might conjecture that the error arose from the obscurity of Speusippus, concerning whom little could have been known during the middle ages, but the question must be left open until the mediaeval Latin translations of the Metaphysics have been made available.

The first group held that matter was the only first principle and concluded that God was prime matter. In this they certainly erred, as matter is an imperfect principle and, therefore, not first:

> Nos autem debemus aspicere ad secundum ordinem et ad principium agens et movens, a quo habent esse et principium materiale imperfectum et etiam principium formale et tota species perfecta constituta in omnibus suis individuis; et dicere debemus illud primum principium esse deum (a. 29, q. 2; I, 172^{r}O).

Rather God, as the cause of all things, is first and not identifiable with prime matter.

In a. 29, q. 2, no mention is made of material infinity being attributed to prime matter, though in a. 35, q. 6 infinite potency is said to have been assigned to it,[75] or of its being an infinitely extended chaos.[76] As was said above, Aristotle in Phys., III, 4 includes the Pythagoreans and Plato among those who held that infinity is a self-subsistent substance, and this text is very likely what Henry has in mind. Chaos is mentioned in Meta., A, 4, Λ, 6, and N, 4: The old poets held that night and heaven or chaos or ocean is the matter from which the world is generated.[77] Plato and Leucippus supposed that there was eternal movement, in an attempt to avoid admitting an efficient cause of the motion in the world. The motion exists in a temporally infinite chaos.[78] The passages from the Physics and Metaphysics seem to have been summarized by Henry in the last part of our text, even though there is no mention of spatial extension in the three Aristotelian texts on chaos.[79]

The source for the second group of pre-Socratics is quite obviously Physics I, 2-4[80] and III, 4:[81]

> Dicentes vero primum principium substantiam aliquam corpoream dicebant primum principium esse aliquod corpus infinitum,
>
> vel extensione, ut Parmenides et Melissus, qui ponebant omnia esse unum infinitum et illud esse principium,
>
> vel continentia infinitorum in uno, ut Democritus, qui posuit in eodem infinitatem atomorum, et Anaxagoras, qui posuit in eodem infinitatem partium consimilium, ut habetur, i Physicorum.[82] Et sic concordabant in infinitate substantiae primi principii (a. 44, q. 1; II, 11^{v}B).[83]

The philosophers who make the first principle an infinite body do so in two ways: (1) Those who posit one infinite all suppose it to be infinite in extension; (2) Those who posit a number of elements consider it infinite in multitude. The attribution of the first view to *both* Melissus and Parmenides is difficult to understand, especially as Aristotle points out at *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}15-17 that Parmenides asserts that being is finite. The infinity of homoeomerous parts and that of atoms belong to Anaxagoras and Democritus, though the parts and atoms *are* the first principles with the result that no one corporeal principle contains them. Further, for Anaxagoras, the homoeomerous parts existed together only in the original mass from which they have been separated. For the atomists, there is no time when an infinity of atoms existed together, since (a) they were originally dispersed throughout the void, (b) only finite numbers of them came together in whirls, and (c) there is an infinite number of separated worlds.[84] From these somewhat erroneous accounts of pre-Socratic views, Henry concludes that the early philosophers agreed in regarding the first principle as infinite in substance.

According to Henry, we are correct in accepting this statement, but we ought not attribute to God any sort of corporeal infinity:

> Nos ergo, id quod falsum ponebant circa naturam primi principii quod deus est respuentes, et veritatem cujus modicam resplendentiam videbant acceptantes, dicimus quod deus tamquam primum omnium principium, a quo est omne finitum in substantia, necessario ponendus est esse in substantia infinitus (*Ibid.*, C).

The pre-Socratics were able to see only part of the truth about the nature of the first principle. They saw that the first principle was the principle of every finite thing and that it was infinite, and we must accept this much of what they say. We are not, however, to go so far as to transfer to God the material infinity expounded by the first group of pre-Socratics:

> Et hoc non infinitate materiali, propter hoc quod infinitas materiae habet rationem imperfecti et partis, quia materia est pars compositi ex ipsa et forma, secundum quod determinat Philosophus et Commentator,iii Physicorum.[85] Tali, inquam, infinitate non est deus ponendus esse infinitus secundum substantiam, quia sua substantia non habet rationem materiae neque imperfecti aut partis, sed magis formae et actus et totius perfecti, ut habitum est supra[86] (Ibid.).

The divine infinity is not material infinity, for this attaches to matter inasmuch as matter is potential with respect to determinate boundaries and to some form that might function as container, and so to becoming the imperfect part of some composite. God, however, is pure form and act and, hence, is whole and perfect.[87] Since God is not matter, His infinity is not material. Nor is the infinity of God the quantitative infinity that Anaxagoras and Democritus predicated of their infinite bodies:

> Neque similiter ponendus est esse infinitus infinitate corporali extensiva vel infinitorum contentiva, quia simplex est et incorporeus, ut habitum est supra[88] (Ibid., 11^v-12^rC).

Because God has no composition within Himself, He is simple and without matter. He is, therefore, not a body. Quantitative infinity, whether it results from infinite extension or from the containing of an infinite multitude of elements, applies only to bodies. We cannot attribute this type of infinity to the divine substance any more than we could material infinity. The type of infinity ascribed to God must rather be proportional to His nature, which is form and act:

> Sed juxta conditionem naturae ejus qua est forma et actus,[89] attribuenda est ei ratio infinitatis sibi proportionalis (Ibid., 12^{r}C).

God is a pure and simple form, because in Him there is no composition between matter and form (which is only found among corporeal things).[90] Further, He is distinguished from creatures generally, because His essence is in no way proportional to any determination in a supposit upon which esse existentiae would follow; rather, He is necesse esse, which in itself includes esse existentiae.[91] The conditio naturae of God is, therefore, distinct from that of creatures, and it is in accordance with it that the aspect of infinity is to be attributed to God. It is evident that the difference in the type of form is the root of the difference between the formal infinity of God and that of creatures:

> Non autem talis qualis attribuenda est formae universali et naturali in creaturis. Forma enim naturalis creaturae, eo quod de se universalis, est apta multiplicari per supposita, quantum est de se quodammodo infinita propter aptitudines ad infinita supposita (Ibid.).

The infinity of natural forms results from their ability to be multiplied in an infinite number of supposits. Every form or essence is of itself undetermined with respect to universality and singularity, but inasmuch as it is in a supposit it is determined to one or the other. If it is in an indeterminate supposit, it is a genus or species and, hence, universal; and this occurs only through intellectual abstraction of the form from determinate supposits. If it is in determinate supposit, it is a particular.[92] But an absolute essence can also be described as "universal" inasmuch as it is indifferent to many.[93] In this sense, it is of itself potential to contraction in an infinite number of supposits, with the result that it has the aspect of infinity. But the form of God is not like this:

> Deitas ergo cum non sit talis forma, quia in ipsa non cadit neque ratio universalis neque ratio particularis, ut visum est supra[94] in parte et amplius videbitur infra,[95] tali ergo infinitate deus dici non potest 'infinitus secundum substantiam' (Ibid.).

Since God's essence is necesse esse, it does not require determination in a determinate supposit to become particular or in an indeterminate supposit to become universal: God is His essence, which is unalloyed with any principle. Hence, He is neither particular nor universal. He may be described only as a kind of singular. Since deity is not susceptible to determination in a supposit, it is not infinite by any aptitude such as is found in natural forms taken as indifferent to many. Their indifference is dependent on potentiality to reception in supposits and, hence, can only ground an imperfect type of infinity:

> Et hoc ideo maxime quia, licet ipsa forma talis de se habet rationem amplitudinis et infinitatis, non tamen habet ipsam quantum est de se nisi in potentia. Non autem actu nisi inquantum ejus amplitudo determinatur in supposito, et ita contrahitur ad partem sive per materiam sive per aliam viam individuationis, de qua alias dicendum est (*Ibid.*).

The infinity of created forms belongs to them inasmuch as they are regarded as unactualized in a determinate supposit. As potential to such actualization, they are infinite, but they are finite only as contracted in a determinate supposit through matter (in the case of corporeal things) or hypostatic accidents (in spiritual creatures)--or, better, through the action of the efficient cause that causes them to subsist in a determinate supposit.[96] The forms are then parts of a composition of nature and supposit and, therefore, not infinite. (Since the actual existence of created things depends upon contraction of their forms in supposits, and since such forms are infinite only as indifferent to contraction, there cannot be any actually existing infinite forms.) The form of deity, however, has no potency for determination in a supposit, nor is it any part of a composite of form and supposit:

> Deitatis autem forma nullam in se potentiam habet omnino ad differens a se re vel intentione, sicut necessario differunt universale et particulare, ut nec est ullius determinationis receptibilis, quae alia est a se re vel intentione, ut similiter habitum est supra.[97] Nec

> similiter rationem partis per aliquam contractionem recipit in supposito, ut habitum est supra,[98] et amplius videbitur infra[99] (*Ibid.*).

The form of God has no potency for being received in a supposit distinct from it either really or intentionally, whereas the universal and the particular among creatures differ intentionally.[100] Hence, there is no determination that deity can receive in order to become individuated. Deity never has the aspect of a part precisely because no contraction makes it part of a composite of form and supposit. In the words of a. 28, *deus est deitas, et deitas est deus.*[101]

Henry has just introduced a theory of distinctions that is quite peculiar to him. Since he bases a number of other arguments in our article on the differences between real, intentional, and rational distinctions, it seems wise to outline the theory here, according to the concise explanation of *Quodl.* V, 6. Henry distinguishes two meanings of 'res': (1) 'res' from 'reor', 'reris', which is an essence with being only in the mind, (2) 'res' from 'ratitudo', which may or may not have *esse existentiae*, but which at least has *esse essentiae* that is guaranteed by the existence of a corresponding exemplar in the divine intellect.[102] Real distinctions are founded on differences between *res* in the second sense:

> 'Res' hic appellatur non figmentum et ens secundum animam tantum, quod dicitur a 'reor', 'reris', neque respectus aliquis, . . . , sed quicquid est natura et es-

> sentia aliqua absoluta habens rationem exemplarem in deo, nata existere in existentia operatione divina, sive sit compositum (ut homo, asinus) sive principium compositi (ut materia, forma), sive fuerit universale sive particulare. Unde re differunt quaecumque diversas naturas et essentias important secundum rem, sive fuerint simplicia (ut materia et forma) sive composita (ut homo et asinus). Re vero sunt eadem quaecumque eamdem rem, sive simplicem sive compositam, important. (I, 161^rK).

Two things are really distinct when they have different exemplars in God's intellect. Examples are the distinctions between a man and an ass and between matter and form.

Even if there is no real distinction between two things, they may still be intentionally distinct:

> Sed appellatur hic 'intentio' aliquid pertinens realiter ad simplicitatem essentiae alicujus natum praecise concipi absque aliquo alio, a quo non differt re absoluta, quod similiter pertinet ad eamdem. Unde dicitur 'intentio' quasi 'intus tentio', eo quod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua determinate tendit, et non in aliquid aliud quod est aliquid ejusdem rei, ut sic super idem in re per intellectum, cujus est dividere ea quae sunt idem in re, formentur diversi conceptus ut de diversis penes conceptum mentis, eisdem autem in re (Ibid., L).

When the mind forms two totally different concepts which refer to the same res, these are distinct only intentionally. But the two concepts must depend upon some composition in the res:

> Diversitas intentionum non potest esse nisi inter illa quae uniuntur in eodum secundum rem,
>
> ita quod conceptus unius penitus excludit conceptum alterius, et e converso . . ,
>
> vel ita quod aliquid quod est in conceptu unius excluditur extra illud quod est in conceptu alterius, . . (Ibid., VN).

The diversity occurs either because one concept does not include the other (as the differentiae rational and sensible or the genus and differentia animal and rational) or because only one of the concepts includes the other (as genus and species, to live and to be, supposit and nature, or being and essence).

A distinction of reason applies only where there is neither a real nor an intentional distinction:

> Sed 'ratio' hic appellatur generali nomine modus aliquis circa rem, sub quo nata est concipi determinate absque eo quod concipiatur sub alio, sub quo similiter nata est concipi, et hoc sine omni ejus differentia re vel intentione; ita quod idem re et intentione conceptum diversis modis concipiendi dicitur differre secundum rationem, inquantum concipitur uno illorum modorum et non alio, sicut patet in conceptione definitionis et definiti et in diversitate divinorum attributorum, . . (Ibid., M).

When the mind conceives one thing under two different modes, which refer to something intentionally and really identical, it forms a distinction of reason. The divine attributes are distinct in this sense, because God's simplicity precludes His being an aggregate of diverse res and His having the composition required for intentional distinction.[103]

Of course, since deity is not determined in a supposit, it is not determined by matter:

> Maxime autem per materiam determinari non habet, quia immaterialis omnino est, et nullo modo actus materiae, ut habitum est supra,[104] sed stat de se et in se perfecta (a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{r}C).

God is not a body and, hence, is not composed of deity and matter. Therefore, deity cannot be determined by matter. It is a pure form existing complete in itself. The infinity attributed to God must be suitable to a pure, self-subsistent form:

> Est ergo deus ponendus infinitus infinitate quae est nata convenire formae simplici libere absque omni ratione determinabilis contractionis et limitationis, quia ex ea ratione qua talis est convenit ei sua infinitas. Talis enim est ratione perfectionis exuberantis in suo esse, quod est maxime formale et absolutum, in nullo receptum, sed secundum se et primo subsistens, ut habitum est supra[105] (Ibid.).

In this summary, God is said to be a pure form uncontracted into a supposit by matter or any other individuating principle. Upon such actuality necessarily follows the fullness of every perfection, because pure actuality cannot be potential to any perfection.[106] Therefore, the infinity that should be attributed to God is that which is compatible with the superabundant perfection of pure actuality.

In the first part of the *responsio*, Henry of Ghent argues against the attribution of two types of infinity to God:

(1) Material infinity, which depends on potentiality to form.

(2) The formal infinity of created forms taken as potential to contraction in a supposit.

In the remainder of the *responsio*, the principles already expounded are explained more fully by comparison of divine and creaturely infinity. In the first place, the dignity and nobility that we find in the divine infinite is not to be found among creatures:

> Infinitas ergo congruens perfectioni esse simplicis ratione suae perfectionis deo debet attribui, quae revera nihil aliud est quam immensitas quaedam et magnitudo spiritualis absque termino,[107] quae omnia in se continet, et omnem perfectionem et omnem rationem essendi; et per hoc omne quod est et quod potest esse, inquantum ipse est ipsa ratio essendi, ut visum est supra[108] (*Ibid.*, D).

God is a certain immensity and unterminated spiritual magnitude. He must contain all things, as their cause, every perfection, as complete being, and every mode of every possible being, as *necesse esse*, but in a more perfect way than is found in creatures. For being and perfections are participated in creatures, whereas in

God they are identical with the divine essence, different from it only by a distinction of reason.[109] By His wholeness and perfection, God contains all, and this is what the pre-Socratics had in mind when they predicated infinity of the first principle:

> Hoc enim est de ratione dignitatis et perfectionis sive totalitatis in ipso, quam omnes in infinito quod ponebant esse somniabant, etiam ponentes aliquod actu infinitum esse in corporalibus. Secundum enim quod dicit Philosophus, loquens de eis in iii *Physicorum*,[110] hinc omnes accipiunt dignitatem de infinito et videntur nobilitare infinitum, quia est omnia continens et omne in seipso habens. Cujus enim nihil est extra, hoc est perfectum et totum[111] (*Ibid.*).

The early philosophers, who posited either matter or some body as infinite in act, attributed to that corporeal subject the dignity that properly belongs to the whole and to the perfect, because they thought it contained all things. But in fact no such corporeal infinite exists:

> Sed revera hoc est magnae dignitatis in infinito spirituali, et esset magnae dignitatis in infinito corporali, si esset tale, quod scilicet omnia in se contineret et nihil haberet extra se et sic esset perfectum et totum. Sed tale esse non potest in corporalibus, ut bene probat contra eos Philosophus in iii *Physicorum*[112] et in primo *Caeli et Mundi*,[113] quoniam in infinito quod possibile est poni in corporalibus et rebus creatis non cadit dignitas illa, sed magis contrarium. Secundum enim quod

> dicit Philosophus ibidem,[114] accidit tam contrarium esse infinitum quam sicut dicunt; non enim cujus nihil est extra, sed cujus semper aliquid extra est, hoc infinitum est (Ibid.).

If there were a corporeal infinite in act, it would contain all things and, hence, would have the dignity of perfection and totality. But Aristotle conclusively established the non-existence of such an infinite and showed that the only type of infinity that exists in the sensible world is the infinite in potency. The infinite in potency depends for its existence on the existence of something outside itself which has not yet been taken up. Hence, it is exactly opposite to the perfect and whole, defined as that of which nothing is outside. It is clear that the dignity of the whole and perfect cannot be attributed to the corporeal infinite. The cause of the error of the pre-Socratics was the confusion of their corporeal principles with the infinite in act of being:

> Et hoc ideo quia juxta determinationem Philosophi[115] infinitum quod contingit esse in corporalibus et in creaturis non est in actu essendo infinitum, sicut illi ponebant in creaturis corporalibus et nos ponimus in creatore, quia omnis creatura certis limitibus naturae et esse sive essentiae suae contenta est.[116] Singula enim et universa in pondere et mensura producta sunt. Sed infinitum, quod contingit in creaturis esse, est infinitum in potentia tantum, et hoc non tali potentia quod aliquando possit esse actu secundum totum, sicut possibile est esse statuam. Completa enim transmutatione aeris ab artifice aliquando

> est perfecta statua in actu, quod appellatur esse in actu puro. Sed in tali potentia quae sic deducitur ad actum, quod semper manet in ipso potentia secundum partem aliquam actui admixta et actus potentiae, quemadmodum habent semper esse dies et ago, scilicet per aliud et aliud fieri.[117] Ubi dicit Commentator,[118] rerum quaedam sunt in actu puro, ut homo demonstratus, et quaedam secundum quod potentia admiscetur cum actu et, si potentia non fuerit, non erit actus, ut dies et omne quod est cum motu. Infinitum autem est quasi accidens hujus entis cujus potentia est conjuncta cum actu, et non ejus cujus esse est in actu puro. Sed sic ponimus infinitatem in deo, tamquam scilicet dispositionem ejus quod est in actu puro (Ibid.).

Every creature is limited in its nature. It follows from this that its act of being cannot be infinite, for no potency can exist in infinite being.[119] The infinity that occurs in creatures is potentiality to receiving further determination. Such an infinite, therefore, cannot exist as a statue does if its matter has been completely determined by form, but only as a day or a combat, which depends for its existence upon another hour or exchange of blows to which it is proceeding. Averroes distinguishes between two sorts of objects: (1) those in act, like a man, and (2) those partly in act and partly potential, as a day or anything in motion. The infinite occurs only as a kind of accident of the being of things in the second group, inasmuch as they are always potential to becoming something they are not yet. However, when we say that God is infinite, we are predicating infinity of something in pure actuality on account of that actuality.

From this it is clear that the infinite in God is not only different from but also opposed to the infinite in creatures:

> Unde contraria est dispositio infinitatis quae potest esse in creaturis et illius quae est in creatore. Illa enim est in semper accipiendo aliquid extra, ita quod acceptum semper sit finitum; sed per alterum et alterum, non sicut in circulo, qui secundum Philosophum[120] similitudinem quamdam habet infiniti, non tamen proprie est infinitum.
>
> In circulo enim idem sumitur multotiens;
> in infinito autem semper sumitur aliquid extra,
> quod numquam fuit prius acceptum
> et hoc in continuis secundum divisiones
> et in discretis secundum appositiones (Ibid.,E).

Creaturely infinity is opposed to divine infinity because it depends on the existence of something outside itself and, hence, is neither whole nor perfect. But a condition should be added to the definition of corporeal infinity in order to distinguish it from the "endlessness" of the circle: it must always be possible to take something from outside which has never before been taken. In the circle, the same thing is taken again each time the circuit is completed, but in the infinite what is taken must always be new. In continuous quantities, which are infinite in divisibility, there must always be new subdivisions of the quantities that are distinct from those already taken up. In discrete quantities, infinite in increase, it must always be possible to put other quantities beside what has been set down.[121] However, there is no such restriction placed on the divine infinite:

> Infinitas autem in creatore, quia in simplici esse et puro consistit, ipsa est in eodem semper accepto, in quo simul rationes infinitorum numerorum et forte specierum entium sunt acceptae simul. Unde contrario modo definiri debet infinitum in creaturis et in deo (Ibid.).

The infinity of God does not consist in taking something outside that which has already been taken, because there is no perfection or aspect of being which does not belong to God as identical with His essence. He, therefore, contains all the aspects of infinite numbers of beings--and perhaps of species of beings--taken together in the unity of the divine essence.[122] The definition of the infinite in God, as that which has all aspects of being in Himself at the same time, is contrary to the definition of the infinite in creatures, as that which always has something outside that which has already been taken:

> De infinito enim in creaturis dicit Philosophus[123] quod est illud, cujus quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid accipere extra. Nos autem de infinito in deo dicimus esse quod est illud cujus quantitatem accipientibus nihil est accipere extra. Propter quod infinitum in deo habet rationem totius et perfecti; infinitum vero in creaturis habet rationem imperfecti et partis. Sic enim (ut dicit Philosophus[124]) nos definimus totum hoc singulare, ut hominem aut arcam, quod est illud cui

> nihil abest. Et similiter sic illud quod est proprie totum et perfectum, cujusmodi scilicet est deus, definimus quod est illud cujus nihil est extra (Ibid., 12^{r}-^{v}F).

The definitions of infinity in God and in creatures are exactly opposite. Since the divine infinite lacks nothing, He has the aspect of the perfect; in containing all, He is whole. The infinite in creatures, however, necessarily lacks something and, hence, has the aspect of the imperfect and of a part. The definition of the whole among singulars, thus contrasted with that of the infinite in quantity, is similar to the definition of the whole and perfect in the proper sense:

> E contrario autem infinitum in creaturis semper est ut pars et imperfectum; secundum enim Philosophum,[125] cujus absentia est extra, non omne est, cum absit. Id est, illud quod est extra quod est aliquid non dicitur 'totum', cum illud abest ei quod est extra ipsum. Et hoc (ut addit alia translatio[126]) sive illud extra quod est aliquid separatum sit extraneum sive non extraneum, ut secundum Commentatorem,[127] contingit in definitione totius in particularibus, quae non sunt tota in rei veritate, cum eis est aliquid extra, licet non sit pars eorum. E contrario autem est in definitione totius in rei veritate, quod est illud cujus nihil est extra omnino, neque de substantia sua neque de alia, secundum quod expositum est supra de perfectione dei[128] (Ibid., 12^{v}F).

The infinite in creatures has the aspect of a part and of the imperfect, because it is not whole or all. For the whole is that which lacks nothing outside it. An addition appears here in the translation of Michael Scot: "whether that something which is outside is something foreign or not foreign to it." The whole in the proper sense, Averroes explains, is not found among particular things (like a man or a box), because there is always something outside their substances. But the whole in the proper sense (the world, for Averroes) lacks nothing belonging to its own substance or foreign to it: there is simply nothing at all outside of it.

This description of the whole in the proper sense is tacitly adopted as the definition of the divine whole by Henry:

> Et haec diversitas contingit in creatore et creaturis, quia a diversis principiis oritur 'infinitas' in creaturis et in creatore. In creatura enim juxta determinationem Philosophi,[129] non oritur 'infinitas' nisi a principio materiali (Ibid.).

The difference between the infinity of creatures and that of God lies in the former's dependence on matter:

> Et ideo accidit quod secundum appositionem non est intelligere infinitum in magnitudinibus; secundum divisionem vero contingit,[130] In numeris autem est e converso, ut dicit Commentator,[131]
>
> quia in creaturis finitas accidit ex forma; infinitas autem ex materia contingit; ut magnitudo non possit transire omnem magnitudinem in infinitum, quoniam tunc possibile esset formam invenire infinitam, quod est impossibile, quia ipsa est causa terminationis et continentiae; et convenit ut diminutio sit in infinitum.

> Causa enim diminutionis est materia, quae est interminata[132] et non terminans. Diminutio enim est ad nihil in re, cujus causa est materia.
>
> E contrario autem contingit in numero, quoniam
>
> additio in quantitate ⟨continua⟩[133] est ex forma, in quantitate ⟨discreta⟩[134] est ex materia;
>
> et divisio in eis est e contrario, quoniam divisio in numeris est ex forma, et in magnitudine ex materia[135] (*Ibid.*).

The infinity of both magnitudes and number is dependent on matter. The former can be infinite by division only and the latter by addition only. For (1) in creatures, form is the determining factor, while matter is the infinite. If a magnitude could exceed every assignable magnitude, form would eventually have to be infinite, for whatever is potential eventually will be actual. However, it would be absurd if the cause of termination were infinite. Hence, the only type of infinity that exists in magnitudes is potentiality to infinite division. But (2) the situation in number is exactly the reverse: It is always possible to add another discrete quantity to any given discrete quantity. The unity of discrete quantity lies in form, with the result that when another unit is added, the addition is from the side of matter. Therefore, addition in number is from matter. (Aristotle notes that the infinite in number is dependent on the infinite divisibility of magnitudes, for it is only inasmuch as one can always take another part of a continuous quantity that one can go on numbering things infinitely. That is, being able to continue counting infinitely depends on having a potential infinity of things to count, which can only occur in the divisibility of magnitudes.[136]) On the other hand, division in number is from form, for the unit in Greek mathematics is indivisible. Number cannot be divided infinitely, because it is impossible (in Greek mathematics) to divide the numbers 2, 3, 4, etc. into smaller parts than the units of which they are composed. Division in discrete quantities is limited and, therefore, belongs to form. To summarize, in continuous quantities division is from matter and addition from form, while in discrete quantities division is from form and addition from matter. The infinity in both cases belongs to matter and finitude to form.[137]

But God's infinity is not material:

> In creatore autem e contrario accidit ei quod contingit in creatura. Cum enim in creatura ex sua forma est finitas ei, quia non subsistit nisi contracta et limitata in supposito; in creatore e contra infinitas ejus a forma consistit, quia omnino illimitata est et incontracta secundum suppositum, sed ex se est quaedam singularitas, ut habitum est supra.[138] Et ideo in actu puro et perfecto tota ratio infinitatis ejus consistit (*Ibid.*).

The natural form only possesses *esse* *existentiae* when contracted into a supposit, which places limitations on the infinity of matter. By its form, then, every existing creature is finite and limited. What infinity it has can only come from its matter and, consequently, is not in act. But God, as a pure, self-subsistent form, is not subject to any limitation or contraction into a supposit. Rather He is of Himself a kind of singular. In lacking any potentiality whatever, He is completely unlimited. Hence, from His pure actuality and perfection follows the aspect of His infinity.

God's perfection, totality, and infinity can be understood as following upon His pure actuality:

> Ut sicut perfectio in ipso est conditio quae sequitur ejus actualitatem absque omni potentiae admixtione, quae quidem perfectio consistit in finis consummatione.[139] Perfectum enim (ut dicit Philosophus[140]) non est nisi illud quod habet complementum (Ibid.).

Perfection follows immediately upon pure actuality in God. For, if He is pure act, He can be potential to nothing and, therefore, has the completion that belongs to the end. But, since the perfect is identical with that which has completion, God is perfect as well. Totality in God follows upon His being, but according to a different intelligible notion:

> Et sicut totalitas in ipso est conditio quae ejus perfectionem continet, quae quidem totalitas consistit in universali esse comprehensione. Totum enim est cujus nihil est extra omnino, ut dictum est supra[141] (Ibid.).

God is potential to nothing and, hence, has nothing outside of Himself. Since the aspect of totality in the proper sense belongs only to what has nothing at all outside itself, God is whole by comprehending the mode of being of every possible creature.

The perfection and totality of God are very closely related, but they are predicated of God according to different intelligible notions. This is explained in a. 43, q. 1:

> Res vero est perfecta inquantum nihil remanet extra eam, et est totum ⟨eo quod quicquid necessarium est ei est⟩[142] in ea. Ipsa igitur respectu multitudinis existentis comprehensae in ea est tota, et secundum hoc quod nihil remansit extra eam est perfecta . . . .[143] Unde quia perfectio est conditio finis, nomen 'perfectionis' imponitur rei a fine suo et complemento, non concernendo in suo significato ea quae in re continentur sub fine et complemento. Res vero dicitur 'tota' quia continet in se omnia quae ad naturam ejus pertinent, sive sit completivum sive aliquid sub completivo (II, 8^{r}B).

The aspect of perfection belongs to God inasmuch as He lacks nothing, but the aspect of wholeness is attributed to Him because He contains all things within Himself. The perfection and totality differ by a distinction of reason, even though they are really identical.

Infinity follows immediately upon the totality and perfection of God:

> Sic infinitas est conditio quae immediate sequitur in ipso ejus totalitatem et simul perfectionem, quae quidem consistit in numquam deveniendo per discursum aliquem ad terminum complementi ejus et perfectionum quas continet in se actu simul, ut magis videbitur in quaestione sequenti.[144] Et haec est infinitas quam omnes loquentes de infinitate primi principii somniabant, licet ab ea

> plures deviabant propter errorem circa ejus essentia et natura, ut dictum est.[145] Unde talis infinitas nihil est aliud quam cujusdam spiritualis magnitudinis immensitas in infinitum spiritualiter protensa, ut amplius dicetur in sequenti quaestione.[146] De qua Propheta dicit in Psalmo,[147] ego cognovi quod magnus est dominus (a. 44, q. 1; 12^{v}F).

Because the completion and perfection of God is without end, and because He contains all perfections within Himself in act, God is infinite in His substance. It is important to note that the infinity of God follows upon the aspects of both perfection and totality, for He must be both perfect and comprehensive of all in order to be infinite. Infinity differs by a distinction of reason from perfection and totality because it adds the note 'without end' to them. Thus, the infinity found in the divine substance is described as a kind of immensity of a spiritual magnitude immaterially infinite in extent. And it is this infinity that the ancient philosophers dreamed about when they attributed infinity to their first principles, though their error concerning its nature prevented them from understanding it clearly. But the Prophet saw the spiritual immensity of God when he said, I know that the Lord is great (Ps. 134, 5).

Divine infinity, inasmuch as it follows upon God's perfection and totality, has its source in the divine being:

> Infinitas igitur quantum ad spiritualem magnitudinem manifeste probatur inesse deo ex hoc quod est esse purum absolutum. Ex eo enim quod tale,est, nullius esse deter-

> minati rationem dicit, sed est ipse ratio essendi omnium perfectiones in se continens, ut habitum est supra,[148] quod esse non posset si finem complementi haberet, qualem finem dat forma in creaturis, cum hoc quod in natura species dat esse completum. Et hoc ideo quia non dat illud nisi secundum rationem determinatam. Propter quod etiam non dat nisi esse finitum, non solum a fine consummante rem in esse, sed a fine consummante et consummationem limitante (*Ibid.*, G).

As pure being, God is perfect being, and, hence, He must comprehend the perfections of every creature within Himself. If there were an end to God's completion, He would be completed in being according to a determinate mode, and this would preclude His comprehending all modes of being. The superabundant fullness of the divine being, therefore, gives rise to an unlimited and indeterminate condition that cannot be found among creatures. For in creatures the form or species gives being in a determinate mode, which can only result in complete and finite being that is limited by an end finishing the being of the creature. Moreover, this end limits the completion of the creature inasmuch as it establishes a state of completion which the creature cannot exceed. No such limitation is possible in the divine being, and so the divine magnitude is endless:

> Unde de tali magnitudine dei infinita intelligitur illud *Psalmum*,[149] *magnus dominus et laudabilis nimis, et magnitudinis ejus non est finis*. *Finis*, scilicet terminum magnitudinis significans, quem comprehendens stet, ut

> nihil quod laudet ulterius comprehendendum restet. Unde dicit glossa,[150] hoc uno verbo dedit cogitare quod non potest capi plene, quia incomprehensibilis est cognitione. Et ideo numquam cesset a laude. Quia enim non est finis magnitudinis ejus, non potes ejus laudem finire. Ex qua glossa manifeste nobis insinuatur ratio infinitatis ejus. Cum enim qualibet quantitate finita data mens nostra majorem potest excogitare, magnitudine autem divina nullam majorem excogitare potest, convincitur ergo concedere divinam magnitudinem esse infinitam (Ibid.).

As Psalm 144, 3 says, God is praiseworthy beyond measure and His magnitude is endless. "End" is to be interpreted as limiting or consuming, not as perfecting. Because God is not bounded, He cannot be comprehended by the human intellect, with the result that the intellect can always give further praise to God. Hence, the incomprehensibility and endless praiseworthiness of God result from the infinity of His magnitude. This is explained in Anselmian phraseology: one can always conceive something greater than any finite quantity and, hence, a quantity than which a greater cannot be thought must be infinite.[151] One is convinced by the divine incomprehensibility that the divine magnitude is infinite. Thus, Henry interprets the first part of the line in the Psalm as following from the second part. He is not holding, as we find in some authors, that the incomprehensibility of God to the created intellect *is* His infinity.[152] Rather, it is a sign that leads us to admit His infinity.

The infinity of God and the finitude of creatures are both formal:

> Et est notandum quod, quamvis infinitas ista et creaturae finitas ambo sunt a forma, hoc tamen est contrario modo.
>
> Omnis enim forma creaturae finitat ipsam, non solum in esse speciei consummando, sed etiam in esse signando, et contra esse alterius speciei limitando, propter quod generis et speciei rationem determinat.
>
> Forma autem divina ita consummat quod non signat, nec contra esse alicujus alterius limitat, quia nec ad speciem aut genus determinatur; sed in esse indeterminato stat, quod per gradus infinitos essendi protenditur, secundum quod perfectiones omnium forte per infinitos gradus producendorum in se continet, ut dictum est[153] (Ibid., H).

The finitude of creatures and the infinity of God result from the diverse types of form found in them: (1) Form is the source of determination in the creature. As formal cause of the thing, it completes the being of the species and designates the being of the composite. At the same time, it prevents the being of another species from existing in this composite. It, therefore, determines the genus and species of the creature. (2) Deity is not the cause of any determination in God. It completes the being of God, but not in such a way as to designate it, limit the being of any species in it, or determine the genus or species. Since deity is identical with God, who is necesse esse, the divine being remains totally indeterminate and, hence, must be extended through infinite grades of being. God's being, thus extended, comprehends the perfections of all things that are or were, and perhaps of all things that can be produced.[154]

Divine infinity is opposed not only to creaturely finitude, but also to creaturely infinity, already shown to be material in origin:

> Ex quo etiam patet quod infinitas perfectionis ejus quantum ad seipsam consistit in simul accepto; quantum autem ad intellectum creatum in semper aliud et aliud secundum rationem intelligendi accipiendo.
>
> Ut sicut infinitas corporis simul existens est magnitudo corporalis, infinitos gradus magnitudinum finitarum in infinitum accipiendarum continens;
>
> sic infinitas essentiae dei est spiritualis magnitudo perfectionis in esse absoluto, infinitos gradus magnitudinum perfectionis in esse in infinitum accipiendarum continens.
>
> Ut sicut corpus infinitum continet in se corporaliter quantitatem mobilis corporis pedalis, bipedalis, et sic in infinitum;
>
> sic essentia dei infinita continet in se spiritualiter quantitatem essendi speciei inanimati, vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationalis, intellectualis, et sic infinitum, ponendo infinitos gradus creaturarum possibiles inter esse dei et esse angeli quantumcumque supremi accipiendi (Ibid., 12^v-13^rH).

The divine infinity with respect to God consists in having the aspects of all perfections of all beings at the same time. But the created intellect is unable to conceive the total perfection of God at the same time; it can do so only successively, putting one perfection after another. The result is that the actually infinite body, which the pre-Socratics thought to exist, is precisely similar to the divine infinite when regarded from the standpoint of the intellect: (1) The infinite body contains infinite grades of finite magnitudes to be taken up infinitely, just as the divine infinite contains infinite grades of creaturely perfections to be taken up infinitely. (2) The infinite body contains in a corporeal manner an infinite number of finite quantities, as the divine infinite comprehends spiritually the being of all species, which are infinite in number if an infinite number of possible grades of beings are posited between the divine being and that of the highest type of creature. Thus, from the side of the intellect the putative infinite body is exactly like the divine infinite. The contrast between them is brought out in the reply to the fourth objection, but here it is at least clear that the quanta contained in the infinite body are taken up successively with respect to the thing as well as with respect to the intellect, whereas the perfections of God exist all together in the divine infinite and are only successive as taken up by the created intellect.

Replies to objections

The first objection argued that the aspect of infinity could only belong to that which is in the category of quantity:

> Ad primum in oppositum, quod ratio infiniti quantitati congruit et non substantiae: Dicendum quod istud

> intelligitur de infinito per extensionem vel partium multitudinem, quale posuerunt philosophi quidem in primo principio, quod ponebant esse corporale, contra quos inducit illud dictum Philosophus.[155] Non autem intelligitur de infinito quod habet rationem perfecti; illud enim solum habet esse in substantia omnino separata a quantitate et materia, secundum quod probat Philosophus[156] quod primus motor, quia est virtutis infinitae, simplex debet esse et immaterialis, abstractus a magnitudine et materia (Ibid., 13^rI).

The infinite that applies only to things in the category of quantity is the infinite in extension or number of parts. Aristotle brings the argument of the objection against those who held that the first principle was one and also infinite in size, which (he argues) can only happen if the first principle is quantity as well as substance and, hence, many. According to Henry, the argument cannot be applied to the perfect infinite, which is in every way withdrawn from quantity and matter. Even Aristotle says that the prime mover must be without matter and magnitude, if it has infinite power. God, in being removed from matter and quantity, has an infinity that is neither material nor quantitative, so the argument must be rejected.

The same consideration answers the second objection:

> Ad secundum patet per idem, quia infinitum incognitum in eo quod est infinitum non est nisi infinitum imperfectum per materiam; formae enim est finitare. Et ideo cum principium cognoscendi non est nisi forma, et

> materia (secundum Philosophum[157]) de se incognita est, et non cognoscitur nisi per analogiam ad formam, oportet quod illud infinitum quod est per materiam inquantum hujusmodi sit incognitum. Cum tamen infinitum quod est deus, quia sua quidditas est per formam, ut dictum est,[158] sit quantum est ex se maxime [in]cognitum[159] (*Ibid.*, K).

The infinite in creatures is potential and connected with matter. Matter, according to Aristotle, is unknown it itself and knowable only through form, which is then the principle of cognition. The infinity of God is not from matter, but from form. As formal, the divine infinite is in itself known in the highest degree, because God's form and His quiddity are identical.

The reply to a. 33, q. 1, ad 1 amplifies this answer:

> Ad primum in oppositum, quod infinitum inquantum infinitum incognitum est, et cetera: Dicendum quod hoc verum est ad litteram de infinito corporali, quia illa infinitas est a materia, ut infra dicetur;[160] et materia (ut dictum est[161]) privat rationem intelligibilis. Non autem de infinito spirituali, cujusmodi est deus, quia haec infinitas est a forma, ut infra dicetur;[162] et forma (ut dictum est[163]) est principium intelligendi. Unde quanto aliquid magis est formale et infinitum infinitate formae, tanto est magis intelligibile quantum est ex se, licet non intellectui indisposito, ut dictum est.[164] Unde si illud dictum Philosophi[165] extendere ad velis infinitum secundum formam, dicendum quod infinitum inquantum infinitum incognitum est quoad intellectum

> creatum, ne possit comprehendere ipsum quoad rationem infinitatis ejus, quia sic solus seipsum intelligit. Non tamen ita incognitum est ei quin aliquo modo ab ipso cognosci et intelligi potest contemperando se sicut vult, quia non naturaliter et de necessitate immutat sed voluntarie quos vult et quantum vult. Unde dictam comparationem de intellectu nostro et oculo vespertilionis exponens, Commentator[166] dicit quod hoc non demonstrat res abstractas intelligere esse impossibile nobis, sicut inspicere solem impossibile est vespertilioni, sed solum notat difficultatem. Unde et licet esset omnino simile ut nullo modo posset deus intelligi ab intellectu creato propter excellentiam splendoris ejus, sicut neque videri lux solis ab oculo vespertilionis; immo quod quantum est ex parte naturae, multo magis visibilis est lux solis ab oculo vespertilionis quam naturaliter divina essentia a mente creata; nihilominus tamen, quantum est ex se, maxime esset intelligibilis, sicut solis lux maxime est visibilis (I, 204^{r}-^{v}M).

The formal infinity of God insures His infinite intelligibility. The Aristotelian argument can only be extended to the divine infinite with a modification: the infinite qua infinite is unknowable with respect to the created intellect. Since no created intellect can comprehend a simultaneously infinite totality, God alone can understand Himself. The human intellect is like the eye of a bat: just as the bat cannot look into the sun because of its brilliance,

so our intellect is unable to know God under the aspect of His formal infinity because He is too highly intelligible. God is, therefore, in the highest degree intelligible, but not with respect to the created intellect. Only material infinity and knowability are mutually exclusive, for formal infinity implies the highest intelligibility.

An appeal to the formal nature of divine infinity also swiftly disposes of the third objection:

> Per idem patet ad tertium. Entitas enim infiniti quod est in potentia est illius quod est per materiam. Entitas autem infiniti quod est per formam, cujusmodi est entitas infinitatis dei, summe est in actu, ut dictum est[167] (II, 13^{r}L).

Aristotle had associated corporeal infinity with matter and potentiality in general. The infinity that is found in God is not material but formal. Since actuality attaches to form, the divine actuality does not preclude but rather necessitates the divine infinity.

The fourth objection is far more serious and difficult and, therefore, requires a longer reply:

> Ad quartum, quod infinitum secundum quantitatem non compatitur secum aliud extra se, ergo nec infinitum per substantiam compatitur aliam substantiam: Dicendum quod infinitum quod non compatitur aliud extra se, hoc est ratione suae perfectionis, ut dictum est supra,[168] et hoc quia perfectum debet esse omne et totum. Secundum enim quod dicit Philosophus, iii Physicorum,[169] 'totum' et 'per-

> fectum' aut idem penitus est aut proximum secundum naturam est. Et disjunctiva artis vera pro utraque parte. Sunt enim penitus idem re et substantia, quia quicquid est totum, eo quod est totum, est perfectum et e converso. Et quoad hoc sunt nomina synonyma, ut dicit Commentator.[170] Sed secundum rationem sunt proxima, quia perfectum est attingendo finem consummantem et complentem in esse. Ut enim dicit Philosophus ibidem,[171] perfectum non est nisi illud quod habet complementum, et complementum est finis. Totum autem, quia non diminuitur ab eo aliqua pars eorum quibus dicitur 'totum', juxta primum modum totius, v *Metaphysicae*.[172] Et sic secundum Commentatorem,[173] sunt nomina sese consequentia (*Ibid.*, M).

The objection states that the infinite in respect of substance does not admit another substance outside of it. In the first place, we ought to recognize that it is not *qua* infinite that the infinite whole does not admit another outside itself but *qua* perfect and whole. 'Perfect' and 'whole', according to Aristotle, are either synonymous or quite close in meaning. Henry thinks that both sides of the disjunctive are true: (1) The perfect and the whole are really identical, because what is complete is the same as what lacks nothing it ought to have. (2) They are proximate according to notion, for a thing is called 'perfect' because it is contiguous with an end that completes and finishes it in being, but 'whole' because it does not lack any part of what is required for its being whole in the relevant respect. Thus, there is a distinction of reason between the perfect and the whole, but they are really identical. There are two types of whole, the particular and the universal:

> Ex eo enim quod aliquid est consummatum in suo esse, continet quicquid pertinet ad perfectionem illius esse,
>
> ut si sit singulare totum, ut homo vel arca, continet quicquid pertinet ad perfectionem illius esse, ita quod nihil ejus sit extra ipsum.
>
> Si vero sit universaliter totum, cujusmodi est deus in ente simpliciter, cujusmodi etiam infinitum corpus esset in ente quanto, si esset in rerum natura, tale, inquam, totum universaliter continet quicquid pertinet ad perfectionem esse universaliter,
>
> vel esse simpliciter, et hoc quoad id quod est totum universaliter in esse simpliciter,
>
> vel esse quanti, et hoc quoad id quod est totum universaliter in esse quanti.
>
> Unde, ut dictum est supra,[174] universaliter totum nihil potest habere extra se separatum, sive extraneum sive non extraneum (Ibid.).

The particular whole contains everything required for the perfection of that being. The universally whole comprehends everything that pertains to the perfection of being taken universally, and this can occur in two ways: (1) The universally whole in being taken simply, which is God, comprehends all that pertains to the perfection of being taken simply. (2) The whole in quantitative being, which the infinite body would be, if it existed, would contain all that relates to the perfection of quantitative being. In either case, the universal whole cannot lack anything that is either foreign to it or not foreign to it:

> Perfectum igitur universaliter in quantitate, cujusmodi esset quantum extensione infinitum, nihil quanti compatitur extra se separatum, neque extraneum neque non extraneum, ut si terra esset infinita non compateretur secum aliquid extra, neque extraneum, ut ignem et aquam, neque non extraneum, ut aliquid terrae quod non est infra ipsam ut pars ejus. Ex illa enim parte qua haberet aliquid extra, esset finitum et haberet tangens se et non occuparet totum.
>
> Similiter perfectum universaliter in esse simpliciter, cujusmodi est deus, nihil ens compatitur extra se separatum, neque extraneum neque non extraneum. Non extraneum, ut alium in natura deitatis, quia deitas non potest esse nisi in se quaedam singularitas. Extraneum, ut creaturam quae alterius naturae et essentiae esset a deo, quae non esset infra ipsum (*Ibid.*).

The universally perfect in quantity, like the putative infinitely extended body, would not admit another quantum outside of itself, whether what lay outside were part of its substance or other than it. For example, the earth, if it were infinite, could not have fire or water, which are foreign to it, outside of itself. Nor could it tolerate any earth, which properly belongs to its substance, outside and not part of itself. The reason for this is that the part outside would bound it in some way, with the result that it would be neither infinite nor whole. The universally perfect in being taken simply, like God, is compatible with no being whatever outside itself and separate from it. That is, there is only one God, because God in Himself is a kind of singular.[175] Further, there can be no creature other in nature and essence from God that is not part of Him in some way. The infinite body and God are similar in comprehending all within themselves, but the manner of the comprehension is different in the two cases:

> Non dico ut pars esse dei, sicut dicebant potentes esse dei, quo deus est, esse cujuslibet entis esse, ut habitum est supra,[176] sicut extra terram infinitam non est terra, quia non est terra omnino quae non sit infra ipsam ut pars ejus et cujus quantitas sit pars quantitatis terrae infinitae. Hoc enim est magnae imperfectionis, quia habet rationem diversitatis et compositionis.
>
> Sed dico sicut ratio essendi. Deus enim, ex quo est ipsum esse subsistens in suo esse, habet omnem rationem essendi, non ut universaliter, sicut habet genus in se differentias, neque distincte secundum rem, sicut infinitum quantum, quod, si esset totum et omne, haberet in se partes suas diversas in substantia secundum diversitatem situum, sed easdem non diversas secundum figuras. Haec enim est differentia inter totum et omne, ut supra expositum est.[177] Sed habet deus in suo esse omnem rationem essendi (ut dicit Dionysius[178]) inconfusibiliter, et hoc contra confusionem quae est in universali, et unite, et hoc contra distinctionem partium quae est in quanto infinito, quod simul est totum et

omne (Ibid.).

The being of God does not depend on the being of anything else. Hence, God does not comprehend all within Himself as parts upon which He, as an infinite whole, would depend. This situation is found in the infinite quantum, e.g. an infinite earth, which must contain every bit of earth within itself as a part. This way of comprehension is denied to God because His unity and simplicity admit no composition of any sort. Rather, God comprehends all by having every mode of being within Himself, because He is subsistent being. His manner of comprehension is distinct from that of the genus, which contains differentiae only confusedly, inasmuch as it is potential to actual existence in a determinate supposit, and from that of the infinite quantum, which contains other quanta as parts distinct in position. The infinite quantum is both whole and all because it not only contains all quanta as parts but also has them as unities, i.e. discrete quanta. The divine infinite can never be described as 'all', but it can be called 'whole', if the parts that the term implies are not understood as quantitative or distinct by position.[179] Hence, God is whole by comprehending in His subsistent being every mode of being unconfusedly and in a unified fashion.

This notion of wholeness and perfection is quite difficult for the human intellect to comprehend, because it operates discursively:

> Et est iste modus essendi plura in eodem mirabilis multum et ineffabilis nobis. Quia tamen ita sit, ipsa veritate rationabiliter coacti cogimur confiteri.
>
> Et est consimilis modus essendi plura in eodem in

> creatura, ut si forma generis esset aliqua una natura in se singularis, et similiter quaelibet differentiarum sub ipsa, excedente tamen in gradu dignitatis et naturae forma generis super formas differentiarum; ita quod forma generis contineret in se sub excellentiori gradu rationem utriusque differentiae in actu, sicut modo continet in potentia, quas quidem rationes continerent in se singulae differentiae sub gradu inferiori.
>
> Vel est similitudo validior in anima intellectiva, si in eodem simplici per essentiam haberet rationale, sensibile, et vegetabile gradu excellentiori quam esset in aliis divisim, hic vegetabile solum, illic sensibile solum, et alibi rationale solum (Ibid., 13^{r}-^{v}M).

The conclusion that God is an infinite whole comprehending all unconfusedly and in a unified fashion has been forced upon us by our reasonings, though it is quite incomprehensible to us. Some imagined examples may aid our understanding: (1) Many creatures would be contained in one genus in this fashion, if there were a subsistent genus that contained all its differentiae in act. The genus would have each differentia in a more perfect mode than it could exist by itself in a singular. (Genera, of course, are not singulars unless determined in a determinate supposit. As absolute essences they contain all differentiae only potentially, because such essences have no esse existentiae.) (2) Similarly, if there were an intellective soul that essentially contained rational, sensible, and vegetable souls in a way more excellent than that in which they exist separately, many souls would be contained in it in the manner in which God contains all beings in His being. (The three parts of the soul are actually subjective parts of a universal whole, which is soul, so that they are not unified in the way imagined.[180])

Though we do not see clearly the manner in which God is whole, it is at least clear that the infinite in quantity does not comprehend all things in the same way that the divine infinite does:

> Ad formam ergo argumenti, quod infinitum quantum non compatitur aliud quantum secum, ergo nec infinita substantia aliud in substantia secum compatitur: Dicendum quod non est simile, quia quantum infinitum in uno simplici non habet inconfusibiliter et unite rationem omnis quanti, sed divisibiliter et distincte (Ibid., 13^{v}N).

The parts contained in the infinite quantum are distinct and divisible, not unified as the modes of being found in God. Therefore, it is true of the infinite quantum that no quantum can lie outside of it in any way:

> Et ideo cum ad infinitum perfectum pertineat quod contineat totum, quod illius naturae est secundum quam est infinitum, ut habitum est,[181]
>
> vel oportet quod quantum non sit infinitum perfectum,
>
> vel quod contineat in se omne quantum divisibiliter et distincte, et ita ut partem suam. Si enim aliquod esset extra, esset separatum, tangens, et apponibile per continuitatem; et sic non esset nisi infinitum in potentia et per appositionem, ut numquam esset infinitum in actu quousque esset ei appositum quantum, ultra quod

> non esset possibilis appositio quanti, et extra quod non posset esse aliud quantum. (Ibid.).

Since a perfect infinite cannot lack any perfection, it must be a whole containing every completion of its nature. Hence, either the infinite quantum is not perfect, or, if perfect, it contains every quantum as a distinct part. For, since a perfect infinite must be infinite in act and potential to no completion of its nature, as long as some quanta exist separately from the infinite quantum, it lacks some part of itself and, hence, is neither perfect nor whole. The case is quite different with regard to the substantial infinite:

> Infinitum vero substantia, cujusmodi est deus in uno simplici esse, secundum quod est infinitum quod est sua substantia, inconfusibiliter et unite habet omnem rationem essendi. Et ideo cum ad rationem infiniti perfecti non plus pertineat quam quod totum, quod est illius naturae secundum quam est infinitum, in se contineat, non obstante quod aliquid divisum secundum substantiam a deo simul habet esse cum deo, deus est infinitus perfecte. Per substantiam enim illam non est apponibile esse dei aliqua ratio essendi, quia nihil habet rationem essendi aliquam quae non sit in illo in gradu multo eminentiori, ut saepe dictum est[182] (Ibid.).

God is infinite according to His substance, which is simple being. As perfect infinite, He need comprehend no more than everything that belongs to the nature according to which He is infinite, that is everything that pertains to being. Therefore, He is perfectly infinite by comprehending every mode of being in a simple and unified manner. The infinity of God is not affected by the existence of another substance outside of Himself, because, inasmuch as He is infinite, He already contains the mode of being of that substance in a more excellent way. In contrast to the infinite quantum that admits another quantum outside itself, God does not lack anything by admitting another substance separate from Him, and, hence, nothing can be added to His being, according to which He is infinite.

From this it is also clear that God with the universe of creatures is no better than God without it:

> Ita quod, cum perfectio dei in esse sit ex ratione bonitatis naturalis in ipso ultimate et consummate, ut habitum est,[183] et ex ratione talis perfectionis sit in ipso ratio infinitatis, ut planius habebitur in quaestione sequenti,[184] sicut non est majus bonum deus cum universitate creaturarum quam solus deus per se, ut patebit loquendo de creaturis, sic non est major perfectio aut infinitas secundum esse, bonitatem, et perfectionem in deo cum universitate creaturarum quae sunt, fuerunt, poterunt esse quam sit in ipso solo per se (Ibid.).

Since God's perfection follows upon His goodness and gives rise to His infinity, God is not more infinite, more perfect, or better with the universe of creatures than without them. For He already contains the mode of being of every possible creature, past, present, and future, with the result that no addition can make Him better, more perfect, or more infinite.

Therefore, the presence of creatures outside of God does not conflict with the infinity of God:

> Quod ergo extra dei essentiam sunt essentiae creaturarum, hoc nullo modo repugnat divinae perfectionis infinitati; immo attestatur ei magis. Ex bonitatis enim divinae et perfectionis exuberantia in sua infinitate, non ex aliqua sua indigentia et imperfectione, producit alia a se, quibus suum esse communicat, non per essentiam, sed per participationem quamdam, non secundum idem esse; quemadmodum illa quibus data est virtus generativa, quae propter imperfectum esse speciei in individuis producunt alia a se, quibus communicant eamdem essentiam specie secundum aliud esse (Ibid.).[185]

Far from opposing the infinite perfection of God, the existence of creatures bears witness to it. For it is by the superabundant perfection and goodness of God that He produces outside Himself creatures to whom He gives participated being. The case is similar to that of plants and animals which produce other members of the same species that are other in being from themselves. However, the individuals of the natural species do so on account of the imperfection of the species, not by such infinite perfection and goodness as we find in God. Indeed, even the infinite quantum could have quanta outside itself, if it were similar to God:

> Similiter si ex quanto infinito propter perfectionis suae exuberantiam producerent⟨ur⟩ alia quanta in diversa substantia, quae solum haberent quantitatis illius

> quamdam participationem, qua dicerentur 'quanta', ita quod omnes rationes participandi quantitatem essent in illa quantitate infinita per essentiam, et essent plura quanta participantia quantitatem, non repugnaret infinitati perfectionis quanti infiniti per essentiam; immo
>
> sicut esse dei et essentia simul sunt ubique cum esse et essentia creaturae, immo sine illa nec ista essent,
>
> sic quantitas illa per essentiam simul essent cum istis habentibus quantitatem per participationem, immo nec ista essent quanta sine quantitate illius.(Ibid.).

If there were quanta substantially distinct from the infinite quantum, and if there were quanta only by participation of quantity, the infinite quantum would comprehend the modes of all participating quantities. It would then be whole and perfect. In fact, just as God, as cause of being, is everywhere at the same time with creatures, so the infinite quantum, as cause of quantity, would be everywhere with the participating quanta.

But how God can be infinite and yet have something outside Himself also caused the ancients difficulties:

> Quod non potentes antiquitus quidam[186] discernere, quomodo videlicet perfectioni divinae, bonitatis, et infinitati et esse ejus non obstat quod alia sunt simul cum illa et extra eam per essentiam, videre non potuerunt quin bonitas et esse creaturae, si esset re aliud a bonitate et esse dei, aliquid apponeret supra bonitatem

> et esse dei, ut majus, melius, et perfectius bonum esset deus cum creaturis quam per se (Ibid.).

It seemed to some ancients that God's being, goodness, perfection, and infinity were in conflict with the existence of anything outside God's substance. Hence, they thought that, if there were a creature outside Him that was other in goodness and being from God, God would be greater, better, and more perfect with that creature than without it. Henry points out that three avenues of escape from this conclusion were followed:

> Et ideo cum non potuerunt istud concedere, quidam dixerunt quod esse et substantia cujuslibet creaturae, in eo quod est, est aliqua portio substantiae dei et divini esse.
>
> Alii vero dixerunt quod esse dei esset esse formale omnis rei, secundum quod de hoc habitum est supra sufficienter[187] (Ibid.).

The first two solutions to the problem are clearly heretical. In a. 29, q. 1, Henry, quoting Augustine, attributes the second to the Manicheans, who held that things have life and being from the God of light but receive their corporeal part from the god of darkness.[188] This opinion leads directly to the first solution, since being in God is identical with His substance.[189] This first solution is attributed to Hermes Trismegistus, who thought that God is everything that is and that all things are full with God.[190] The third solution is the true one:

> Alii vero praedicta bene discernentes, non dicebant quod creatura est aliquid divinae essentiae vel

> informata esse illo quod deus est, sed quod creaturae habent essentiam et esse participata ex perfectione et infinitate divina exuberante in alia, secundum illa quae perfectius habet in se, quasi divinum esse sit esse cujusdam generis per essentiam, continens in sua perfectione in actu esse omnium differentiarum quas per participationem accipiunt diversae species. Si enim formae rerum materialium essent per essentiam separatae, ut imponitur dictum fuisse a Platonicis, quanto forma abstracta esset communior, tanto esset perfectior et actualior (Ibid.).

The solution is true in general, because it recognizes that creatures are not parts of the being of God, but rather participate being given to them by God. As a. 21, q. 2 explains, the being of creatures is participated, imitative, and secondary and, therefore, is not the same as the being of God, nor has it anything in common with it, for the term 'being' is applied to creatures only by extrinsic denomination.[191] The divine being contains the mode of being of every creature in a more perfect manner than that in which it exists in the creature. The divine being can, therefore, be viewed as a kind of subsistent genus containing in act the differentiae of all beings, which then participate it. The case would be like that of the Platonic forms, which are superior to forms in matter in that they are common to many. (Of course, Henry does not admit the existence of Platonic forms, or any subsistent universal. Nor does he think that God is a subsistent genus, as we have seen. But the comparison does clarify the view being considered.) Three formulations of this last solution are known to Henry:

> Et ideo dixerunt quidam ex istis illud quod recitat Apostolus in _Actibus_,[192] loquens philosophis Atheniensibus, et dicit, _quidam_ _vestrorum_ _poetarum_ _dixerunt_ (Aratus scilicet et Homerus), '_Ipsius_ _genus_ _sumus_', quasi scilicet generalem naturam esse ejus participantes (_Ibid._).

The first statement indicates that we are God's genus (or tribe), which Henry interprets as a general nature of being which we participate. On the face of it, this opinion does not seem acceptable, but, as it is used in _Acts_ 17, 28, it simply points out that God is not distant from creatures. The second opinion is that of Hermes:

> Dixerunt etiam ex eadem sententia quidam alii ex eis quod omnia plena sunt deo, . . .[193] (_Ibid._).

This view has already been pronounced heretical in a. 29, q. 1, as we have seen. Its appearance here is rather strange, for, according to a. 29, q. 1, it ought to belong to the first solution given above. But it seems to be used here like '_Ipsius_ _genus_ _sumus_' to indicate the nearness of creatures to God. The third opinion is that of Paul:

> . . . juxta quorum[194] sententiam Paulus formavit et suam cum dixit,[195] _deus_, _qui_ _fecit_ _mundum_ _et_ _omnia_ _quae_ _in_ _eo_ _sunt_, _hic_ _caeli_ _et_ _terrae_ _cum_ _sit_ _dominus_, _non_ _in_ _manufactis_ _templis_ _habitat_; _nec_ _manibus_ _humanis_ _colitur_ _indigens_ _aliquo_, _cum_ _ipse_ _det_ _omnibus_ _vitam_ _inspirationem_ _et_ _omnia_. _Fecitque_ _ex_ _uno_ _omne_ _genus_ _hominum_ _inhabitare_ _super_ _universam_ _faciem_ _terrae_,

> *definiens statuta tempora, et terminos habitation⟨i⟩s*[196] *eorum, quaerere deum; si forte attrectent eum, aut inveniant, quamvis non longe sit ab unoquoque nostrum. In ipso enim vivimus, movemur, et sumus* (Ibid., 13^{v}-14^{r}N).

The opinions of Aratus and Homer and Hermes are reformulated by Paul. God is the cause of the world and its contents, and He does not depend on any creature. He made the race of men so that they could seek and find Him. However, He is not far from us, *for in Him we live, move, and exist*. The lines point out both the independence of God from creatures and His nearness to them. The last phrase, of course, is the problematic one, and Henry quotes several Augustinian glosses on the text in order to explain it:

> Ubi dicit glossa,[197] quia id operatur in nobis quod vivimus, movemur, et sumus, et hoc est opus quo continet omnia, quia ejus sapientia pertingit *a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter*;[198] per hanc dispositionem in illo vivimus, movemur, et sumus. Quod si hoc opus suum rebus subtraxerit, nec movebimur, nec vivemus, nec erimus (*Ibid.*).

It is only because God works in us that we live, move, or are. The creature is totally dependent on God. But by operating within creatures, God contains all things, so that in Him we live, move, and are. The second gloss points out that this does not mean that we are not substantially distinct from God:

> Et ut dicit alia glossa,[199] neque tamquam ejus substantia in illo sumus, sicut dicitur vitam habere in semetipso. Sed cum aliud sumus quam ipse, non aliud in ipso sumus,

> nisi quia id operatur quod vivimus, movemur, et sumus. Caelum et terra et omnia quae in eis sunt, universa scilicet spiritualis et corporalis creatura, non in seipsa manet, sed in illo, quia quod non est in ipso, de quo dicitur *ex ipso et in ipso et per ipsum omnia*,[200] nihil est. Etiam si aliquid esse res habeat in seipsa, perfectius habet in illo, quia *quod factum est ab ipso, in ipso vita erat*,[201] et sine ipso nec vita nec vivens erat (*Ibid.*).

Creatures are not parts of the divine substance; yet they have a more perfect kind of existence in God, without whom they could not exist. This implies not only that every creature has existence as a divine idea, but also that its mode of being is comprehended in divine being:

> Et hoc non solum per suam ideam in divina sapientia, secundum quod dicit Augustinus, *Sermo I Super Joannem*,[202] terra facta est, sed ipsa quae facta est non est vita; est autem in ipsa sapientia sempiternaliter[203] ratio quaedam, qua terra facta est, haec est vita, sed per esse in divina essentia, ut expositum est supra[204] (*Ibid.*).

Creatures exist sempiternally in the divine wisdom and also in the divine essence as the modes of being comprehended by subsistent being.

The reply to the fourth objection has solved a major aporia regarding the attribution of infinity to God. The divine infinite has been shown to be completely unlike the infinite quantum in the manner of its comprehension of all things in itself. While the infinite quantum can only contain other quanta as distinct parts of itself, God comprehends all beings by containing the modes of being of all possible creatures in a unified manner within subsistent being. The infinite in quantity, if it existed, could only be perfect if it allowed no quantum to exist outside itself, whereas God already contains the modes of all possible beings within Himself in a manner superior to that in which they can exist outside of Him and, hence, can admit substances separate from Himself without wounding His perfection and totality. The solution has taken the form we anticipated in discussing the objections: the infinite in substance has been shown not to be parallel to the infinite in quantity.

The reply to a. 21, q. 1, arg. 2 likewise denies the proposed likeness between God and the quantitative infinite:

> Ad secundum, quod infinitum simile non compatitur et contrarium destruit: Dicendum quod est infinitum extensione, de illo verum est quod dimensiones suae totum locum occupant. Et ideo non compatitur secum aliquod dimensionatum; aliquid tamen non dimensionatum bene secum compateretur. Infinitum vero virtute et simplicitate, cujusmodi est deus, nullum ens expellit; immo omne ens penetrat et continet et compatitur secum, sicut causa causatum (I, 123^{v}D).

The infinite in extension, though admitting non-quantitative entities outside itself, must have within itself every quantum. The divine infinite, which is not infinite in quantity, is not opposed to the existence of other substances; in fact, He is necessary to them as their cause. Further, since evil and non-being have no effect on the goodness and being of God, the divine infinite is also compatible with their existence:

> Nec solum ens et bonum, sed et defectum entis et malum, quia non est aliquid contrarium bono quod ipse est formaliter, eo quod malum non privat bonum quod ipse est, sed bonum aliquod creaturae cui contrariatur. Et ideo per suam existentiam non destruit omne illud malum quod contrariatur bono creaturae, sicut ipsum habet destruere per suam existentiam ipsum bonum creaturae quod natum est destrui per ipsum malum. Sed si destruit quandoque malum illud, hoc facit nostra voluntate inquantum ei contrariatur ut deordinativum a fine omnis entis, quod ipse est; qua voluntate sua ita est bonus et potens super omne malum destruendum, quod nullo modo mala fieri in operibus suis permitteret nisi de malo illo aliquod eliceret bonum, et sic in finem et decentiam universi ordinaret, sicut dicit beatus Augustinus in Enchiridion,[205] et sicut dicit beatus Gregorius,[206] quae deus iratus permittit, sic tolerat ut in consilii sui usum vertat. Unde fit ut quod sine voluntate dei agitur, voluntati ejus contrarium non sit, quia dum in usum bonum mala vertuntur, ejus consilio militant etiam quae repugnant (Ibid.).

The evil and non-being that are in the universe are not contrary to the good and being subsistent in God, for they have no effect whatever on Him. Hence, His infinite goodness and being do not destroy them. If God destroys evil, He does so not by His substance but by our will, inasmuch as evil is contrary to the end of the creature. Indeed, He would not allow evil to exist if He were not able to put it to good use, and in this judgment Augustine and Gregory concur.

A. 21, q. 1, ad 2 seems to depend on the same doctrine that we find explicitly and fully stated in a. 44, q. 1, ad 4, that is, that the divine infinite is not like the infinite in quantity in its manner of comprehending all things, and, consequently, it can allow them to exist distinctly from itself.[207]

The fifth objection is summarily dismissed by denying that God is the imperfect infinite:

> Ad quintum, quod non cujus nihil est extra, sed cujus semper aliquid est extra, hoc est infinitum, cujusmodi non est deus: Dicendum quod illud dictum est de infinito imperfecto, quod possibile est esse in rerum natura, quale non est deus. Sed est infinitum perfectum, cujus ratio est quod nihil est extra eum, ut patet ex praedeterminatis[208] (a. 44, q. 1; II, 13^{v}0).

The infinite that is whole (i.e. has nothing of its nature outside itself) does not exist in nature. Only the imperfect infinite, which depends upon potentiality to further completion can exist among creatures. God is perfectly infinite, because He has the aspects of all beings, possible and actual, within His being. Hence, the Aristotelian description of the infinite applies to the infinite in quantity, which does not exist other than imperfectly, but not to the divine infinite, which is perfect.

The answer to the sixth objection requires a distinction of the meanings of 'end':

> Ad sextum, quod deus habet complementum et finem, et 'infinitum' dicitur privatione finis: Dicendum quod est finis consummans, quod est perfectio cujuslibet rei, ut dicitur in iv modo finis, in v *Metaphysicae*,[209] et finis consumens, quod est ultimum uniuscujusque, a quo nihil extra invenitur, ut dicitur in primo et secundo modo finis. Ubi dicit Commentator,[210] ut superficies sunt ultima corporis et lineae superficiei et puncta linearum et orbis stellarum corporum quae sunt intus, quoniam extra ipsum nihil est, et similiter cutis animalis (*Ibid.*, P).

In *Metaphysics*, Δ, 17, Aristotle distinguishes four senses of 'end': (1) that beyond which it is impossible to find a part of a thing, (2) the form of a spatial magnitude, (3) the final cause, (4) the essence of a thing, which is the limit of knowledge. Henry classifies (4) as the completing end of a thing, which places no restriction on the thing. (1) and (2) are found only in quantitative substances, on which they place spatial restrictions. The end that is the perfection of God is end in the first sense:

> Finis primo modo dictus est 'finis complementum', et congruit maxime deo, quia ipse est finis et complementum omnium, ut dictum est supra.[211] De fine secundo modo intelligitur illud quod 'infinitum' dicitur privatione finis, et hoc de infinito imperfecto. Talem enim finem

> dat forma in quantitate cum hoc quod dat perfectionem, et privatio ejus est ex materia, ut dicit Commentator, *Super iii Physicorum*,[212] et habitum est supra.[213] De infinito autem perfecto, sive spirituali sive corporali, utrum dicatur 'infinitum' privatione finis, patebit in quaestione sequenti[214] (*Ibid.*).

The first sense of end belongs to God because He is the final cause of all things, but the second sense applies only to spatial magnitudes. It is by privation of end in the second sense that 'infinite' seems to be applied, because it denies a form required by matter for the perfection of a corporeal thing. Perfection such as is found in God is according to the first sense and, hence, does not conflict with 'infinite' said by privation of end in the second sense. But whether 'infinite' is said by privation of end at all is left for consideration in the second question.

CHAPTER IV

HENRY OF GHENT, SUMMA, ARTICLE 44 (II)

Introductory Note

In the first question, Henry has shown that infinity must be attributed to God. As a predicate following upon 'perfect' and 'whole', 'infinite' seems to have been given a positive signification already. Yet the name itself is negative in form. The apparent conflict between these two facts gives rise to a discussion of the manner in which the term is applied to God. This discussion naturally depends heavily upon Henry's general doctrine on the mode of signification of the terms that refer to the divine attributes. A long and elaborate consideration of positive and negative theology in relation to the divine attributes is given in a. 32, q. 4, "Utrum deo attributa significant de ipso aliquid positive an negative". As a preliminary to the treatment of a. 44, q. 2, we shall, therefore, examine briefly a. 32 and its sources.

Henry quotes extensively from four authors in a. 32, q. 4, Augustine, Dionysius, Avicenna, and Moses Maimonides, who seem not only to be used as corroborative evidence for Henry's views, but also to be the actual sources for his position (especially in the case of Moses Maimonides).

Henry draws briefly upon Augustine's De Doctrina Christiana, I, v-vi, in which Augustine confesses that it is rather difficult to find a name suitable to the excellence of God.[1] On the one hand, all words seem insufficient to express what we desire to say about God. The reason is that God is ineffable. But we cannot even assert this if He is truly ineffable, for to affirm 'God is ineffable' is already to say something about Him. Hence, it appears that we are forced to remain silent. On the other hand, God asks us to worship Him in our own words. The seeming conflict between the two positions can be resolved by referring to Him as 'God'. For, although the word itself conveys nothing about the nature of God, yet "it moves us to think of a most excellent and immortal nature,"[2] The theory underlying this is that what is beyond our intellect can only be expressed imperfectly. Hence, we must refer to it with a non-descriptive name that merely points to what we wish to signify.

Dionysius' theory of negative, positive, and superlative theology is expounded in the short De Mystica Theologia: We make affirmations of God, calling Him 'good', 'wise', 'being', etc., but we do so only on the ground that God is the cause of these attributes in creatures.[3] Actually, we must immediately negate all the attributes previously affirmed of God, for He is above every caused nature. Since the affirmative attributes taken from creatures and applied to God carry with them the defect that they have in creatures,[4] our affirmations are conditional only, though our negations are proper.[5] But the statement (e.g.) 'God is not good' does not indicate a privation in God, but rather is intended to imply that He is above the goodness that exists in creatures.[6] The super-goodness of God is above the intellect,[7] and also above every affirmation and denial.[8] Hence, we must proceed from positive theology, through negative theology, ultimately arriving at mystical (superlative) theology, which both subsumes and leaves behind the two previous methods.[9] Dionysius thus knows three types of divine attributes: (1) positive, which are only conditionally affirmed of God, as cause of the perfections found in creatures, (2) negative, which are properly predicated of God, because He is above the defective attributes that are perfections in creatures, (3) superlative, which locate God above the created order and surpass both affirmation and denial.

Tract VIII of the Metaphysics of Avicenna contains two texts on the divine attributes in general: The first property of necessary being is quia est, et quia est ens, but there are other properties that belong to God as well. Of these some are attributed by relation, while others are mixed with negation.[10] Those which are predicated by relation do not introduce any plurality into the divine being, for the relations are caused essences following God's essence and, hence, not part of it.[11] Some properties are simply mixed with negation. 'Substance', for example, is imposed to indicate that God is not in a subject. Others are predicated only through relation, as 'first' indicates God's priority with respect to every other thing. Still others are both mixed with negation and ascribed through relation; in this way 'generous' signifies that God does not turn His efforts toward Himself.[12] In these texts Avicenna introduces a negative meaning into seemingly positive divine attributes and admits relations between God and creatures. He speaks only of attributes that are negative in meaning or relative, apparently excluding attributes that are non-relative and positive on the ground that these would imply some multiplicity in the divine essence.[13]

The Guide for the Perplexed of Moses Maimonides contains a long section[14] devoted to the divine attributes and the propriety of applying various types of names to God. The divine attributes may represent either essential properties or properties superadded to the essence of God.[15] The first are excluded from the divine essence on account of its unity. Further, there can be no accidents in God, which the second would entail. Now affirmative attributes include (1) definitions, (2) parts of definitions, (3) qualities, (4) relations, and (5) actions. (1) God cannot be defined, since there are no higher causes in terms of which this could be done, and (2) He cannot be described by a part of a definition, for this would imply that His essence was compound. (3) None of the four types of quality (physical dispositions, physical qualities, passive qualities or emotions, quantitative qualities) can be predicated of God, because the presence of an accident in God would wound His unity. (4) God and creatures do not belong to the same class (for the one has necesse esse, whereas the others have possibile esse) and, hence, there can be no relations between them. Further, if God could be described by relations, though the relations would not be accidents of His essence, yet He would still be in some sense subject to the accident of relation, which would imply plurality in His essence. Relations cannot be the bases of the divine attributes, but they are the best bases yet encountered, for, if interpreted less than literally, they do not imply plurality or change in the divine essence. (5) But of all the grounds, action is surely the best, for it introduces no plurality whatever into the divine being, since the actions of God are entirely separate from His essence and result from nothing superadded.[16]

Any theory of divine attributes that implies in God corporality, emotion or change, non-existence or potentiality, or similarity with creatures must be rejected.[17] Similarity is based upon relation, and no relation can exist between God and any of His creatures. Thus, the predication of existence, life, power, wisdom, will, priority, posteriority, etc. to the divine essence cannot be grounded in any similarity between God and creatures. The names are purely equivocally applied in the two realms.[18] If such names mean anything, they indicate the negation of the opposite in God and do not represent essential attributes. But even under this interpretation, they are misleading.[19]

The only way in which God can be properly described is through negative attributes. These are similar to the positive attributes in being of perfectly general implication; e.g., 'animal' does not express more than 'neither plant nor mineral', nor does 'neither plant nor mineral' express more than 'animal'. But negative attributes differ from positive in that the former do not purport to describe the essence of the thing to which they are ascribed, as the latter do. Thus, negative attributes imply neither essential nor accidental properties in the divine essence. Further, they convey the highest knowledge of God possible to the created intellect, for the divine essence is unknowable to us and, hence, is inexpressible by means of positive attributes. All we can know of God positively is that He exists and that He created and governs creatures.[20] Proof that certain things are to be denied of God through negations does, however, yield knowledge. In fact, it is the only true knowledge of God that is possible, for the affirmation of qualities really represents a negation on the real level, since the attributes affirmed are perfections only in relation to us and also imply plurality in God.[21]

Three types of divine attributes are admitted by Moses: (1) positive attributes referring to God's actions,[22] (2) positive attributes that imply the negation of the opposite, (3) negative attributes. None of these describes the essence of God. The *Tetragrammaton* alone can indicate the divine essence, and even it can only be God's true *nomen proprium* because it is completely non-descriptive.[23]

The *resolutio* of Henry's *Summa*, a. 32, q. 4 points out that there are two possible types of attributes that can be taken up from creatures and applied to God: (1) those depending on some likeness between God and creatures, (2) those that are properly attributed to Him. The first signify positively in creatures, but they posit nothing in God, except a kind of likeness. There are two ways in which this can occur: (a) The attribute is predicated because God contains the perfections of all things; (b) The attribute is applied on account of some property in God. The weight of the whole question, therefore, hangs on the attributes which are predicated per proprietatem. Such attributes signify in one of four ways: (1) positively and absolutely, (2) positively and in a certain respect, (3) negatively and absolutely, (4) negatively and in a certain respect. Further, it must be asked whether all, some, or none of the divine attributes signify in each of these ways. Consequently, there are twelve parts to the question.[24]

The responsio approaches the question from a different standpoint. First, Henry distinguishes two ways in which the signification of divine attributes may be studied: (1) from the point of view of the things that are signified (denotation), (2) from the point of view of the mode of the signification (connotation). 'Lapis' and 'petra', for example, signify the same things (have the same denotation), but they do so from different angles (with different connotations).

As regards the denotation of the names of the divine attributes, one may hold either (a) that we understand what is signified distinctly and in particular or (b) that we merely intend to signify something distinctly and particular. Henry thinks that no divine name can signify positively in the first way. But, since the names we are considering have been taken up from creatures (which they signify positively),[25] we can understand generally and incompletely what is to be signified.[26] The authorities also support this: Dionysius holds that God cannot be understood by any created intellect. Rabbi Moses writes that attributes like truth and goodness can be understood distinctly and in particular in creatures, but only generally in God, and he notes that the names taken from creatures and applied to God are really said equivocally in the two realms. Further, Moses, Augustine, and Dionysius seem, in Henry's view, to agree that we use negative words to signify something positive in God, although we do not understand perfectly what we intend to express by the negations. Henry here draws on several texts of Moses that do not imply that negative terms are applied to God for any other reason than that of preventing our having erroneous conceptions of Him.[27] The line taken from Augustine is rather non-committal when viewed in its context.[28] And the passage from Dionysius is mistranslated by Eriugena: the original text says no more than that theologians are accustomed to apply privations to God.[29] Either because of the mistranslation of the Dionysian text or from some other motive, Henry imposes on these authors a doctrine of positive signification of negative divine names, which (so far as we know) is Henry's own innovation. His conclusion, insofar as it relates to the question under discussion, is that no divine name signifies positively and absolutely anything distinctly and perfectly understood by us.[30]

But we do intend to signify something positively by every name that we take from creatures and (equivocally) apply to God. In this way, we intend to imply that the attribute is in God per eminentiam, as identical with His essence.[31] Thus, according to Henry, Dionysius thinks we should call God 'super-good', 'super-wise', etc. to signify positively the existence of goodness, wisdom, etc. in an eminent fashion that is unintelligible to us.

Augustine also says that we cannot formulate propositions about God because He is ineffable, thereby suggesting that we intend to indicate something positively by such propositions, but we cannot understand it perfectly. Lastly, Moses agrees that we intend to signify something positive, but our complete lack of knowledge of God prevents our understanding what it is. It is not clear that any of these authors really means to imply that we correctly intend to signify something positive in God by naming or failing to name Him: all of them seem to call Him 'super-good' (etc.), fail to describe Him, or apply negations to Him simply to affirm His transcendence of creatures. Henry concludes that we are unable to understand what we intend to signify positively in God, because we fail to understand His attributes other than generally (in generali, as they also exist in creatures). Since we have no special knowledge of God, and since a perfect knowledge is required to name the essence of anything, we cannot give a descriptive name to the essence of God. Moses, who says that the nomen proprium of God is the Tetragrammaton, and Augustine, who holds that 'deus' is non-descriptive, agree on this point.[32]

Having explained the signification of divine names from the point of view of their denotation, Henry turns to the discussion of their connotation, first explaining their ratio. The names of the divine attributes are first imposed on the attributes as they manifest themselves in creatures. Here they signify something absolutely perfect and worthy, something which it is without qualification better to be than not to be. When they are transferred to God, the attributes do not carry with them the intelligible aspect (ratio) which they have in creatures, i.e. the aspect of being received. The names of the attributes are imposed on God in accordance with His nobility and eminence, that is under the aspect of containing all the perfections that are absolute perfections in creatures. In God the attributes are composed of this aspect (as it were, formally) and the divine essence (as it were, materially). Consequently, the names of the attributes signify the divine essence under a certain aspect.[33] But, further, each name is formally imposed on God in a way that implies that the attributes are distinct from the divine essence and from each other. The divine essence and its attributes do not, however, differ in any way. Therefore, from the point of view of the connotation, the names of the divine attributes cannot signify positively and absolutely, for, if they did, they would imply a multiplicity of attributes distinct from God's essence. Since the formal mode of signifying of the names prevents their signifying positively and absolutely, it remains that they signify negatively and in a certain respect, even though the divine essence itself is something absolute and positive.[34]

Avicenna agrees with this account and also holds that the divine attributes (from their formal aspect) signify either negatively or with relation or both. Henry adds that even those that signify negatively do so only in a certain respect, not absolutely. There are two types of names that signify negatively and in a certain respect: (1) those that are positive or affirmative in form, (2) those that are negative or privative in form. Names of the first type (which includes all positive divine names) can signify only negatively with respect to the thing signified, for they are not suitable to the divine essence and serve only to remove the opposite imperfections from God. Henry quotes Avicenna's examples of 'substance', which denies accidentality, 'unity', which negates division through quantity, and 'intelligence', which denies matter and the material. He concludes that such names, although attributed affirmatively, signify real negations and, hence, are part of the *via remotionis*. But through such attributes the transcendence of God is implied, with the result that they also are part of the *via eminentiae*. When, in the way of eminence, the preposition 'super' is added to the positive names of these attributes, they express positively and with respect to creatures. Thus, names positive in form express negatively and in a certain respect on the real level, though secondarily (when raised to the *via eminentiae*) they express positively and in a certain respect. Names that are negative in form are imposed on God to indicate the lack of privations in Him. For example, 'incorporeal' and 'immortal' indicate that God lacks matter and temporal limitation, which are real privations in creatures. Since the negation of a privation is a position, these names signify real positions in God.[35]

The names that signify with relation do so in two ways: (1) with respect to creatures, (2) with respect to the created intellect. The first group is divided into three: (a) names applied to God as cause of these attributes in creatures (from Moses, Dionysius, and Avicenna), (b) names implying relations between God and creatures, like 'creator', 'judge', etc. (from Avicenna), (c) names applied to God by excess, on account of the likeness of creatures to Him, through attributes which it is absolutely better to have than not

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The doctrine of the positive signification of negative divine names is clearly held by Henry in a. 32, q. 4. He derives the idea of the negative signification of positive names from Avicenna and Moses Maimonides and seems to have simply reversed the procedure in giving a positive import to negative names. His major source here is surely Dionysius. For Henry continually argues that negations imply superlative positive ascriptions (positiones) that are unintelligible to us. It is fairly clear that Dionysius never held such a doctrine (nor did Avicenna or Moses) and that it is in fact Henry's own.

Question II

Objections and sed contra

Two objections are given to the positive signification of 'infinite' as applied to God:

> Circa secundum arguitur quod 'infinitas' non significat circa deum aliquod positive, sed privative sive negative tantum.
>
> Primo sic: Deus dicitur 'infinitus' ex opposito ejus quo creatura dicitur 'finita', quia penes finitum,

> et 'infinitum' describitur distantia inter creatorem et creaturam. Sed creatura quod dicitur 'finita', hoc est ex positione finis limitantis naturam ejus et essentiam, quia esse cujuslibet creaturae sub certis limitibus continetur,[37] ut declarari habet loquendo de creaturis. Ergo quod creator deus dicatur 'infinitus', hoc erit ex remotione finis limitantis naturam et essentiam. Ex hoc autem solum dicitur 'infinitus' privative. Ergo, et cetera (a. 44, q. 2; II, 14^{r}Q).

The first objection argues that God is called 'infinite' because He is infinitely removed from creaturely limitations. The first sentence asserts only that God is infinite relative to creatures, from whom He is infinitely removed. However, the objector immediately carries the argument beyond the sphere of infinity by extrinsic denomination when he identifies the infinity of God with the absence of limitations of His essence and nature: The creature is intrinsically finite, as contained within certain limits, whereas God is intrinsically infinite, because He lacks essential limitation. Hence, the objector argues, God is not called 'infinite' except privatively.[38]

The second objection seems to arise from the relations between the volitional attributes:

> Secundo sic: Ratio infiniti sequitur rationem perfecti et completi. Cum enim aliquid est completum et perfectum et totum simpliciter, tunc demum potest dici 'infinitum'. Secundum quod dicit Commentator, versus finem viii ⟨*Physicorum*⟩,[39] si aliqua linea recta

> est completa, inquantum non potest fieri additio, necesse est ut sit infinita. Sed completio, perfectio, et totalitas comprehendit quicquid positive significat in re, quia quicquid est citra ultimum positivum in re incompletum est et imperfectum et rationem partis habet, sed ultra ultimum positivum in re nihil est significandum nisi privative. Ergo, et cetera (Ibid.).

As has already been seen,[40] the aspect of infinity follows upon the aspects of perfection and totality and, hence, completion. Now whatever is perfect, whole, and complete has no part outside itself, which could be added to the whole. 'Complete', 'perfect', and 'whole', therefore, signify everything positive in God. If 'infinite' has an aspect distinct from these, it can only signify privatively.

The sed contra, like the first objection, depends on the infinite distance between God and creatures:

> In oppositum est, quoniam eo deus maxime est infinitus, quo excedit rationem omnis finiti, quia non excedens alterum aequatur ei; et ideo, si unum eorum est finitum, et alterum. Sed deus rationem omnis finiti excedit in positivo et non in privativo, quia id in quo excedit aliquid dignitatis importat. Privatio autem per se nihil dignitatis importat, sed magis defectus, qui in deo nullo modo poni potest. Ergo, et cetera (Ibid.).[41]

As infinite, God must exceed all finite natures, since, if He failed to exceed any finite nature, He would necessarily be finite. Further, that in which God exceeds creatures must be something positive, for by the predication of it God is regarded as more worthy. Privative names qua privative cannot signify anything other than defects. Therefore, because God exceeds all finite things, and because this carries dignity, 'infinite' must signify this by an affirmation, not by a privation. (The responsio takes up this argument at greater length, and further consideration must be left until that point, but it is well to note here that the dignity thought to be conveyed by the term 'infinite' becomes an important part of Henry's own argument.)[42]

Body

The response opens with a list of the meanings of the term 'infinite':

> Hic oportet primo distinguere modos infiniti. Dicitur enim 'infinitum' multis modis.
>
> Uno enim modo dicitur 'infinitum' quod non est natum finiri, quia non habet processum omnino neque qui natus est finiri neque qui non natus est finiri, ad modum quo vox dicitur 'invisibilis'. Et hoc juxta primum modum infiniti in magnitudine, quem ponit Philosophus, in iii Physicorum,[43] quo videlicet ut dicit Commentator, ibidem,[44] dicitur quod punctus est infinitus, quia non habet longitudinem finitam aut infinitam. Et est iste modus infiniti privationis ejus quod non est nata res subjecta, neque secundum speciem neque secundum genus, habere, quemadmodum arbor dicitur non habere visum. Unde tale 'infinitum' proprie dicitur negative. Et tali

> modo infinitatis dicunt aliqui quod deus dicitur 'infinitus', quia nec habet nec natus est habere aliquam finitatem (Ibid., R).

The first way of infinity is drawn from Aristotle's Physics, III, 4. 'Infinite' indicates a lack of termination resulting from the total absence of a process in the thing. Points and colors, as Averroes notes, are infinite in this sense, which is parallel to the invisibility of words. Since anything that is infinite in this way has no process that is terminated or naturally constituted to be terminated, 'infinite' signifies the privation of a terminus that the thing is not naturally constituted to possess. (This is not properly a privation, but rather a negation, as will be seen below.) Because God is not constituted to have a boundary, some authors attributed this type of infinity to God, though we shall see that it does not carry the dignity meant to be ascribed to God by means of 'infinite'.

The second meaning of 'infinite' seems to be the second way enumerated by Aristotle in Physics, III, 4:[45]

> Secundo modo dicitur 'infinitum' cujus processus non habet finem, natum tamen finiri, ut est quantitas omnis dimensiva. Etsi enim imaginetur infinita, nata tamen est finiri inquantum dimensio est; et nata est stare omnis linea inter punctos inquantum linea est, et superficies inter lineas, et corpus inter superficies.[46] Et talem modum infinitatis nemo potest tribuere deo, quia non caret omnino aliquo quod natus est habere; hoc enim esset imperfectionis in ipso, ut patet

> ex supra determinatis[47] (Ibid., 14^{r}-^{v}R).

Every measurable quantity is intended to end, and, therefore, if it is infinite, it is so by a privation (in the proper sense) of a boundary in it. Because this privative type of infinity represents an imperfection, no one can attribute it to God.

The third type is that which is correctly applied to God:

> Tertio dicitur 'infinitum' cujus processus semper protenditur, et non habet finem in quo deficit, nec natum est finiri. Et juxta hunc modum (ut credimus) deus dici debet 'infinitus'. Et est infinitum secundum istum modum vere positivum alicujus in re. Et si secundum rationem et impositionem nominis negationem importat, illa est ejus quod realiter negatio vel privatio est, et sic etiam illa negatio quam importat veram positionem vel affirmationem affert et includit, ut jam patebit[48] (Ibid., 14^{v}R).

The infinity that should be predicated of God is that of an infinitely extended process, neither terminated nor naturally constituted to be terminated. If according to meaning and use this way of infinity carries a negation, the negation is the negation of a privation or a negation on the level of reality. Consequently, as will be argued in the sequel, 'infinite' when applied to God actually signifies an affirmation, though it is negative in form.

Henry summarizes these three ways before proceeding to a detailed consideration of the third:

> Primo ergo modo, 'infinitum' proprie dicitur negative, quia nihil ponit circa subjectum positive.

> Secundo modo, dicitur proprie 'infinitum' privative, quia ponit aptitudinem ad contrarium circa subjectum.
>
> Tertio modo, 'infinitum', etsi secundum impositionem et modum nominis privative aut negative dicitur, secundum rem tamen positive dicitur, quia illa negatio nobis dat intelligere verissimam affirmationem. Non enim est negatio vel privatio alicujus positivi vel affirmationis, sed privativi et negationis magis, ad modum quo in genere substantiae 'incorporeum' dicitur 'privatio' vel 'incorruptibile' (Ibid., S).

The first two meanings of 'infinite' are negative and privative respectively. According to the third, although the name 'infinite' is negative in form, yet it expresses something positive in the thing. For it is the negation or privation of a negation or privation, not of a position or affirmation, with respect to the thing. In the same way, 'incorporeal' and 'incorruptible' express privations of corporeity and corruptibility, themselves privations of superior planes of reality. A. 32, q. 4 explains this in greater detail:

> Illa vero nomina quae a negatione sive privatione secundum vocem imponuntur, ut sunt 'incorporeum', 'immortale', et hujusmodi, quia non negant a creatore nisi quod secundum veritatem defectus aliquis est in creaturis (ex eis enim quae in se habet nihil potest ab eo vere negari), patet quod hujusmodi negatio non est nisi respectiva ad creaturas, et cum hoc non est nisi ad in-

sinuandum alicujus contrarium, veram positionem (I, 195^{r}Q). Names that are negative or privative in form are applied to God to express the negations of privations that exist in creatures. Since the negation of a defect is an affirmation, such names signify positions with respect to God. This way of knowing God gives us truer knowledge than the predication of positive attributes, because names positive in form are derived from creatures and carry to God the defective character which they have in creatures. Names negative in form express an affirmation, but one that has no defect and actually represents the position of something present in God in a way incomprehensible to us.[49]

The negative way of predicating 'infinite' of God was maintained by some philosophers:

> Sunt autem aliqui qui in scriptis posuerunt deum esse infinitum negative solum et hoc in dupliciter ponunt.
>
> Quidam enim ponit quod deus dicitur 'infinitus' negative a negatione alicujus finitantis ipsum et mensurantis extra, quia impossibile est ipsum finiri loco, tempore, aut intellectu aliquo creato. Ipse enim solus seipsum perfecte intelligit, et sic ipse solus seipsum finiens est et suo intellectu mensurans, quia ipse tantum seipsum intelligit quantus est (a. 44, q. 2; II, 14^{v}T).

The first writer held that God is infinite by the negation of anything bounding Him externally, inasmuch as He is not circumscribed by place, time, or the created intellect. This type of infinity is purely relative to created things (place, time, intellects). It does not imply the absolute infinity of the divine being. Because little work has been done on the notion of divine infinity at the end of the thirteenth century, it is rather difficult to determine who it is that Henry has in mind here. However, the phraseology seems to have been borrowed from John Damascene:

> Circumscriptibile quidem est quod loco vel tempore vel comprehensione comprehenditur; incircumscriptibile vero quod nullo horum continetur. Igitur incircumscriptibilis quidem solus est Deus, sine principio et sine fine ens, et omnia continens et nulla comprehensione contentus. Solus enim est incomprehensibilis et interminabilis, a nullo cognitus, ipse vero solus sui ipsius est contemplator (*De Fide Orth.*, I, 13; PG, 853B; Burgundio, p. 59).[50]

The emphasis on the denial of external limitation in God is characteristic of the period before the middle of the thirteenth century, since (as we have seen[51]) the conception of pure form or being as infinite in itself does not arise until approximately 1245. Authors writing before 1250 often quote or depend upon John Damascene's notion of divine infinity so that 'quidam' may be John or one of his followers.[52] The second interpretation of negative divine infinity probably belongs to the latter half of the thirteenth century:

> Alius vero ponit deus dicitur 'infinitus' negative, a negatione finientis ipsum et terminantis intra, eo quod nullus perfectionis suae est terminus et finis, et hoc loquendo de fine et termino consumente quantitatem bonitatis et perfectionis ejus, ad modum quo punctus

> finit et terminat quantitatem lineae (a. 44, q. 2; II, 14^{v}T).

According to the second writer, God is infinite by the negation of anything terminating Him from within, that is, by the negation of a boundary (_finis vel terminus consumens_) to His goodness and perfection. According to Henry, a _finis consumens_ is that which not only completes, but also limits the completion of a thing, whereas a _finis complens_ (completing end) perfects but does not limit completion. God can be described as 'perfect' because He possesses every completing end, but He is not terminated by any boundary that would limit His completion. According to the second writer, God is negatively infinite through the absence of any boundary internally limiting the extent of His goodness and perfection. This position is taken by Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas,[53] but further investigations must be made before it can be definitely asserted that Henry has either of them in mind.

Henry agrees that God is infinite by the absence of boundaries limiting Him externally or internally. However, he does not think this is all that the term 'infinite' means:

> Revera bene verum est quod illis modis deus est infinitus, nullo enim termino consumente, neque intra neque extra, clauditur suae perfectionis quantitas et magnitudo. Sed quod ad hoc significandum imponitur nomen cum dicitur deus esse infinitus, ut cogamur dicere quod 'infinitas' in deo non dicitur nisi negative, hoc non videtur:
>
> Primo ex natura negationis quam importat hoc

> nomen 'infinitum'.
>
> Secundo ex natura rei significatae per nomen.
>
> Tertio ex modo impositionis ipsius nominis (Ibid., V).

'God is infinite' does not signify that God is negatively infinite in either of the ways held above; rather, the predication of infinity ascribes something positive to God. Henry proposes to argue the positive signification of 'infinite' in God from three points of view: (1) from the nature of the negation present in 'infinite', (2) from the nature of the thing signified, (3) from the way in which the name is imposed.

1. Negation (in contradistinction to privation) asserts absolutely nothing in the subject of which it is predicated:

> Ex natura negationis hoc bene apparet, quia negatio, cum nihil ponat ratione qua negatio est, nihil dignitatis apponit ei de quo aliquid negat, nisi forte per accidens ratione subjecti cui de necessitate alterum contrariorum inest; ut, si homo est et non est caecus, est videns, quod non ponit illa negatio ex natura sui, quoniam si sic ubicumque poneretur idem poneret et sequeretur 'lapis non est caecus, ergo est videns' (Ibid.).

If a negation conveys a position of something in a subject, it does so only accidentally. This can happen when we know something in the nature of the subject of which the negation is predicated that entails that one of two opposites must be present in it. For example, since every man either is blind or sees, the negation of blindness in a man entails sight. But the affirmation of sight in a man follows only from the negation of blindness together with the nature of man. If it followed merely from the negation of blindness, the argument would apply equally well in the case of a stone, with the result that if a stone were not blind, it would necessarily see. Hence, negations only assert something in a subject by accident, as correlates of privations:

> Unde magis hoc congruit ei ratione qua habet vim privationis quam negationis. Privatio enim ut privatio semper requirit subjectum in quo sit quasi forma quaedam et dispositio subjecti, negatio autem nequaquam. Unde differentia est inter negationem et privationem, ut vult Philosophus, quarto Metaphysicae,[54] quod negatio est absolutio simpliciter alicujus. Privatio vero habet naturam subjectam. Ubi dicit Commentator,[55] negatio est absolutio negati simpliciter. Privatio autem est absolutio ejus a natura determinata. Et cum illa natura fuerit disposita per privationem, erit in forma affirmationis. Propter quod dicit Philosophus, ii Physicorum,[56] privatio species quodammodo est (Ibid.).

Negations represent the removal of the negated without implying any affirmation in the subject. For example, 'not white' implies nothing regarding the color of the object of which it is predicated. However, privations represent a lack of something in a subject, which must be determined to the privation or to its opposite. For example, since blindness is the privation of sight in an animal naturally possessing sight, the negation 'not blind' entails the affirmation 'sees' with respect to such an animal, because of the nature of the subject. It is by the nature of privation that a negation affirms something, if it affirms at all. 'Infinite' in God is in no way a privative term, as was pointed out above,[57] but if it is negative only it affirms nothing in the nature of the subject of which it is predicated:

> Si ergo solum negative praedicaretur 'infinitum', et nihil positive significaret circa deum, tunc nihil dignitatis et perfectionis diceret 'infinitum' circa ipsum, nisi per accidens ratione subjecti. Quantum enim est de se, pura negatio indifferenter convenit enti et non enti, sicut patet de negatione termini infiniti. Sed hoc nihil ad rationem dignitatis in significato ejus quod est infinitum, sicut
>
> neque innascibilitas in patre ex hoc est notio dignitatis in patre quod imponitur a negatione qua non habet esse ab alio per nativitatem, sed ratione primitatis affirmatae sub negatione,
>
> neque incorporale est differentia constitutiva speciei ratione negationis, sed affirmationis alicujus incogniti subintellecti (*Ibid.*).

'Infinite' does not have the force of a pure negation when applied to God, because, if it did, it could not express the dignity and perfection which we convey by the term. The dignity associated with 'infinite' is crucial to Henry's argument, because without it there would be no reason to deny the purely negative signification of 'infinite', held by nearly all previous authors. Negations in themselves are indifferent to being and not being: one can deny a terminus of the infinite without implying anything as to the existence of the infinite. But 'infinite' carries an affirmation in the same way that 'unborn' implies originality in the Father and 'incorporeal' expresses an affirmation of something unknown to the human intellect. From the nature of the negation, it is, therefore, clear that 'infinite' is not a pure negation, but in itself expresses an affirmation of the perfection and dignity of the divine being.

2. Likewise, there is in God an aspect that goes beyond the aspects of perfection and totality, and it is this aspect that the name 'infinite' signifies:

> Idem etiam patet secundo, scilicet ex natura rei quae dicitur 'infinita', ex conditione ejus secundum quam dicitur 'infinita'; ad cujus intellectum oportet considerare gradus secundum rationem intelligendi, quibus res eadem in esse suo perficitur.
>
> Cum enim perfectio omnis est in re a fine, et finis et bonum idem, secundum Philosophum, iii *Metaphysicae*,[58] res igitur quaecumque in natura essentiae suae ex hoc dicitur 'bona', quod attingit aliquo modo finem in complemento naturae et essentiae suae (*Ibid.*, X).

In order to understand that God's nature requires that 'infinite' signify some positive aspect in God, it is necessary to see the relation between 'good', 'perfect', 'whole', and 'infinite'. Henry, with Aristotle, identifies the good and the end. Something is termed 'good' by essence inasmuch as it is in contact with its end.

But 'perfect' has a higher aspect than 'good':

> Sed non dicitur ex hoc 'perfecta' nisi attingat complete finem illum, ut nullius completionis pertinentis ad illam naturam ei possit fieri ulterior additio. Haec enim est definitio completi, ut dicit Commentator, super finem viii Physicorum,[59] et patet ex praedeterminatis[60] (Ibid.).

A nature is called 'perfect' if it is so completely in contact with its end that no addition can be made to it with respect to its end. 'Perfect', therefore, expresses an aspect above that of goodness, inasmuch as it indicates total contact with the end. Similarly, 'whole' expresses an aspect lying beyond 'perfect':

> Sed adhuc ex hac ratione non dicitur 'totum', sed ex hoc scilicet quod continet in se omnia illa ex quibus completur, tamquam compositum ex rationibus completionis quasi ex partibus, quia scilicet continet in se omnes rationes perfectionis quasi partes, ex quibus completur et constituitur in esse, et nulla earum est extra. Haec enim est definitio totius, ut dicit Philosophus, iii Physicorum,[61] et habitum est supra[62] (Ibid.).

When a nature contains all the perfections that are appropriate to it, that nature is termed 'whole'. 'Whole' adds an aspect above perfection because it indicates not only that nothing lies outside the nature but also that the nature contains all the ends required for the completion of the nature and being of the thing. 'Perfect' and 'whole' are extremely close in meaning, but they differ in notion:

> Et licet valde propinqua sint secundum hoc in significato suo 'perfectum' et 'totum', ut idem significent re, significant tamen differenti ratione, ut dictum est.[63] Et praecedit secundum rationem intelligendi ratio perfecti rationem totius, quia ex eo quod res habet completionem et est consummata in natura sua, ut nihil ei addendum sit, ex hoc habet totalitatem qua continet omnia quae suae naturae sunt, ut nihil eorum sit extra. Et propter istam propinquitatem, dicit Philosophus, iii Physicorum,[64] quod 'totum' et 'perfectum' aut idem significant penitus aut proximum secundum naturam. Ubi dicit Commentator,[65] aut sunt nomina synonyma aut consequentia. Et verum est quod sunt synonyma ex parte rei significatae; consequentia autem sunt quantum ad rationem significandi, ut dictum est supra[66] (Ibid., 14^v-15^rX).

The perfect and the whole are really identical, but there is a distinction of reason between them. For a thing is called 'perfect' because no addition can be made to it, but 'whole' because it contains all things within itself. These first three grades of completion (goodness, perfection, wholeness) do not represent the highest mode that is possible to a thing:

> Ex hoc autem quod res est perfectum quid et totum, non ex hoc adhuc habet quicquid dignitatis natum est esse in re.
>
> Si enim res sic perfecta est ut naturae

> suae habeat completionem,
>
> et sic tota est ut quaecumque naturae suae sunt in se contineat;
>
> si cum hoc in utroque sic sit protensa ut quicumque intellectus finitus aliquid ejus quod est completionis et totalitatis suae concipiat, et in concipiendo semper ulterius procedere possit, ut semper concipiendo magis ac magis concipiat, et sic in concipiendo semper magis ac magis proficiat, ita ut numquam quo ultimo standum sit inveniat, et sic numquam a procedendo deficiat;
>
> quod cum hoc omnia illa secundum quae procedendo proficit res illa in se actu contineat, hoc magnae dignitatis et perfectionis est, non solum negative sed positive significando (Ibid., 15^rX).

The dignity that lies above that of goodness, perfection, and totality includes and follows from the superabundant perfection of these attributes. The greatest dignity belongs to a nature that is not only perfect and whole but also infinitely extended in perfection and totality. From the point of view of the created intellect, which cannot conceive the totality of infinitely extended perfection totum simul, such a nature would always have a perfection beyond what was conceived, so that the intellect could always proceed further in attributing perfection to it, although these perfections existed in the nature at the same time and in act. This dignity and perfection is the greatest possible and, as actually existing in God, is a positive attribute superior to goodness, perfection, and totality.

This superior grade of dignity must have some name, and 'infinite' is the term used to signify it:

> Ad hoc ergo significandum debet esse aliquod nomen impositum, quod rationem superioris gradus dignitatis significat in re quam significet hoc nomen 'perfectum' aut hoc nomen 'totum'. Et si illud nomen non sit hoc nomen 'infinitum', quia non significat aliquid positive circa deum, debet esse aliud. Quare cum aliud non invenimus, et tamen illum gradum dignitatis circa rem divinam concipimus et exprimimus in communi usu, et non nisi noc nomine 'infinitum', oportet ergo concedere quod 'infinitum' aliquid positive circa deum significet; ut sic ista quatuor nomina 'bonum', 'perfectum', 'totum', 'infinitum' se habeant per ordinem in significando gradus conceptionum nostrarum circa simplex divinum esse (*Ibid.*, Y).

The examination of the modes of completion found in the divine being as distinguished by the intellect reveals a grade of dignity superior to that of perfection and totality. Now it is inconceivable to Henry that this grade should lack a name. Its name may be 'infinite' or some other name, but, since there does not seem to be any other possible name, it is necessary to admit that 'infinite' correctly expresses it. Inasmuch as the grade of dignity named by 'infinite' is an aspect irreducible to any other aspect of the divine being, 'infinite' must signify something positive in God. The four names 'good', 'perfect', 'whole', and 'infinite' thus signify the completion of the divine being in order of increasing dignity:

> Ut 'bonum' significet absolute in ipso esse aliquid in quo finitur fine esse divinae naturae complente, juxta illud *Psalmum*,[67] *bonus es tu*. Glossa,[68] proprie est bonus et ex se (*Ibid.*).

According to Henry's plan, 'good' indicates that the divine nature has an end completing its being. 'Perfect' signifies that the divine being is in possession of its end:

> 'Perfectum' vero significat bonitatem esse in ipso, in qua divinum esse consummate et complete finitur, juxta illud *Psalmum*,[69] *omnis consummationis vidi finem*. Glossa,[70] intraverat iste in sanctuarium dei, viderat altissima quae non possunt explicari, sed brevi scientia conclusit dicens, *omnis consummationis vidi finem*. Glossa,[71] consummatio est omnium virtutum perfectio, id est perfectio in virtute, quae nihil aliud est quam ultima potentia in bonitate. Virtus enim est ultimum de potentia, ii *Caeli et Mundi*.[72] Unde talis completio in bonitate dicitur 'virtus'. De qua dicit etiam Philosophus, vii <*Physicorum*>,[73] quod tunc unumquodque perfectum est, cum attingit proprie virtuti. De qua etiam dicit quod virtus est dispositio perfecti ad optimum[74] (*Ibid.*).

The divine being is perfect because it is in possession of its end. As Augustine points out in a gloss, completion is the perfection of every virtue. Since virtue is the last power in goodness, completion in goodness is identical with completion in virtue and with perfection. While 'perfect' emphasizes the lack of any incompletion, 'whole' stresses the completions comprehended:

> 'Totum' vero significat ipsam consummationem, inquantum in se omnis boni et perfectionis actu simul est contentiva, juxta illud quod dicit Dominus Moysi, Exodus xxxiii,[75] ostendam tibi omne bonum (Ibid., Z).

'Whole' signifies that every good and perfection is comprehended in act at the same time in the divine being. Lastly, 'infinite' signifies the extent of God's comprehension of perfections:

> 'Infinitum' vero significat ipsam consummationem omnino perfectionem omnem continentem, ut semper in ulterius et profundius procedentem quocumque finito in eo per intellectum concepto. Ut ad hoc adducamus quod dicitur de sapientia, Sapientia vii,[76] infinitus thesaurus est hominibus. Glossa,[77] quanto quisque profundius discit, tanto profunditatem cognoscit (Ibid., Z-A).

'Infinite' indicates a completion surpassing that of any finite thing that can be conceived. The intellect cannot comprehend the infinity of God, but it can be led to recognize that He is infinite.

On the grounds that there is an aspect in God superior in dignity to goodness, perfection, and totality and that this aspect requires a name, which in common use is 'infinite', Henry concludes that 'infinite' signifies something positive in God:

> Cum igitur ad tale quid positivum significandum utimur principaliter in deo hoc nomine 'infinitum', ponendum est simpliciter quod 'infinitum' principaliter significat aliquid positive in deo. Illud enim debet dici nominis significatum ad quod significandum eo uti-

> mur communiter, quia loquendum est ut plures, secundum quod dicit Philosophus[78] (Ibid., A).

'Infinite' is normally used to signify the aspect that lies above totality and perfection. Since the signification of a name is what it is normally used to signify, it must be admitted that 'infinite' signifies a positive aspect in God.

3. But for all of this, a negation is connected with the term 'infinite' from the point of view of the imposition of the name:

> Bene tamen verum est quod in hoc nomine 'infinitum' positivo huic annexa est negatio, quam significat ex ratione impositionis nominis, et hoc non primo et principaliter, sicut illi dicunt, sed secundario et ex consequente, ut circa divinam bonitatem, sive in essentia sive in potentia, sive in quocumque alio attributo (Infinitas enim omnia consequitur quae sunt in deo, ut supra dictum est.[79]) dicamus 'infinitum' significare rationem semper ulterius procedendi quocumque termino signato, quod est positivum quid, cui annexa est negatio termini et finis consumentis, a qua fit nominis impositio, ad modum quo linea semper in ulterius protensa 'infinita' dicitur, quia sic protensa est, cui protentioni necessario annexa est privatio termini, ut puncti signati, in quo deficit protensio lineae. Imponitur enim sic nomen 'infinitum' in linea imaginata semper protensa (Ibid., A-B).

The negation connected with 'infinite' from the mode of the imposition of the name is not attached to it primarily and principally, as the authors mentioned above held, but rather secondarily and as a consequence. For 'infinite' principally signifies the aspect of always proceeding further, and this is a positive signification. Secondarily, 'infinite' signifies the negation of a boundary that would prevent the subject's proceeding further. It is from this secondary and negative signification that the name is imposed. For example, a line is called 'infinite' because it is so extended that it is always proceeding further; but a negation is secondarily annexed to the infinity of the line because it has no boundary. The reason for this is that further extension implies the lack of a terminus:

> Nihil enim potest esse semper protensum nisi careat termino in quo stat protensio, et sic illi affirmationi necessario consequens et annexa est ista negatio, a qua--tamquam ab eo quod nobis notius est, per habitum scilicet finiti sibi contrarium, quam sit illa protensio--sit nominis impositio. Et consimiliter in proposito nomen 'infiniti' circa deum imponitur a negatione termini sive finis, tamquam ab eo quod nobis notius est per finitum sibi contrarium in creaturis, quibus nomina primo sunt imposita et deinde ad deum translata (*Ibid.*, B).

The negation of a boundary is a consequence of further extension. Yet because boundaries are more known to us than further extension, we impose 'infinite' by this secondary signification, as the negation of a boundary. This is true in the case of lines and of God, to whom names are translated from their primary use in signifying creatures.

However, if we consider the signification of the terms 'finite' and 'infinite' more closely, we will discover that the latter is not primarily imposed to signify a negation:

> Unde et si interius velimus considerare significata horum nominum 'infinitum', 'finitum', patebit nobis tertio quod hoc nomen 'infinitum' circa deum vel quodcumque semper protensum non imponitur ad significandum negationem termini consumentis, ut propter hoc 'infinitum' in deo non dicatur nisi negative. Et hoc patet ex ipsius nominis impositione (Ibid.).

From the point of view of the imposition of the name, 'infinite' appears to be negative, because we tend to conceive it as a negation of what is more known to us. But if we properly understand what 'finite' and 'infinite' signify with respect to the thing, we will see that its primary signification is positive. The primary signification of 'finite' is in reality the privation of further extension:

> Clarum enim est nobis quod hoc nomen 'finitum', inquantum significat finem consumentem, realiter privationem importat ulterioris protensionis. 'Infinitum' autem simpliciter in creaturis, si ponatur esse in actu, importat hujus privationis privationem, in deo autem negationem. Privatio autem vel negatio privationis realis affirmatio est. In eo igitur, in quo 'infinitum' videtur significare negationem aut privationem, realiter significat affirmationem. Et sic absolute dicendum quod 'infinitum' in deo affirmationem et positivum quid

> significat, non negativum, etsi nomen a negatione imponitur (Ibid., C).

'Finite' with respect to the thing implies a boundary and, therefore, signifies a privation of further extension. Thus, the primary signification of 'finite' is privative, not positive. 'Infinite' in creatures indicates the privation of a boundary, i.e. the privation of a privation, whereas in God it expresses the negation of a privation. The privation or negation of a privation is an affirmation. Therefore, both in creatures and in God, 'infinite' signifies an affirmation, even though the affirmation is imposed through privation or negation. But it must be noted that, when 'infinite' is predicated of God, it signifies the negation, not the privation, of a privation:

> Dico a negatione, non a privatione, quia 'infinitum' privative dictum nullo modo cadit in deo, sicut cadit in quantitate dimensionali. Nam hujusmodi quantitas nata est habere finem. Quantitas autem spiritualis in deo finem nata habere non est. Unde quantitas dimensionalis 'infinita' dicitur subtractione ejus quod nata est habere. Quantitas vero spiritualis in deo dicitur 'infinita' subtractione ejus quod non est ipsa nata habere, ~~sed~~ quod nata est habere creatura a qua nomen mutuavit, cujus est ratio finitatis, quae nota nobis est et cognita; et per ipsam 'infinitum' inquantum dicit ejus negationem vel privationem (15^{r-v}C).

God is not naturally constituted to have a boundary, as dimensional quantity is, and, consequently, is not called 'infinite' by the privation of a boundary. The name 'infinite', which is transferred from creatures to God, expresses a negation or privation of finitude only to the extent that it is applied primarily to creatures, which are naturally constituted to be bound. Hence, 'infinite', even from the point of view of the imposition of the name, primarily expresses an affirmation:

> Patet igitur ex nominis impositione tam in deo quam in creatura quod hoc nomen 'infinitum' non significat principaliter negationem vel privationem, sed potius alicujus positionem, quoniam infinitum, secundum Philosophum,[80] inquantum infinitum incognitum est. Non est autem incognitum secundum quod importat negationem vel privationem finis consumentis, ut dictum est;[81] oportet igitur quod infinitum inquantum infinitum significet positionem contrariam illi fini consumenti, secundum quam est incognitum, et hoc intellectui creato, ut dictum est[82] (*Ibid.*, 15^{v}C).

If 'infinite' did not primarily signify an affirmation, it would be impossible to explain how the infinite *qua* infinite is unknown. For to the extent that it is the negation or privation of a boundary, the infinite is well known to the created intellect. Therefore, 'infinite' must have a positive signification contrary to 'bound', which has already been shown to be privative in nature.

This positive signification is the primary signification of 'infinite':

> Quod autem significat infinitum inquantum infinitum est, hoc est significatum principale. 'Infinitum' ergo

> non tantum in deo, sed et in creatura principaliter significat positionem sive aliquid affirmative. Unde quod mundus, quem Philosophus posuit esse totum et summe perfectum, non potuit dici ab eo 'infinitus'; hoc non erat tam quia terminum habebat, scilicet superficiem extremae sphaerae, quam quia non habebat aliquam ulteriorem protensionem. Unde patet quod talis finitas mundi realem importat negationem, licet imponatur a modo affirmationis (Ibid., D).

Since 'infinite' principally signifies the affirmation of further extension, 'finite' primarily indicates an absence of further extension. Aristotle was forced to assert that the world was finite, not so much because it had a boundary, as because it lacked further extension. Small wonder then that 'infinite' both in creatures and in God signifies affirmatively:

> Propter quod non est mirum, si e contrario 'infinitum' tam in deo quam in creaturis realiter importet affirmationem, licet imponatur a modo negationis vel privationis, quia negatio, per quam via remotionis a deo quod est in creaturis cognoscimus aliquid in deo, nobis notior est quam affirmatio absoluta ejus quod secundum veritatem est in deo (Ibid.).

The term 'infinite' is obviously negative in form, with the result that the affirmation it signifies is negatively or privatively imposed. This happens because finitude, in reality a privation, is more known to the created intellect than infinity. But since, as has been shown, 'infinite' really signifies positively, the term expresses an affirmation, despite its manner of imposition.

Henry thinks that Pseudo-Dionysius concurs in this judgment:

> Et hoc est quod dicit Dionysius, tangens utrumque in significato hujus nominis 'infiniti', capitulo ii *Caelestis Hierarchiae*,[83] loquens de divina essentia, aliquando dissimilibus manifestationibus ab ipsis eloquiis supermundane laudatur, eam 'invisibilem' et 'infinitam' et 'incomprehensibilem' vocantibus, ex quibus non quid est, sed quid non est, significatur; hoc enim (ut aestimo) patentius[84] est in ipsa. Ecce quoad significatum negativum, et sequitur quoad affirmativu⟨m⟩: Ignoramus autem superessentialem ipsius et invisibilem et ineffabilem infinalitatem (*Ibid.*).

Henry interprets the text of Pseudo-Dionysius as indicating a two-fold signification of negative divine names: (1) We predicate 'infinite' and similar terms of God in order to indicate what God is not (i.e. that He is not finite, etc.), and from this point of view 'infinite' is negatively imposed; (2) Since we are ignorant of exactly what the terms mean in God, there must be something positive in God which the terms affirm, and from this standpoint 'infinite' has a positive signification. However, all that the text of Pseudo-Dionysius seems to suggest is that the denial of finitude (which is proper) involves an assertion of the transcendence of God over everything finite. Finitude, as we have seen,[85] is equated by Dionysius with being. Infinity is two-fold: (1) That which is below being (i.e. evil) is infinite as non-being; (2) That which is above being (i.e. God) is infinite as transcending being. Thus, since God is non-being (as super-being), the denial of finitude cannot assert anything positive in the divine being precisely because God is non-being. Further, the divine infinity is incomprehensible to us inasmuch as infinity is the same as non-being, which is incomprehensible because of its lack of form. The interpretation Henry imposes upon the text is the result of a metaphysics entirely different from that of the Pseudo-Areopagite: it is only when infinity has been associated with pure form or being, as opposed to lack of form or non-being, that the term can signify anything positive in the divine reality.

But Henry adduces a second text in support of his interpretation:

> Et quod illa ineffabilis infinalitas re affirmatio est, licet modo negationis propter defectum nostri intellectus in ipsam comprehendendo significata, aperte declarat Dionysius in similitudinibus, capitulo vii *De Divinis Nominibus*,[86] ubi dicit sic: consuetudo est theologis, contrario mentis affectu a deo quae sunt privationes depellere; sicut et 'invisibilem' aiunt eloquia 'claram lucem' et 'multum laudabilem' et 'multivocum', 'ineffabilem' et 'innominabilem' et 'omnibus praesentem' et 'ex omnibus inventum', 'incomprehensibilem' et 'non investigabilem'. Ecce quia dicimus deum tamquam 'claram lucem invisibilem', ut, contrario affectu negationis vel privationis quam nomine exprimimus, realem privationem vel negationem depellamus, et apicem visibilitatis exprimamus, a cujus visione apex mentis nostrae necesse habet deficere (*Ibid.*).

The first line of the quotation has been given various Latin translations: John the Saracen reads 'contraria passione in deo ea quae sunt privationis dicere', whereas Grosseteste translates 'contraria passione in deo ea quae privationis abnegare'. The line in Greek reads 'antipeponthotōs epi Theou ta tēs sterēseōs apophaskein'.[87] If the interpretation of Eriugena and Grosseteste is correct, the line means that we remove real privations from God with verbal negations, as Henry asserts. If John the Saracen is correct, it indicates merely that theologians customarily apply privative names to God in order to indicate the divine transcendence. J. Vanneste has studied this passage at length and concluded from its context that the line should be understood in the second way.[88] If so, Henry's interpretation does not express the true doctrine of the Pseudo-Areopagite, though, of course, he cannot be blamed for a misinterpretation resulting from an error in translation. The conclusion he draws is that we are unable to make assertions concerning God directly and, hence, do so by means of privative or negative terms:

> Propter quod cum nomina imponimus rebus sicut ipsas comprehendimus; sub modo privationis nomen imponimus propter nostram defectibilitatem circa ipsam, per quam tamen intendimus insinuare nobis incomprehensibilem positionem. Et sic deum, qui est finis omnis consummationis, dicimus 'infinitum', insinuando in ipso finem consummantem ultra capacitatem omnis creaturae, semper ulterius protensum. Et quod dictum est de 'invisibili' et 'infinito', hoc intelligatur de quolibet nomine privativo in deo (*Ibid.*).

'Infinite' signifies in God an end or goal that is perpetually ex-lations: John the Saracen reads 'contraria passione in deo ea quae sunt privationis dicere', whereas Grosseteste translates 'contraria passione in deo ea quae privationis abnegare'. The line in Greek reads 'antipeponthotōs epi Theou ta tēs sterēseōs apophaskein'.[87] If the interpretation of Eriugena and Grosseteste is correct, the line means that we remove real privations from God with verbal negations, as Henry asserts. If John the Saracen is correct, it indicates merely that theologians customarily apply privative names to God in order to indicate the divine transcendence. J. Vanneste has studied this passage at length and concluded from its context that the line should be understood in the second way.[88] If so, Henry's interpretation does not express the true doctrine of the Pseudo-Areopagite, though, of course, he cannot be blamed for a misinterpretation resulting from an error in translation. The conclusion he draws is that we are unable to make assertions concerning God directly and, hence, do so by means of privative or negative terms:

> Propter quod cum nomina imponimus rebus sicut ipsas comprehendimus; sub modo privationis nomen imponimus propter nostram defectibilitatem circa ipsam, per quam tamen intendimus insinuare nobis incomprehensibilem positionem. Et sic deum, qui est finis omnis consummationis, dicimus 'infinitum', insinuando in ipso finem consummantem ultra capacitatem omnis creaturae, semper ulterius protensum. Et quod dictum est de 'invisibili' et 'infinito', hoc intelligatur de quolibet nomine privativo in deo (*Ibid.*).

'Infinite' signifies in God an end or goal that is perpetually extended. But it does so by means of a negation, because the human intellect is unable to understand such extension in any way except through the denial of a boundary, which 'infinite' immediately expresses to it. The same is true of all other seemingly privative names that are applied to God. Pseudo-Dionysius is also thought to agree on this point:

> Et quod illa ad litteram sit intentio Dionysius patet, quia per hoc exponit[89] illud Apostoli,[90] *quod stultum est dei sapientius est hominibus*, dicens, eodem modo et divinus Apostolus laudasse dicitur stultitiam ineffabilem; et ante omnem rationem referens veritatem, hanc igitur irrationalem et mente carentem (*Ibid.*, E.).

The quotation is garbled, the text of Eriugena reading:

> Eodem modo et nunc divinus Apostolus laudasse dicitur stultitiam dei, quod apparet in ea contra rationem et inconsequens, in ineffabilem et ante omnem rationem referens veritatem (*De Div. Nom.*, vii; PL 122, 1153A-B).

In the same chapter,[91] Dionysius explains that there are two reasons for Paul's assertion: (1) The understanding of men is very far below that of God; (2) It is the custom to predicate privations of God in order to indicate His transcendence. Hence, although the praising of the divine folly appears absurd, it actually is done to indicate an ineffable truth that lies above reason. Henry's interpretation is correct to the extent that Dionysius does say that the transcendence of God is beyond human intellectual capacity and that privative terms are used to express it. But here again it is not true to say that Pseudo-Dionysius intends to indicate that the terms have any positive signification other than mere transcendence.

Replies to objections

The second question closes with replies to the two objections:

> Ad primum igitur in oppositum, quod creatura dicitur 'finita' positive, ergo e contra deus dicitur 'infinitus' negative: Dicendum secundum jam dicta quod verum est, sed illa affirmatio finis, quam dicit 'finitum' in creatura, est per carentiam perfectissimae positionis, scilicet protensionis in infinitum, ejus cujus non tam consummationem quam consumptionem dicit 'finis' in creaturis. Et ad illius protensionem circa naturam divinam significandam, utimur hoc nomine 'infinitum', licet imponatur a negatione finis consumentis, quem positive dicit 'finitum' in creatura. Et sic quoad modum significandi et nominis impositionem 'finitum' magis significat aliquid positive quam 'infinitum'; quantum tamen ad rem intentam significari est e converso, ut dictum est[92] (q. 44, a. 2; II, 15^{v}F).

The first objection argued that God is infinite because he lacks the intrinsic limitation of creaturely essences, with the result that 'infinite' signifies only negatively (or "privatively", as the objector expresses it). In his reply, Henry merely reiterates his view that the term 'finite' signifies with respect to the thing the privation of an infinite extension, while 'infinite' affirms such extension. 'Infinite' is negative and 'finite' positive only with respect to the form of the names.

Henry divides the second objection into two parts, which he treats separately: (1) that 'infinite' does not signify anything beyond 'complete', 'perfect', and 'whole'; (2) that 'infinite' must signify privatively if it does signify something over and above 'complete', 'perfect', and 'whole'. In answer to the first part, Henry argues that the aspect of infinity is implicitly included in those of wholeness, perfection, and completeness:

> Ad secundum, quod ultra rationem completi, perfecti, et totius significat aliquid hoc nomen 'infinitum', quod non potest esse aliquid positivu⟨m⟩: Dicendum secundum praedicta[93] quod 'infinitum' non significat aliquid ultra rationem totius et perfecti quod omnino sit extra rationem perfecti et totius, sed quod in ipsa concluditur sicut determinatum in indeterminato. Sic enim 'perfectum' addit super rationem boni simpliciter accepti rationem completionis et consummationis in bonitate, quam 'bonum' absolute dictum non explicat suo nomine; includit tamen ipsam sicut confusum determinatum. Ratio enim completionis est ratio bonitatis cujusdam. Unde cum nihil potest esse actu infinitum quin sit perfectissimum et summe totum, licet infinitum in potentia rationem imperfecti et partis habet, ut dictum est supra,[94] tunc demum dicitur aliquid vere 'infinitum', cum perfectioni suae et totalitati ejus non potest fieri additio (Ibid., 15^{v}G).

'Infinite' signifies nothing that is absolutely beyond the aspects of totality and perfection. Rather, just as 'good' implicitly indicates the perfection of that of which it is predicated, because the end and the good are the same, so also the infinity of God (i.e. His being always extended) is implied by His perfection (lack of nothing) and totality (containing all within Himself). Yet it must be noted that, although the aspect of infinity is not absolutely distinct from the aspects of totality and perfection, infinity is only implicitly contained in wholeness and perfection:

> Quod non solum est propter negationem vel privationem finis consumentis, sed magis propter protensionem, quae omnem hujusmodi finem excludit et est vera ratio positiva, non ultra rationem positivam in nomine '[im] perfecti' vel 'totius' ita quod sit extra ipsum, sed quae est inclusa in ipsa ut in confuso et explicata determinate nomine 'infiniti', ut dictum est.[95] Et sic ratio infiniti est ultima ratio determinata positiva quae in re quacumque potest haberi. Et exprimit summe rationem dignitatis divinae (Ibid., 15^v-16^rG).

The name 'infinite' is applied to signify an extension that includes every end. Hence, it does signify something positive. But because perfection and totality imply the containing of every end, infinity is implicitly contained in perfection and totality. 'Infinite' refers explicitly to a positive aspect that already exists in perfection and totality implicitly. It, therefore, represents the last positive aspect that can be expressed about anything and conveys the divine dignity in the highest possible way.

The second half of the objection is answered using the same principles:

> Et quod arguitur, quod id quod est citra ultimum positivum in re habet rationem imperfecti et incompleti, et sic 'completum', 'perfectum', et 'totum' significant id quod est ultimo positivum in re: Dicendum quod positivum in re significatum ultra rationem totius et perfecti potest intelligi dupliciter,
>
> vel quod illud positivum sit omnino extra rationem totius et perfecti,
>
> vel inclusum ut in confuso (Ibid., 16^{r}H).

The positive aspect of infinity may be beyond that of wholeness and perfection in one of two ways: (1) It may be completely outside these aspects; (2) It may be implicit in them. It is certainly not outside in the first way:

> Primo modo verum est assumptum, et hoc modo nullum est attributum divinum quod significat in deo aliquid positive super divinam essentiam; et quod est citra tale positivum in re significatum non potest esse nisi imperfectum et incompletum (Ibid.).

In the first way, there is no divine attribute which signifies positively. For in God every attribute is really identical with the divine essence. Hence, if 'infinite' signified in this manner, it could not signify positively, but only negatively or privatively. In the second way, it signifies positively:

> Secundo modo bene significant attributa divina aliquid positive super divinam essentiam, et unum attributum

> super aliud. Et sic non est verum quod id quod citra tale positivum in re significatur non sit nisi imperfectum; immo est aeque perfectum secundum rem, licet non secundum rationem intelligendi, secundum quod esse in deo continet omnem divinam perfectionem, sed secundum rationem intelligendi sub perfectiori ratione significat 'vivere' in deo quam 'esse' (Ibid.).

The divine attributes are wholly identical with the divine essence and, consequently, are equally perfect in God. However, from the point of view of the understanding, they are contained in God according to an order of perfection, so that (for example) 'life' signifies under a more perfect notion that 'being'. This explains the relationship between 'infinite', 'perfect', and 'whole':

> Et sic ultra rationem totius et perfecti significat rationem positivam hoc nomen 'infinitum', quia explicat rationem perfecti et totius, quod hoc nomen 'totum' vel 'perfectum' non explicat; ita quod perfectum et totum simpliciter et in summo non intelliguntur in deo nisi quia includant rationem infiniti, ut sic nullum finitum inquantum finitum per limitationem protensionis spiritualis bonitatis et perfectionis habet rationem perfecti simpliciter et absolute, sed solum infinitum; et si finitum habeat rationem totius et perfecti, hoc est in genere aliquo, non absolute. Quomodo autem talis ratio positiva in divinis attributis super rationem essentiae non sumitur ex aliquo absoluto, sed solum respectivo, videbitur infra, cum erit sermo de diversitate attri-

butorum[96] (Ibid.).

The aspects of perfection and totality are not fully expressed by the terms 'perfect' and 'whole', for these connote only the character of lacking nothing and containing everything and do not point out the perpetual extension of the perfections. Hence, it is impossible to understand the aspects of perfection and totality in God without also thinking them under the aspect of infinity. For this reason, only an infinite being can be whole and perfect absolutely, as God is, and whatever is finite cannot be whole and perfect except in some respect. Consequently, infinity is implicitly contained in the aspects of wholeness and perfection, but it also must represent a positive aspect over and above them.[97]

CHAPTER V

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The Accomplishment of Article 44

First question

The set of objections (11^{v}A) with which Henry of Ghent begins the first question indicates that his main adversaries are those who interpret all infinity as quantitative and who balk at attributing infinity to God because of the Aristotelian remarks about infinity. According to their account, an infinite God would be a quantity, unknowable, potential, material, and neither whole nor perfect. These objections are commonly found in the questions written in the second half of the thirteenth century.[1] The fourth objection, which I have been able to locate in two authors (Thomas and Gerard of Abbeville),[2] argues instead that a God infinite in substance must exclude other substances in exactly the same way that an infinite quantum excludes other quanta. Yet even here, although a non-quantitative type of infinity is admitted, it is thought by the objector to be precisely similar to quantitative infinity.

That Henry's primary concern in this question is to show that God is infinite in a non-quantitative manner is also indicated by the opening section of the *responsio* (11^{v}B), which he devotes to an historical account of the pre-Socratic opinions concerning the infinite. The infinite, for the pre-Socratics, was either matter or an attribute of a corporeal substance. Since God is neither prime matter nor a corporeal composite, Henry easily rejects both of these as candidates for the type of infinity possessed by the divine essence (11^{v}-12^{r}C).

Thus far, Henry follows the usual thirteenth-century procedure of denying that God is quantitatively infinite. He now (12^{r}C) turns to the rejection of infinity by indifference, such as is possessed by the absolute essence. The problem seems to have arisen mainly out of Henry's adoption of the Avicennian metaphysics of essences.[3] Henry agrees with Avicenna in distinguishing three states of essences, each with a distinct type of being: (1) The *essentia absoluta* is the proper object of the created intellect and of definition. It possesses of itself *esse proprium* (or *esse essentiae*, *esse quidditativum*, *esse cognitivum*, *esse definitativum*), and its being is guaranteed by the existence of a corresponding exemplar in the divine mind. As absolute, the essence is completely indifferent to determination in a supposit (whether determinate or indeterminate), with the result that it is neither universal nor particular. (2) If the essence is contracted into a determinate supposit, it receives *esse existentiae* (or *esse naturae*, *esse naturale*, *esse in effectu*). Such an essence is particular and individual by its contraction. (3) Inasmuch as the essence exists in some mind, it has *esse rationis* (or *esse in anima*) and is universal as predicable of many.[4] As we have seen, Henry employs the term 'universal' in two senses, as equivalent to 'absolute essence' and in its traditional use. The argument of q. 1 seems to use it in the first sense.

Henry appears to have been confronted with the following problem: If God is pure form, He is not determined in a supposit and, hence, might be infinite as indifferent to such determination, in the same way that an absolute natural essence is indifferent. The solution to the problem requires an explanation of the way in which natural forms are infinite by indifference. Their infinity arises, Henry thinks, from their susceptibility to contraction in an infinite number of supposits. As absolute essences, they do not have esse existentiae, which they can receive only by contraction. Consequently, their indifference is grounded in their potentiality with respect to infinite supposits, in none of which they are actually contracted. On the other hand, God is a pure self-subsistent form, in which esse essentiae is identical with esse existentiae. His infinity cannot be rooted in indifference with respect to infinite supposits precisely because He does not require--and so is not potential to--contraction in a supposit. Thus, the infinity of absolute essences is denied of God because He is free from potentiality. Divine infinity must rather agree with the mode of being of a self-subsistent and totally actual form.

In the second section of the responsio (12^rD-^vF), Henry turns from the rejection of certain views on divine infinity to a more positive comparison of creaturely and divine infinity, which brings out the prominent features of both. God's infinity must be in agreement with His mode of being, which is that of pure actuality, upon which follows perfection and totality. Aristotle proves in the Physics that no corporeal thing can be infinite in act. The only type of infinity that is found in creatures is potential, for actuality in the creature follows upon a form that limits its nature. But, secondarily, creaturely infinity results from an absence of something which has not yet been received into it and so **from** its imperfection and lack of wholeness. Thirdly, both types of infinity found in creatures are material in origin. For division in continuous quantities and addition in discrete quantities arise from matter, and these are the only ways in which infinity is found in creatures. Divine infinity is thus contrasted with quantitative infinity in three ways: (1) God is infinite in act, whereas creatures are infinite only in potency; (2) Divine infinity is consistent with perfection and totality, whereas quantitative infinity precludes both; (3) God's infinity is from form, while creatures' infinity results from matter.

In the preceding section, infinity has been said to follow immediately upon actuality, perfection, and totality. Henry pauses briefly ($12^{v}F$) to explain their interrelation. God, as a self-subsistent form, is in pure act. He is perfect because (as pure act) He is not potential with respect to any perfection and, hence, is complete. Since He is completely perfect, He contains every perfection and is, consequently, whole. But inasmuch as this perfection and totality is possession of perfections without end, God is also infinite. Like all divine attributes, those that relate to the divine will imply no composition in God and, as a result, are neither really nor intentionally distinct. Yet perfection, totality, and infinity each add a new note and, therefore, differ by a distinction of reason.

The third part of the responsio (12^vG-13^rH) explains in detail how a natural form limits a creature in a way that the divine form does not limit God. Since God is pure and absolute being, containing the mode of being of every perfection, He does not have a determinate mode of being. The form of a creature confers being according to a determinate mode and, as a consequence, being that is confined within certain limits. Three points of contrast arising from this can be noted. The creaturely form completes the being of the species, designates that being, and prevents the being of another species from existing in it, thereby determining the genus and species of the creature. The form of deity, however, although it completes the being of God, does not designate or determine it, since it is wholly identical with that being. The indeterminate being of God thus can contain the mode of being of every possible being. This comprehension of infinite perfections is simultaneous, but, when regarded from the point of view of the created intellect, it appears successive in the same way that the putative infinite body is conceived to comprehend infinite quanta successively.

The manner in which God comprehends all possible beings contrasts sharply with the way in which the infinite quantum would contain all quanta. The ways of comprehension are treated in the reply to the fourth objection (13^rM-14^rN). Hence, we may immediately turn to the ad 4, without pausing for any detailed consideration of the replies to the other objections, the answers to which are quite obvious in the light of the responsio.

The objector argued ($11^{v}A$) that God, if substantially infinite, cannot admit the existence of any other substance, basing his argument on an alleged parallel between quantitative and substantial infinity. Henry begins his reply by correcting one of the misconceptions of the objector: contrary to what was implied, neither God nor the infinite quantum contains all on account of its infinity, but rather as a result of its totality. It is because it contains all that it can be described as whole, not because it contains things without end. Further, there are two types of wholes: (1) particular wholes, which merely contain all that is necessary to their own beings, (2) universal wholes, which contain all that applies to being of a given type. The objector is, of course, only concerned with universal wholes, since the parallel he asserts lies between the universal whole in absolute being (God) and the universal whole in quantitative being (the infinite quantum).

Now, according to the description given in one Latin version of Aristotle, the universal whole may be defined as that which does not admit the separate existence of any being of the given type with respect to which it is universally whole, whether that being is like or unlike its own nature. Hence, it is true that the infinite quantum (if a universal whole) must contain every quantum as its part. For example, the earth (if a universal whole) would have within itself not only all earth, but also every bit of fire, air, and water. It is also correct to say that God, as universal whole in being, must comprehend within Himself every possible being. Since God is de se singular, He contains all divine being. Further, every creaturely being must also be comprehended within the divine being.

Up to this point Henry agrees with the objector, but they must part company now (13^rM). For God does not contain every being as part of Himself, as the putative infinite quantum would. Rather, He comprehends the mode of being of every substance in a unified and unconfused manner, because every mode of participated being is implied in subsistent being. Since God comprehends every mode of being, He does not lack anything by admitting the existence of creatures outside Himself. Therefore, the existence of creatures is quite compatible with the divine wholeness. Henry contrasts this manner of comprehension with the ways in which the infinite quantum and an absolute essence comprehend. The infinite quantum contains quanta as parts that are divided inasmuch as they occupy distinct places. A genus, on the other hand, contains differentiae only potentially and, therefore, confusedly. But God comprehends modes of being in a unified manner (not as parts) and unconfusedly (not potentially). The difficulty in understanding how this is possible leads Henry to give three imaginary illustrations as aids to the understanding: (1) A subsistent genus would comprehend individuals unconfusedly if it contained all its differentiae in act; (2) If one intellective soul comprehended vegetative, sensible, and rational souls in a more perfect manner than they exist separately, it would comprehend them in a unified manner; (3) Similarly, if the infinite quantum were subsistent quantity, it would contain the modes of quantitative being of all quanta in a unified and unconfused manner. In none of these cases would the existence of participated substances wound the totality of the self-subsistent substance.

The reply closes with a brief historical sketch of views on how God comprehends beings (13^{v}-15^{r}N): (1) Creatures are part of the substance and being of God; (2) God is the formal being of creatures; (3) God is the subsistent being that gives participated being to creatures. Henry regards the first two views as unacceptable, but he quotes numerous scriptural texts and glosses in support of the third. As has already been noted, he seems to present interpretations of some of these texts that conflict with the analyses he gives in a. 29, q. 1. It appears very likely that Henry is far more concerned with finding some authority for the whole reply to the objection than he is with presenting an historically accurate (or even consistent) account of the views of the ancients.

Our brief study of the history of infinity up to the time of Henry of Ghent has revealed not only a list of views on infinity but also a systematic method of discovering the differences between various accounts and their metaphysical bases. First, we expect to find in any late thirteenth-century solution to the question "utrum deus sit infinitus" sets of arguments opposing and in support of divine infinity. The arguments in opposition reveal the background against which the author has developed his solution, as well as the opinions of his contemporaries on the subject. The supporting arguments allow us to specify the author's sources for his view and also the precise meaning which he attaches to the term 'infinite' when he applies it to God. A comparison of the questions of selected authors provides the basis for estimating the contributions of one or more of them.

In applying the method to a. 44, q. 1 of Henry of Ghent, we must turn first to Henry's opponents. The quantitative character of the arguments in opposition has previously been emphasized. Henry begins his responsio with a discussion of the infinite principles of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Henry's main opponents, then, seem to be those who know only quantitative infinity, which, naturally, they are loath to attribute to God. In this respect, Henry is completely in line with Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas, Gerard of Abbeville, and Richard of Middleton. Since Henry has no new opponents, we may assume that the background against which he developed his answer was the same as that of his immediate predecessors.

However, in his response, Henry rejects one type of infinity from God that is not known to have been asserted by anyone. The possibility that God might be infinite as indifferent to contraction in infinite supposits seems rather to have occurred to Henry because of his own metaphysical views. These views, which Paulus[5] has treated in detail, arise from the tempering of Avicenna with Augustine. From Avicenna, Henry has drawn the notion of the essentia absoluta, which is indifferent to contraction in any supposit. Since its supposits are potentially infinite, the absolute essence is infinite as indifferent to infinita. Though the problem is especially serious for Henry (as the first author both to regard absolute essences as so important and to discuss divine infinity), he rejects it in exactly the same way that Thomas does, namely by asserting that God is pure actuality and, therefore, without passive potency for such contraction.[6]

Employing the same methods as his predecessors, Henry sharply contrasts the infinity of God with creaturely infinity, using Aristotle as his source for the latter. The positive results of the comparison are that divine infinity is actual, formal, and consistent with totality and perfection. As we have already seen, Fishacre, Bonaventure, Gerard, and Richard base most of their arguments for divine infinity on the simplicity of God's essence. Bonaventure in some texts agrees with Thomas' main line of argument, according to which God is infinite because He is pure actuality or pure being.[7] We also find in Thomas statements that divine infinity is formal,[8] though this locution is generally avoided, because the infinity he attributes to angelic forms is also called 'formal'. Both Bonaventure and Thomas contrast the perfection of divine infinity with imperfect material infinity.[9] Thus, the main points about divine infinity brought out in the second section of our question are to be found in the writings of Henry's predecessors.

Henry's major innovation seems to involve a simple shift of emphasis (already apparent in Thomism) from infinity as following upon simplicity and unity to an infinity resulting from actuality. For the most part, Richard Fishacre and Bonaventure argue from simplicity to infinity. Bonaventure seems to think that God's pure actuality implies His simplicity and His simplicity his infinity. Perfection, which is equated with totality, does not appear to be the ground for the attribution of infinity.[10] In Thomas, approximately the same doctrine occurs: actuality gives rise to perfection and totality (again equated), which in turn imply goodness; actuality also implies simplicity, upon which infinity follows.[11] Henry of Ghent, on the other hand, argues that the properties relating to the divine will follow upon pure actuality in the following order: goodness, perfection, totality, infinity. Simplicity does not enter the picture, except as another property following upon actuality, and goodness is given a more fundamental status than perfection. Further, perfection and totality are distinguished in accordance with the Aristotelian texts. A new and more elaborate ordering of the divine attributes thus appears to be the major difference between Henry and his predecessors.

However, this modification reflects a slightly different conception of infinity itself. For Henry, God is infinite as pure actuality possessing all perfections endlessly. This thought is found in one text of Bonaventure, but it is not developed there. As Thomas and Bonaventure usually argue, infinity is a simple negation of limitation founded upon God's lack of composition and consequent unalloyed actuality. He contains all modes of being as pure act and, hence, is perfect (and whole), but this is not the source of His infinity.

Second question

As we saw in our historical summary, the question whether 'infinite' signifies negatively, privatively, or positively, is not taken up by any of Henry's predecessors except Bonaventure.

This author hints in a reply to an objection in his Commentary on the Sentences[12] that 'infinite' is negatively imposed but signifies an affirmation with respect to the thing signified. In earlier distinctions, Bonaventure considers as separate questions whether 'one', numerical names, 'equality', and 'similitude' signify positively or privatively,[13] but d. 43 does not contain a separate question on the positive signification of 'infinite'. Nonetheless, we may speculate that Henry's awareness of Bonaventure's concern with the mode of signification of other names, as well as his knowledge of d. 43, a. un., q. 2, ad 6, may have prompted him to ask how the term 'infinite' signifies.

The lack of a separate question on the subject in Bonaventure or any other author leaves us unable to identify Henry's opponents. The single objection in Bonaventure and a similar objection in Richard of Middleton[14] are only vaguely like Henry's first objection (14^rQ), and neither of these authors has an objection like the second (Ibid.). We may conjecture that the second objection (that 'infinite' does not signify anything positive over and above perfection and totality) probably was directed explicitly to Henry's hierarchical ordering of the attributes relating to the will. The first objection (that, since 'finite' signifies positively, 'infinite' must signify negatively) is just the sort of reaction that any contemporary or predecessor (except Bonaventure) would have exhibited to the question posed by Henry.

The sed contra (Ibid.) mentions a popular argument that is also found in William of Auvergne, Richard Fishacre, and Bonaventure.[15] However, it is not based upon this argument, which attributes infinity to God only by extrinsic denomination. It argues instead that the property by which God exceeds everything finite carries a certain dignity which only a position can convey. A similar argument is found in Richard of Middleton,[16] but no hint of its origin is given either by Henry or by Richard.

Although we are unable to identify the authors of the objections or the sed contra, the outline of views given later in the responsio (14^{v}T) at least suggests the schools of thought that produced the negative view of infinity, which Henry is most concerned to combat. The first of these maintained that God was infinite as lacking external limitations of place, time, or understanding. Some or all of these ways of infinity are found in the neo-Platonists, Augustine, Lombard, William of Auvergne, and Albert the Great, and they are mentioned even by authors such as Bonaventure and Thomas, who normally argue that God is intrinsically infinite. In general, however, it represents the view derived from John Damascene and commonly held in the first half of the thirteenth century. As Albert continually quotes Damascene and does not seem to have expounded intrinsic infinity until his late works, Henry may well have him in mind. The second author thought that infinity was predicated of God because He lacks internal limitation. This is the view that belongs to Fishacre, Albert (in his later writings), Bonaventure, Thomas, and Gerard of Abbeville. It is undoubtedly the standard conception of infinity among Henry's contemporaries and immediate predecessors.

What is clear from the information we possess is that Henry's main adversaries are the exponents of negative divine infinity (loosely called 'privative' in the objections). Henry knows and distinguishes the external and relative infinity current before 1250 and the intrinsic infinity defended during the last half of the thirteenth century. Naturally, he is especially concerned with the latter view, as the *responsio* makes clear.

Henry prefaces the solution to the question with a distinction of three types of infinity (14^{r}R-^{v}S): (1) the negation of a terminus of that which has no process, (2) the privation of a terminus of that which has a process and is naturally constituted to end, (3) the position of a perpetually extended process of that which is not naturally constituted to end. The first two ways are drawn from Aristotle's *Physics*, whereas the third obviously goes beyond the Greek notion of infinity. Since no one can predicate privations of God, no one can hold that God is infinite in the second way. But, although the first way correctly conveys God's lack of external and internal limitations, this sense of 'infinite' does not express what we mean to ascribe to God when we assert that He is infinite. It now appears that the name 'infinite' is predicated positively of God.

Henry proposes to defend this position from three points of view (14^{v}V): (1) from the nature of the negation (14^{v}V), (2) from the nature of the thing signified (14^{v}X-15^{r}A), (3) from the imposition of the name (15^{r}A-^{v}E). The nature of negation is distinct from that of privation: as Aristotle and Averroes note, negation is the removal of something absolutely, whereas privation is the removal of something from a determinate nature. Thus, a negation can imply an affirmation in the subject only accidentally, by means of privation, as, for example, the negation of blindness implies the affirmation of sight in a subject naturally constituted to see. Just in itself, a negation never affirms. Consequently, if 'infinite' were a pure negation, it could not express the dignity that we intend to ascribe to God when we say 'God is infinite'.

This first argument, from the nature of negation, depends upon the Aristotelian distinction between negation and privation. Further, it is simply laid down by Henry that we do intend to signify a certain dignity by means of 'infinite'. Surely this is true in the twentieth century, but was it true in the late thirteenth? Or was Henry urging his contemporaries to attach such a dignity to 'infinite'? A glance at Bonaventure's conception of infinity indicates that it represents a superior aspect in God. He writes that it is predicated of God on account of His "supreme immensity".[17] Thomas repeatedly says that infinity follows upon pure actuality. It is difficult to ascertain anything more than that infinity is regarded as a higher divine attribute in the second half than in the first half of the thirteenth century and that Bonaventure and Thomas both think it carries some worth. Henry's affirmation that 'infinite' is used to ascribe a certain dignity to God is probably correct, but it is undoubtedly also true that the attention he gave to it caused it to carry even more weight with Duns Scotus and the moderns.

The second argument, from the nature of the thing signified, begins with a repetition and amplification of the distinction of the aspects of goodness, perfection, totality, and infinity, already set out in the first question. Something is good by contact with its end, perfect by completely contacting it so as to lack nothing, whole by containing all completions, and infinite by containing all perfections (as it were) in a perpetually extended manner. It is clear that the four attributes differ only by a distinction of reason, but still 'infinite' adds the note 'further extension' to the notions of perfection and totality. From the point of view of the created intellect, the infinite always evokes a perfection beyond what has already been conceived; in fact, however, God contains all of these perfections in act and at the same time. Therefore, there is an aspect in God which has great dignity and still is not named by the terms 'good', 'perfect', and 'whole'. If we look around for a name that will denote this further perfection, we find that 'infinite' is the name that is used to signify it.

Was 'infinite' used to signify an aspect above perfection and totality at the end of the thirteenth century? For Fishacre, Bonaventure, Thomas, and Gerard, infinity seems rather to have followed upon simplicity. Bonaventure and Thomas also argue that it is implied by the divine actuality, but they generally appear to hold that it is because of the simplicity of the divine essence, which follows upon actuality, that God is infinite. The inclusion of the four attributes goodness, perfection, totality, and infinity under the attributes relating to the will, their description, and their hierarchical order seem peculiar to Henry. For Thomas and Bonaventure, at least, 'infinite' does not appear to add a note to perfection and totality. In the context of Henry's work, in-ready set out in the first question. Something is good by contact with its end, perfect by completely contacting it so as to lack nothing, whole by containing all completions, and infinite by containing all perfections (as it were) in a perpetually extended manner. It is clear that the four attributes differ only by a distinction of reason, but still 'infinite' adds the note 'further extension' to the notions of perfection and totality. From the point of view of the created intellect, the infinite always evokes a perfection beyond what has already been conceived; in fact, however, God contains all of these perfections in act and at the same time. Therefore, there is an aspect in God which has great dignity and still is not named by the terms 'good', 'perfect', and 'whole'. If we look around for a name that will denote this further perfection, we find that 'infinite' is the name that is used to signify it.

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Although 'infinite' signifies positively, a negation is associated with it from its mode of imposition. 'Infinite' primarily signifies further extension of perfection, but, secondarily and as a consequence, it signifies the negation of a boundary to further extension. Because boundaries are more known to the human intellect than further extension, the form of the name is derived from the secondary signification. But properly, 'infinite' should be imposed according to its primary signification, in which it signifies positively. Indeed, 'finite' primarily signifies a privation of further extension and only secondarily the position of boundaries, from which the name is derived. 'Infinite' in creatures likewise signifies the privation of finitude, which is a real privation. In God, it refers to the negation of finitude, but only secondarily, inasmuch as it is transferred from creatures to God. The fact that 'infinite' is primarily imposed in its positive signification is supported by two arguments (15^vC-D): (1) Since the negation of the privation of boundaries is as well known to us as the boundaries themselves, the infinite qua infinite would not be unknown if it did not signify something positive; (2) The world is called 'finite' not so much because it is bound by the surface of the outermost sphere as because it lacks further extension. Further, Henry adduces three texts from Dionysius to support his position (15^vD-E). His views of these passages, which we have already discussed at length, result from misinterpretations and mistranslations.

This third argument for the positive signification of the term 'infinite' is an application of the general theory of the signification of divine names expounded in a. 32, q. 4. The view of Avicenna and Moses Maimonides that all positive names signify negatively or with relation has again been reversed. In a. 44, q. 2, 'infinite' signifies positively, whereas 'finite' primarily signifies negatively. Henry reads this doctrine into Dionysius (and into Moses in a. 32, q. 4), but again it seems to be Henry's own innovation.

The reply to the second objection (15^vG-16^rH) considers in more detail the relation between the attributes relating to the will in an effort to dispel the misconception that 'infinite' cannot signify positively because perfection and totality include everything positive in the divine being. Perfection and totality contain infinity implicitly, and, hence, 'infinite' signifies nothing that is absolutely beyond these aspects. But in making the note 'further extension' explicit, 'infinite' does signify something positive and beyond the aspects of perfection and totality. More generally, no divine attribute signifies something absolutely distinct from every other attribute, because all the attributes are really identical with each other and with the divine essence. But yet there are distinctions of reason between them that allow the intellect to order them according to a hierarchy of perfection. Thus, the attributes perfection, totality, and infinity are really identical, but each adds a note of higher perfection to the one preceding. Hence, infinity does represent an aspect above perfection and totality.

Henry possesses a very clear awareness of the types of negative divine infinity expounded in the thirteenth century, extrinsic and relative infinity, by which spatial, temporal, and cognitive limitations are denied of God, and intrinsic infinity, which negates internal limitations of the divine essence. His responsio seems to be directed mainly against the second view, which the majority of his contemporaries undoubtedly held. Henry's background then appears to be the same as that of Thomas and Bonaventure, though he presents an account of infinity that is very different from theirs.

The main interest of q. 2 lies in the three arguments for the positive signification of 'infinite'. The first, which involves the Aristotelian distinction of negation and privation and a linguistic comment on the current use of 'infinite', seems unparalleled elsewhere in the writings of Henry and his predecessors. The dignity that Henry thinks the term conveys probably did belong to it by 1280, partly at least as a result of the intrinsic and essential character given to it by Richard Fishacre and his followers, particularly Bonaventure and Thomas. The second argument and the reply to the second objection seem to be entirely the result of Henry's arrangement of the attributes goodness, perfection, totality, and infinity. I have been unable to discover any similar structure in Bonaventure or Thomas, though there may be an undiscovered precedent for it. The third argument seems to be the direct result of Henry's apparently original account of the signification of the names of the divine attributes. Bonaventure's remark on the positive signification of 'infinite' appears to be a rudimentary form of Henry's argument, but credit for the detailed development of the idea must go to Henry.

However, are we confronted with a new notion of infinity in Henry of Ghent or a mere reinterpretation of the intrinsic infinity known from the time of Fishacre? Throughout a. 44, Henry speaks of infinity as the perpetual extension of perfections and completions of the divine nature. This is essent~~ial~~ly the infinity of actuality found in Bonaventure and Thomas, but it has been made to follow upon perfection and totality instead of simplicity, and its negative character has been abolished to make way for a positive interpretation. The latter modification, made in the second question, involves only a substitution of "always having further perfections" for "having further perfections without end". The only distinction between the two seems to be that the former is positive, whereas the latter is negative. Henry may have been concerned to institute the changes because of the hierarchical structure he had planned for the attributes relating to the will, each of which was to add a higher positive note to the preceding attribute, and because of the theory of signification he had expounded some years before in a. 32, according to which negative divine names signify real positions. He was undoubtedly prompted in his endeavor by the good press infinity had received in Thomas and Bonaventure. This is not to say that Henry's contribution is insignificant, for its influence on Duns Scotus and the moderns, though it has not yet been documented, appears to be great. But the change from negative to positive infinity certainly does not reflect the new metaphysics that the changes from extrinsic to intrinsic infinity and from infinity of non-being to infinity of being so clearly evidence.

Henry of Ghent and his Predecessors

Three views of infinity

The outline of the history of infinity of Chapters I and II reveals three great periods in the history of infinity in Henry's predecessors. The first, which seems to have been originated by the Milesian School, is that of quantitative infinity. It took the form of spatial infinity in Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Xenophanes. For the Pythagoreans, the infinite appears to have been a spatially extended, subsistent material principle. Parmenides denied the spatial infinity of being, though his follower Melissus argued that being could only be one if it were both spatially and temporally infinite. The pluralists introduced an infinite multiplicity of principles in opposition to the Eleatic one, and they ascribed spatial and temporal infinity to the mass (whether mind, the whole, void, or air). The atomists' position on infinity was adopted almost entirely by the Epicureans. Plato seems to have followed mainly in the footsteps of the Pythagoreans in positing a subsistent infinite inferior to its opposite principle, limit, but he also knew and applied the temporal infinity of Melissus and the pluralists. All of these authors contributed in various ways to the development of quantitative infinity.

But it was Aristotle who presented the first technical analysis of quantitative infinity, and it was his work alone that was known to the middle ages directly. According to Aristotle, the infinite in magnitude existed only in division, whereas the infinite in number existed only in increase and was dependent on the infinite divisibility of magnitudes. There could be no actually infinite magnitude or number, and hence all infinity was in potency and a property of a process, not a product. Motion and time provided the bases for the attribution of infinite power to the prime mover, who required infinity of power to cause an infinite motion over an infinite time. But even here infinity remained quantitative and predicated only extrinsically of the prime mover. The Stoics incorporated the spatial and temporal infinity of the pre-Socratics and the infinite divisibility of Aristotle into their physics.

These physical and quantitative notions of infinity persisted throughout the history of infinity. But the development of the incorporeal notion of god led to a non-quantitative and metaphysical concept of infinity, found first among the neo-Platonists. For Plotinus and his followers, god was above the form of the lower hypostases and, hence, was infinite as lacking the limitations imposed by form. A similar type of infinity was attributed to matter as below being and in the other hypostases as pre-being. In general, any principle which lacked form also lacked limit and, hence, was infinite as non-being.

It was not until the thirteenth century that a new concept of infinity appeared. According to Richard Fishacre and his successors, infinity was to be attributed to God because He lacked the limitations imposed by matter. God was no longer infinite as unformed, but as purely formal and immaterial. The cause of limitation for the thirteenth century was matter, not the form of the Greeks. Within this third period, we can distinguish three progressively more sophisticated views. The first, that of Fishacre, attributed infinity to God on account of His simplicity, i.e. lack of material composition. The metaphysics of actuality developed by Bonaventure and Thomas allowed a more complete account of infinity, according to which the divine actuality gave rise to the divine simplicity, upon which infinity followed. These two views were superceded by the new analysis presented by Henry of Ghent. For him, infinity followed immediately upon totality and perfection, which were rooted in the divine actuality. As infinity added a new note to perfection and totality, the term 'infinite' no longer had the negative signification it possessed for Thomas but was conceived as signifying the divine actuality positively.

Bases of the three views

Since the work of L. Sweeney, the existence of the three basic views of infinity has been known. However, the problems that prove most interesting and enlightening to the student of the history of infinity remain almost entirely neglected: Why was each of these views held? What was the reason for the absence of a doctrine of divine infinity in the Latin West between 350 and 1240? It is with some hesitation that I present my speculations on these matters, for the investigations of the history of infinity have not advanced to the point where they render indubitable the generalizations I wish to propose. Yet I cannot fail to consider here what seem to be the most profound problems in the area of infinity, and I consider them in the hope that my reflections, however defective, may prove useful to other students of the topic.

The pre-Socratic notion of reality, as is well known, was primarily physical. Infinity, which they made either a subsistent reality or a property of reality, was, quite naturally, quantitative--either a material substance or a property of a material substance. Plato and Aristotle developed notions of incorporeal ultimate reality, but they did not predicate infinity of it. The reason seems to be two-fold: (1) the Pythagorean association of infinity with evil, (2) the connection of infinity with formlessness and (hence) materiality. Since both Plato and Aristotle associated form with completeness and perfection, the ideas and the prime movers, as pure forms, had to be finite in the highest degree. The exclusion of infinity from incorporeal being reflects the Greek association of form with finitude.

Neo-Platonism amalgamated Plato's one and good. The one was the source of all being and, hence, transcended both being and form. Further, because the presence of form implied the presence of a formed, the unity of the one prohibited its having form. For the neo-Platonists, as for Plato and Aristotle, form and finitude were intimately connected. Thus, they held the one (or good) to be infinite as above all form. The new infinity of non-being expounded by Plotinus and his followers depended heavily upon the traditional Greek conception of infinity as formlessness. The new insight that enabled the predication of infinity of the first principle arose from the realization that there could be a source of being that necessarily transcended being.

The writings of Plotinus, in the translation of Marius Victorinus,[17] were read (at least in part) by Augustine. Why was it that Augustine nowhere attributed to God the infinity of non-being that Plotinus predicated of the one? The reason, quite obviously, is that Augustine's God was being. Augustine, unable to reconcile the Plotinian infinity with Exodus 3, 14, simply ignored infinity of non-being and reverted to the traditional uses of 'infinite' as equivalent to 'transcending place', 'transcending human cognition', etc.

The identification of God with being in the Augustinian "metaphysics" accounts for the absence of a doctrine of divine infinity for the next eight centuries. During this time, metaphysical and physical speculation fell to a low ebb. Greek physics and metaphysics were unknown in the Latin West, and, lacking Greek stimulation, scholars devoted their energies to theological and dialectical inquiries. Quite naturally, no new concept of divine infinity was developed.

At the end of the twelfth century, a new flood of Greek texts began to reach the West. The works of Aristotle, together with the summaries of Avicenna and the commentaries of Averroes, were translated and assimilated by theologians and philosophers during this and the following century. The result was that by the middle of the thirteenth century a number of extremely sophisticated Christian metaphysics were developed. The writings of John Damascene, Pseudo-Dionysius, and other neo-Platonists were synthesized with the pre-Christian writings within the new metaphysics.

One of the recurrent themes of neo-Platonism was the infinity of the divine reality. No such infinity appeared in the Aristotelian texts, but there seemed to the thirteenth century to be no *a priori* reason for excluding infinity from the divine being. Ignoring or failing to realize the intimate neo-Platonic association of infinity with non-being, theologians incorporated the doctrine of divine infinity within their theologies. Whether God was pure essence, pure form, or pure existence, still he could be regarded as infinite inasmuch as he was completely unlimited being.

Two factors thus seem to have contributed to the development of a notion of infinite being: (1) the formulation of Christian metaphysical systems, at the head of which was a God who was pure being, (2) the neo-Platonic assertions of divine infinity. With its sources in Aristotelian and neo-Platonic texts, infinity of being represents an extremely clear example of the formation of entirely new doctrines through the synthesis of divergent streams of thought.

Of the three views of infinity of being which we distinguished in the thirteenth century, that of Richard Fishacre is surely the least sophisticated. Although his *Commentary on the Sentences* has not yet been edited, we may speculate that the reasons for its primitive character are (1) that it was either the first or one of the first accounts and (2) that it depended on a less developed metaphysics. The writings of Bonaventure and Thomas, representative of the second view, contain extremely sophisticated metaphysics of actuality, which provide the bases for a very precise account of infinity, as following upon simplicity and actuality. Though different from the metaphysics of Bonaventure and Thomas in many respects, the metaphysics of Henry of Ghent does not seem to provide grounds for a new concept of divine infinity. Rather the interpretation of infinity as a positive attribute appears to result from Henry's new theological ordering of the divine attributes relating to the will, his theological requirement that each volitional attribute add a new note to the divine essence, and his novel account of the signification of divine names.

NOTES

Foreword (pp. 1-3)

[1] "L'infinité divine chez saint Augustin", *Augustinus Magister*, I (Paris, 1954), 569-574.

[2] *Quodlibeta Magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo* (Paris, 1518), reprinted, Louvain, 1961.

[3] *Summae Quaestionum Ordinariarum Theologi recepto praeconio Solemnis Henrici a Gandavo* tomos prior, tomos posterior . . . in aedibus J. Bodii Ascensii (Paris, 1520), reprinted, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1953.

[4] The details of Henry's life are concisely stated by J. Paulus in his article "Henry of Ghent" in the *New Catholic Encyclopedia* (1967).

[5] Henry himself notes that infinity of power is irrelevant to infinity "in substance and essence" (*Summa*, a. 44, prol.; II, 11v).

Chapter I (pp. 4-36)

[1] See, for example, the fragment of Orpheus in which chaos is called 'apeiron' (DK 1 B 13).

[2] Translations of pre-Socratic fragments are taken from K. Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* . . . (Oxford, 1962), except where indicated.

[3] See DK 12 A 9, 15.

[4] See K. Freeman, *The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Companion to Diels* . . . (Oxford, 1946), p. 57. Aristotle supports this second view at *Phys.*, III, 5; 204b22-24.

[5] G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* . . .

(Cambridge, 1964), pp. 171-72, seem unjustified in their assumption that Aristotle (DK 21 A 30) or Theophrastus (DK 21 A 31 (2)) implies that the god and the world are equated. Kirk and Raven note (p. 172) that god is motionless, whereas the world is in motion, for Xenophanes.

[6] Cf. DK 21 A 31 (5, 7).

[7] See Kirk and Raven, pp. 171-72.

[8] Aristotle, *Meta.*, A, 5; 986a23-27; DK 58 B 5.

[9] Agreeing with Kirk and Raven, p. 241.

[10] Cf. Aristotle, *Meta.*, M, 6; 1080b16-19; DK 58 B 9; M, 8; 1083b8-13; DK 58 B 10.

[11] Kirk and Raven, pp. 246-48.

[12] We do not treat the later Pythagoreans, as nothing is known that points to an advance in the doctrine of infinity over early Pythagoreanism.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

[14] See also DK 30 B 2.

[15] The argument is actually backwards. For this, see Kirk and Raven, p. 300.

[16] It cannot *be* empty space, for this is divisible. See J.E. Raven, *Pythagoreans and Eleatics* (Cambridge, 1948), p. 91.

[17] Archelaus of Athens, pupil of Anaxagoras, held on all relevant points to his master's theory.

[18] Omitted by Kirk and Raven.

[19] The fragments of Antiphon the Sophist contain these lines: "Hence he (*God*) needs nothing and receives no addition from anywhere, but is infinite and lacking nothing (DK 87 B 10)." 'God' is supplied by most commentators, probably unjustifiably. M. Untersteiner, *The Sophists*, tr. K. Freeman (New York, 1954), argues convincingly that the fragment is actually a summary of the Gorgian conception of pre-Socratic first principles and "non-Antiphontic in character and therefore polemical" (p. 236; see also pp. 259-260).

[20] As is well known, Aristotle attributes to Plato the view that there are two infinites, self-subsistent substances called 'the great and the small' (*Phys.*, III, 4; 203a4-16). Whether this doctrine was expounded by Plato in lectures or actually belonged to the Academy is very much in doubt. As there are no texts support-

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ing the view in Plato's writings, we are prevented from entering into a discussion of it here.

[21] At *Parm.*, 132A-133A, Parmenides is made to argue that the theory of ideas implies an infinite regress of forms, which must then be infinitely numerous. Plato never answers the argument, nor does he ever assert the numerical infinity of the forms (cf. *Rep.*, 597C-D).

[22] Negative accounts, directed against the infinite as substance or attribute of bodies, are given at *Phys.*, III, 4-5 (summarized at *Meta.*, K, 10) and *De Caelo*, I, 5-7.

[23] See also III, 4; 204a1-2. The Oxford translation is quoted unless otherwise noted.

[24] The division adopted is that of Cornford, Aristotle: *The Physics* (New York, 1929), 226-27, n. c.

[25] That this is the usual Aristotelian usage is shown by 206b 20-22. Cf. *Meta.*, Ⓜ, 4-6, where several other meanings are explained.

[26] In this discussion, I have depended heavily on J. Hintikka, "Aristotelian Infinity", *Phil. Rev.*, LXXV (1966), 197-218. Cf. A. Edel, *Aristotle's Theory of the Infinite* (New York, 1934), pp. 34-65, which seems a less adequate account.

[27] Aristotle does not think that the disproof of the infinite in the direction of increase affects the mathematicians in the slightest (207b27-34). He does not take into account the axiom of parallels, which clearly presupposes it; see Hintikka, pp. 201-206.

[28] Aristotle must at least hold that an infinite spiritual substance has quantity; see *Phys.*, I, 2; 185a32-b5.

[29] The first position is adopted by R. Mondolfo, *L'infinito nel pensiero dell'antichità classica* (Firenze, 1956), pp. 458-463. It is strenuously opposed by L. Sweeney, "L'infini quantitatif chez Aristote", *RPL* LVIII (1960), 519-525. We follow Sweeney's interpretation here.

[30] See, for example, Sweeney, "L'infini quantitatif", p. 523.

[31] Nowhere does Aristotle give any other reason for attributing infinity to the prime mover's power.

[32] Cf. Cicerô, *De Nat. Deor.*, I, xiv, 36-xv, 39.

[33] See *ibid.*, 142 and Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.*, II, xlvi, 118, where it is noted that Panaetius denied universal conflagration.

[34] Cf. Plutarch, *De Comm. Notit.*, 1085c.

[35] Compare the definition of 'void' in Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.*, X, 1-4.

[36] Arguments demonstrating these points are given by Cleomedes, *loc. cit.*

Chapter II (pp. 37-84)

[1] The interpretation of infinity in Plotinus has been discussed in a number of recent articles: A.H. Armstrong, "Plotinus's Doctrine of the Infinite and its Significance for Christian Thought", *Downside Rev.*, LXXIII (1955), 47-58; L. Sweeney, "Are *Apeiria* and *Aoristia* Synonyms?", *Mod. Schoolman*, XXXIII (1956), 270-280, "Infinity in Plotinus", *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), 515-535, 713-732; W.N. Clarke, "Infinity in Plotinus: A Reply", *Gregorianum*, XL (1959), 75-98; L. Sweeney, "Plotinus Revisited", *Ibid.*, 327-331, "Another Interpretation of *Enneads* VI, 7, 32", *Mod. Schoolman*, XXXVIII (1960-61), 289-304, "Basic Principles in Plotinus's Philosophy", *Gregorianum*, XLII (1961), 506-516).

[2] Cf. VI, 7, 32.

[3] See Clarke, pp. 81-84; Sweeney, "Another Interpretation", pp. 289-304.

[4] Cf. II, 4, 5.

[5] III, 6, 7.

[6] Cf. VI, 6, 3.

[7] L.J. Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (New York, 1949), pp. 99-117.

[8] *Platonica Theologia*, pp. 132-33, quoted Rosán, pp. 102-103, n. 14.

[9] Rosán, pp. 104-108.

[10] *P.T.*, pp. 132-33, quoted Rosán, pp. 102-103, n. 14; *P.T.*, pp. 101-102, *Comm. Parm.*, col. 1167, quoted Rosán, p. 124, n. 27.

[11] *Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera Inedita* . . . nunc secundus curis emendavit et auxit Victor Cousin (Paris, 1864), *Comm. Parm.*, 1119-121; see Rosán, p. 127.

[12] See L. Sweeney, "Divine Infinity in the Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: Toronto, 1954), pp. 75-114.

[13] See also *ibid.*, IV, 10, V, 9.

[14] See also *ibid.*, XIII, 1, 3.

[15] See also *ibid.*, XI, 1.

[16] Sweeney, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

[17] Sweeney, *loc. cit.*

[18] See also *De Div. Nom.*, I, 1; IV, 3, VII, 1.

[19] See also *ibid.*, V, 1-2, VII, 2-3, IX, 3.

[20] John Eriugena holds substantially the same view of divine infinity. See especially *In Hier. Cael.*, II, 3; PL 122, 154B-55D; *De Div. Nat.*, I, 39; PL 122, 482C-D, II, 19; PL 122, 553A, II, 28; PL 122, 587B-D (God as absolutely infinite), 589B-593C. Matter is also infinite as deprived of form; see *De Div. Nat.*, I, 56; PL 122, 499D-500C.

[21] Two papers by Sweeney outline infinity in John Damascene: "John Damascene's 'Infinite Sea of Essence'", *Studia Patristica*, VI (Oxford, 1959), Texte und Untersuchungen, Bd. 81 (1962), pp. 248-263; "John Damascene and Divine Infinity", *New Scholasticism*, XXXV (1961), 76-106.

[22] Edited by E.M. Buytaert, *De Fide Orthodoxa: Versdons of Burgundio and Cerbanus* (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955).

[23] Cf. *ibid.*, I, 4; PG 94, 797B.

[24] Cf. *ibid.*, I, 14; PG 94, 860A.

[25] See Sweeney, "'Infinite Sea'", p. 263, n. 1.

[26] Infinity in Augustine has been considered in two articles: Gilson, "L'infinité divine"; L. Sweeney, "Lombard, Augustine and Infinity", *Manuscripta*, II (1958), 24-40.

[27] See, for example, *De Trin.*, XV, v, 8; PL 42, 1062.

[28] *Op. cit.*, pp. 570-72.

[29] Cf. *Contra Faustum*, xxv, 2; CSEL 25, 727.

[30] Sweeney, "Lombard, Augustine", pp. 28-31.

[31] L. Sweeney treats Peter Lombard on infinity in two articles:

"Divine Infinity: 1150-1250", *Mod. Schoolman*, XXXV (1957-58), 38-51 and "Lombard, Augustine".

[32] See "Divine Infinity: 1150-1250". Hugh of St. Cher, writing 1231-35, makes no advance over Peter Lombard; see R.F. McCaslin, "Divine Infinity in Selected Texts of Hugh of St. Cher" (Unpublished M.A. thesis: St. Louis, 1961).

[33] *De Trin.*, XII, 21; PL 10, 446B.

[34] The texts are collected and interpreted by Sweeney in "Divine Infinity: 1150-1250", pp. 43-45.

[35] *De Trin.*, VIII, 43; PL 10, 269A.

[36] The quotation is from Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sac. Christ. Fidei*, I, sec. pars, 22; PL 176, 214B-C.

[37] See Sweeney, "Lombard, Augustine", pp. 32-33, n. 6.

[38] "Primus Tractatus Divinalis Magistri Guillelmi Parisiensis, Scilicet De Trinitate . . .", *Opera Omnia* (Paris, 1674), II, 1a-17b.

[39] *Ibid.*, c. ii, p. 2a.

[40] *Ibid.*, cc. vi-vii.

[41] Infinity is equivalent to eternity in the proof for the temporality of the world. See *ibid.*, c. x, p. 14a-b.

[42] Pars II, cc. lxv-lxvii; Paris, 1674, I, 914a-21b.

[43] *De Virt.*, c. xx; Paris, 1674, I, 185a.

[44] *Loc. cit.*

[45] Pars III; Paris, 1674, II, 158a-59a.

[46] Infinity is applied to mortal sins at *De Leg.*, xxi; Paris, 1674, I, 61a-64b. Evil is infinite, while good is determinate in the *De Bono et Malo*, ed. J.R. O'Donnell, *MS*, XVI (1954), 221.

[47] For Richard Fishacre, see L. Sweeney and C.J. Ermatinger, "Divine Infinity according to Richard Fishacre", *Mod. Schoolman*, XXXV (1957-58), 191-212.

[48] d. 2, c. 1, prol.; ed. Ermatinger, ll. 2-6.

[49] *Ibid.*, ll. 261-64.

[50] *Ibid.*, ll. 265-283.

[51] *Ibid.*, ll. 285-291.

[52] *Ibid.*, ll. 292-97.

[53] *Ibid.*, ll. 300-309.

[54] See D.A. Callus, *Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford* (London, 1944), pp. 32-33.

[55] For Gerard of Abbeville, see Appendix.

[56] The investigation of Albert's doctrine of infinity has been made by F.J. Catania: "Divine Infinity According to Albert the Great's Commentary on Lombard's *Sentences*" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation; St. Louis University, 1959), "Divine Infinity in Albert the Great's Commentary on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard", *MS*, XXII (1960), 27-42.

[57] See also *ibid.*, d. 9K, a. 18, sol.; Borgnet, 25, 299a-b.

[58] See also *ibid.*, d. 36C, a. 8, ad q. 2; Borgnet, 26, 220a-b.

[59] *Ibid.*, d. 43C, a. 1, sol.; Borgnet, 26, 379a.

[60] In *I P. Sum. Theol.*, tr. 3, a. 14, m. 1, ad 2; Borgnet, 31, 70b-71a.

[61] Treated in J. Prather, "Divine Infinity in Selected Texts from Saint Bonaventure's Commentary on the *Sentences*" (Unpublished M.A. thesis: St. Louis University, 1964).

[62] See also *ibid.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 4, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 138b.

[63] *Ibid.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 1; Quaracchi, I, 605b. See also *ibid.*, q. 3, ad 3; Quaracchi, I, 613a-b.

[64] See also *ibid.*, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 606b-607a.

[65] *Ibid.*, q. 2; Quaracchi, I, 608a-611a.

[66] See Sweeney, "Divine Infinity in the Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas".

[67] q. 1, a. 1; ed. Mandonnet, I, 1002-1004.

[68] *Ibid.*, sol.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 1002-1003.

[69] See also *De Ver.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 5; ed. Spiazzi, I, 29a, no. 14.

[70] The infinity of God is called "formal" (as involving no matter) at *S.T.*, I, q. 86, q. 2, ad 1; Ottawa, I, 537a.

[71] Leonine ed., p. 41a-42a. See also *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 2, resp.; ed. Pession, II, 11b, no. 2.

[72] The last two types of infinity of power are the same as the extensive and intensive infinity of Thomas Aquinas.

Chapter III (pp. 85-157)

[1] See a. 21, prol.; I, 123^{r}: Visis quasi praeambulis ad intentum nostrum principale, quomodo scilicet theologia sit de deo, et quod de rebus divinis sit scientia, et quomodo de eisdem in eadem locutio sit habenda ⟨aa. 1-20⟩, restat de principali intento prosequi, quae scilicet et qualia in hac scientia de deo et de rebus divinis ex ea sunt sentienda ⟨aa. 21-75⟩. . . . Et juxta duplicem praescriptum modum quo utitur omnis tractatio divinarum scripturarum, circa deum duo sunt dubitanda: Primum, quae et qualia de deo sunt intelligenda ⟨aa. 21-72⟩; Secundum, quomodo intellecta de ipso sunt proferenda ⟨aa. 73-75⟩. . . . Et quia in deo sunt substantiae unitas et personarum distinctio, ideo circa primum quaeruntur duo: Primum, de eis quae pertinent ad communem substantiam ⟨aa. 21-52⟩; Secundum, de eis quae pertinent ad personarum distinctionem ⟨aa. 53-72⟩. See also Paulus, _Henri de Gand_ . . . (Paris, 1938)--hereafter referred to as "Paulus"--p. 244, n. 1.

[2] A. 21, prol.; I, 123^{r}: Et quia in divina essentia aliquid consideratur ut res et natura subjecta, aliud vero ut proprietas ei inhaerens, ideo circa primum adhuc quaeruntur duo: Primum, de ipsa divina substantia in se; Secundum, de substantialibus ejus proprietatibus.

[3] A. 28, prol.; I, 164^{v}: Primae sunt deitatis ut deitas est, quasi proprie et naturaliter inditae ei, et nulli creaturae neque communicabiles neque communicatae. Aliae vero sunt quasi proprietates deitatis communes deo et creaturae, et a creaturis translatae et deo attributae secundum usum sermonis humani, sed a deo creaturis communicatae secundum rei veritatem, . . . A. 32, prol.; I, 188^{r}: Postquam expeditum est de divinis proprietatibus propriis, et quasi divinae naturae inditis, sequitur de ejus proprietatibus communibus, et quasi divinae naturae a creaturis attributis, de quibus primo tractabimus in se et absolute, secundo comparando ea ad essentiam et ad invicem. Et in se dupliciter: Primo, in generali; Secundo, in speciali.

[4] A. 33, prol.; I, 203^{v}: Sequitur art. xxxiii, de proprietatibus communibus substantialibus divinae essentiae a creaturis attributis in speciali. Et quia omnia essentialia attributa divina pertinent vel ad intellectum vel ad voluntatem in deo, . . . ideo circa ea quae sunt divini intellectus et voluntatis versatur tota consideratio de hujusmodi attributis, circa quae tria sunt consideranda: Primum, absolute de eis quae pertinent ad intellectum, quia intellectus praevius est ad voluntatem; Secundum est absolute de illis quae pertinent ad voluntatem; Tertium, de eis quae pertinent ad ambo, comparatis ad invicem.

[5] A. 35 deals with the power of God in general.

[6] A. 37 treats the habit of God in general.

[7] A. 39 deals with the action of God in general.

[8] *Meta.*, A, 2; 982^{b}4-10.

[9] *Ibid.*, Δ, 16; 1021^{b}24-25.

[10] *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}8-15.

[11] Compare:

Richard of Middleton, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, contra; Brescia, 1591, I, 382b: Negatio non dicit aliquam nobilitatem in re de qua dicitur, nisi aliquam includat affirmationem. Sed infinitas dicit magnam nobilitatem in Deo. Ergo dicit in ipso aliquam positionem.

with:

Summa, a. 44, q. 2; II, 14^{v}V: Negatio, cum nihil ponat ratione qua negatio est, nihil dignitatis apponit ei de quo aliquid negat, . . . Si ergo solum negative praedicaretur 'infinitum', et nihil positive significaret circa deum, tunc nihil dignitatis et perfectionis diceret infinitum circa ipsum.

Compare:

In I Sent., d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, resp.; Brescia, 1591, I, 382b: Infinitas est in divina essentia, potentia, et duratione, et in quolibet istorum ponit spiritualem magnitudinem transcendentem omne futurum, quod est, vel esse potest intelligi; transcendere autem omne finitum, quod positivum est, cui annexa est negatio finis.

with:

Summa, a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{r}D: Infinitas . . . deo debet attribui, quae revera nihil aliud est quam immensitas quaedam et magnitudo spiritualis absque termino, quae omnia in se continet et omnem perfectionem et omnem rationem essendi, et per hoc omne quod est et quod potest esse, . . . *Ibid.*, q. 2; II, 15^{r}B: Ut circa divinam bonitatem, sive in essentia, sive in potentia, sive in quocumque alio attributo . . . dicamus 'infinitum' significare rationem semper ulterius procedendi quocumque termino signato, quod est positivum quid, cui annexa est negatio termini et finis consumentis, a qua fit nominis impositio.

[12] E. Hocedez, *Richard de Middleton* . . . (Louvain, 1925), pp. 27-49, 71-79.

[13] pp. 49-55.

[14] A long list of these cross-references appears in J. Gómez Caffarena, "Cronología de la «Summa» de Enrique de Gante por relación a sus «Quodlibetos»", *Gregorianum*, XXXVIII (1957), 117-128, upon which we here draw.

[15] See Paulus, xvi-xvii, n. 4.

[16] *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320*, I (Paris, 1925), 87-95, 177-199. *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris aux XIII siècle* (Paris, 1933), I, 387-391, no. 192.

[17] Caffarena, chart, p. 133.

[18] Note also that *Summa*, a. 51, q. 1 cites *Quodl.* V, q. 1 (quoted above) with the words 'anno praeterito'. Hence, a. 51 must be dated *ca.* Christmas 1281-Easter 1282, and certainly not later than the middle of 1282.

[19] Q. 4; I, 192^{v}I-196^{r}&: "Utrum deo attributa significant de ipso aliquid positive an negative".

[20] Et est istud non ens medium inter non ens simpliciter . . . et ens simpliciter . . . ut sit ex se quasi indifferens ad utrumque, ut exposuimus in quadam quaestione de quolibet.

[21] Note that *Summa*, a. 27, q. 1; I, 162^{v}-163^{r}T and 163^{r}V also cite *Quodl.* III, q. 2 and q. 9.

[22] Ut determinavimus in quaestione quomodo rationis praedicamentorum deo attribuuntur.

[23] *Quodl.* IV, 7; I, 94^{r}X also cites a. 33, q. 2, ad 3.

[24] Quoted above, p. 88.

[25] Q. 2; II, 15^{r}X, ad 2; II, 16^{r}H.

[26] *Supra*, a. 35, q. 6; I, 226^{r}A-229^{v}Z.

[27] Emended in accordance with a. 44, q. 2; II, 14^{r}Q.

[28] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 2; $185^{a}33$-$^{b}3$.

[29] *Supra*, a. 32, q. 3; 192^{r}C-^{v}H.

[30] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 2; $185^{a}27$-$^{b}5$.

[31] See also a. 26, q. 2; I, 159^{r}S and a. 32, q. 2; 189^{r}H-192^{r}B.

[32] *Aristotelis de Physico auditu libri octo* cum Averrois Cordubensis variis in eosdem commentariis . . . (Venitiis, 1562).

[33] Reprinted in *S. Thomae Aquinatis In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio* cura et studio P.M. Maggiolo (Taurini, 1954). Incipit: Quoniam quidem intelligere et scire contingit circa omnes scientias. Explicit: Indivisibile est, et impartibile et nullam habens magnitudinem. Compare with the first translation in Averroes'

Commentary. Incipit: Quoniam cognoscere ac scire contingit circa omnes methodos. Explicit: Indivisibile est, et impartibile, et nullam habens magnitudinem. See A. Mansion, *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne* (Louvain, 1946), p. 66, n. 48.

[34] The translation belongs to Michael Scot. See *Aristoteles Latinus*, *Codices* descripsit Gregorius Lacombe . . . , I (Roma, 1939), 104. Incipit of the Scot translation: Quoniam dispositio scientiae et certitudinis in omnibus viis. Explicit: Indivisibilem et impartibilem et nullam habere magnitudinem. In the second translation of Averroes' *Commentary*, incipit: Quoniam dispositio certitudinis, et scientiae in omnibus viis. Explicit: Indivisibilem et impartibilem et nullam habere magnitudinem. The translation was made from the Arabic before 1235. See V.J. Bourke, *Introduction to* Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics*, tr. R.J. Blackwell, *et al.* (New Haven, 1963), p. xvi.

[35] *Infra*, II, 12^{v}F: Et hoc (ut addit alia translatio) sive illud extra quod est aliquid separatum sit extraneum sive non extraneum. See below, pp. 121-22 and n. 126.

[36] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 4; 187^{b}7-8.

[37] All translations (Juncta, *AL*, VII, 2) read 'ignotum'.

[38] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 4; 187^{b}7-13.

[39] A. 34, q. 1; I, 211^{r}I: Absolute ergo dicendum quod in deo veritas est et quod deus veritas est, immo summa veritas, quia summa essendi necessitas; . . .

[40] See a. 33, q. 2; I, 206^{r}Z.

[41] A. 34, q. 4; I, 215^{v}D: Et sic absolute dicendum quod veritas dei quae est ipse deus et habet esse in ejus essentia, ut essentia est et natura, et in ejus intelligentia; non tamen ut forma inhaerens, . . .

[42] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 4; 187^{b}7-8.

[43] A. 44; II, 11^{v}A-16^{r}H.

[44] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 5; 204^{a}8-206^{a}8.

[45] *Ibid.*, 6-7; 206^{a}9-208^{a}4.

[46] *Ibid.*, 6; 206^{b}12-16.

[47] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 59; Juncta, IV, 113^{v}D.

[48] A. 28, q. 2; I, 166^{r}D: Id circo simpliciter dicendum quod omnino absurdum est ponere et impossibile quod deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. *Ibid.*, q. 6; 170^{v}N: Cum igitur omnis potentia

quae cum actu nata est facere aliquam compositionem differens est ab ipso--in deo autem omnino non distat potentia ab actu neque differt--in deo ergo nulla potest esse omnino compositio ex potentia et actu. Ex quo relinquitur quod sit actus purus et simplex . . . . See also a. 33, q. 1; I, 204^rL-^{v}O.

[49] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 5; 204^b14-19.

[50] *Phys.*, III, 5; 204^b11-22.

[51] A. 44, q. 1, obj. 4 and a. 21, q. 1, obj. 2 have clear parallels in the writings of Thomas Aquinas and Gerard of Abbeville, though there the objectors hold rather that nothing can be distinct from a God infinite in power or essence:

> Omne quod est distinctum est finitum. Sed potentia Dei est distincta a rebus aliis. Ergo est finita (Thomas Aquinas, *De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 7; ed. Pession, II, 11a, no. 2).
>
> Omne illud quod ita est hoc, quod non aliud, est finitum. Sed deus ita est deus quod non est leo vel asinus, et sic de aliis creaturis. Ergo, deus est finitus (Gerard of Abbeville, *Quodl.* XIII, q. 10, contra; *infra*, Appendix, p. 2*).

These objections begin by simply asserting the distinction of God from all creatures and then argue to His finitude. The objections in Henry, however, are *reductiones ad absurdum*: Suppose that God is infinite; then nothing can lie outside of God, which is false; therefore, . . . Despite this difference of form, the four arguments seem to make the same point, viz. that infinity and distinction are in conflict. For similar arguments, see Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, obj. 2; Quaracchi, I, 609a and Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 1, obj. 3; Ottawa, I, 36b-37a.

[52] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^a1-2.

[53] *Ibid.*, 207^a8-9.

[54] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 1; II, 3^vA-6^rP, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^rA-^{v}E.

[55] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 206^b33-207^a15.

[56] *Ibid.*, 207^a14-15.

[57] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 1; II, 3^vA-6^rP.

[58] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 72; Juncta, IV, 119^vG.

[59] III, 5; 204^b1-4.

[60] The character of some arguments in opposition to divine infinity is discussed by L. Sweeney, "Some Mediaeval Opponents of Divine Infinity", *MS*, XIX (1957), 233-245.

[61] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^a17-21.

[62] *Supra*, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}A-^{v}E.

[63] III, 6; 207^{a}15-27.

[64] This is the interpretation of Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 65; Juncta, IV, 116^{r}D-^{v}H and W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford, 1936), p. 368.

[65] The translations of Moerbeke and Michael Scot could not have occasioned the misrepresentation of Aristotle's text. See Averroes, *In Phys.*, III; Juncta, IV, 116^{r}B-D.

[66] Cf. *Phys.*, III, 4; 203^{a}1-4 and a. 35, q. 6; I, 226^{r}B: Dicendum quod quantumcumque antiqui philosophantes errabant in natura et substantia primi principii, quod nos deum appellamus. In hoc tamen omnes concordabant, quod esset infinitum potentia et virtute.

[67] III, 4; 203^{a}1-^{b}2.

[68] *Supra*, a. 29, q. 2; I, 172^{r}K-O, which is definitely the text to which Henry refers. Cf. a. 42, q. 1; II, 5^{r}K: Unde peccabant quidam ex antiquis philosophis, qui primum principium, quod deus est, dixerunt esse primum principium materiale, ut dicitur xii *Metaphysicae*, et expositum est supra. (The reference is probably to a. 29, q. 2.)

[69] Cf. a. 35, q. 6; I, 226^{r}B: Dicentes enim ipsum esse primam materiam attribuebant ipsi potentiam infinitam passivam, receptibilitate scilicet omnium formarum in infinitum, quas casu ponebant transmutari circa materiam.

[70] The Stoics and Epicureans are said to have adopted the doctrine (*Ibid.*). See Chapter I, pp. 31-36.

[71] Aristotle, *Meta.*, Λ, 7; 1072^{b}30-34.

[72] Averroes, *In Meta.*, XII; Juncta, VIII, 323^{r}E: Omnes autem, qui existimabant existimationem, ut Pythagorici et Leucippici, quod bonum et nobile non est in primo, . . . The translation of Moerbeke has 'Pseusippus' (*Ibid.*, D).

[73] I, 172^{r}N.

[74] See W.D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* . . . (Oxford, 1924), II, 381.

[75] Quoted above, n. 66.

[76] I, 172^{r}K.

[77] 984^{b}23-29, 1091^{b}4-6.

[78] 1071^{b}26-1072^{a}9.

[79] The summary probably also depends on the whole of Meta., A, 4-7.

[80] 184^{b}15-188^{a}18.

[81] 203^{a}16-^{b}2.

[82] Ibid., I, 2-4; 185^{a}32-188^{a}18.

[83] Cf. a. 35, q. 6; I, 126^{r}B: Dicentes vero deum esse substantiam corpoream infinitam, dicebant ipsum habere potentiam infinitam activam, cum in corpore infinito non potest esse nisi virtus infinita.

[84] See Chapter I, pp. 12-17.

[85] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 207^{a}26-28; Averroes, In Phys., III, comm. 65; Juncta, IV, 116^{r}F.

[86] Supra, a. 28, q. 2; I, 166^{r}A-^{v}G and q. 6; I, 169^{v}H-170^{v}P, a. 42; II, 3^{v}A-8^{r}&, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}A-^{v}E.

[87] See a. 21, q. 2, ad 3; I, 125^{r}R, q. 4; I, 128^{r}V, a. 42, q. 2; II, 7^{r}T, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}B-^{v}C.

[88] Supra, aa. 28-29; I, 165^{r}M-178^{r}C.

[89] See a. 28; I, 165^{r}M-170^{v}P.

[90] See a. 28, q. 2; I, 166^{r}B-D.

[91] Ibid., ad 2; I, 166^{v}G, q. 4; I, 167^{v}T-168^{r}V; q. 6; I, 170^{r}L.

[92] A. 28, q. 2, ad 2; I, 166^{v}G: Suppositum enim inquantum suppositum subsistit formae, et ratione subsistentiae, quam de se importat, habet rationem determinationis formae in se, per quam recipit rationem universalis, si significetur per suppositum indeterminatum, cujusmodi est animal aut homo, vel individui particularis, si significetur per suppositum singulare, cujusmodi est hoc animal vel hic homo, . . . Omnis essentia creaturae, quantum est de se, indeterminata est et indifferens, ut ei accidat ratio individui et particularis per determinationem in supposito definito in se subsistente, et ratio universalis per determinationem in supposito indefinito per intellectum abstracto a suppositis definitis, . . . See also a. 28, q. 5; 168^{v}B-169^{v}G and a. 43, q. 2; II, 9^{r}G-H.

[93] Quodl. III, 15; I, 76^{r}-^{v}A; see Paulus, p. 76, n. 1.

[94] Supra, a. 28, q. 5; I, 168^{v}A-169^{v}G and a. 43, q. 2; II, 9^{r}G-H.

[95] Infra, a. 53, q. 1; II, 60^{v}A-61^{v}I.

[96] A. 28, q. 2, ad 2; I, 166^{v}G: Ponenda est ratio individuationis in creaturis spiritualibus aliter quam per materiam, ut per accidentia hypostatica vel per actionem efficientis, quod facit eam subsistere in determinato supposito. Ita quod ratio hujusmodi determinationis in supposito determinato est sicut propria causa per se essentialis individuationis in unoquoque individuo creaturae, . . . Paulus, pp. 353-367.

[97] *Supra*, a. 28, q. 5; II, 169^{r}D.

[98] *Ibid.*

[99] *Infra*, a. 53, q. 1; II, 60^{v}A-61^{v}I.

[100] See a. 28, q. 5; I, 168^{v}C, 169^{r}D.

[101] *Ibid.*, 169^{r}E. Thomas Aquinas is also concerned to distinguish God's formal infinity from that of creatures. See especially *In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; Mandonnet, I, 1003 and *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 1, resp.; Ottawa, I, 37a.

[102] *Quodl.*, VII, 1; I, 258^{r}B; see Paulus, pp. 21-26.

[103] See Paulus, pp. 208-249.

[104] *Supra*, a. 28, q. 2; I, 166^{r}A-^{v}G, a. 33, q. 1; I, 204^{r}L.

[105] *Supra*, a. 21, qq. 4-5; I, 126^{v}K-129^{v}I. See also a. 42, q. 1; II, 3^{v}A-6^{r}P. Cf. a. 35, q. 6; I, 126^{r}B: Nos vero qui primum principium, quod deus est, non ponimus nisi formam simplicem et puram, secundum supra determinata; infinitatem potentiae non debemus ei attribuere, nisi quae convenit formae purae.

[106] See a. 42, q. 1; II, 3^{v}A-6^{r}P.

[107] Cf. Augustine, *Enarr. in Ps.*, CXLIV, iv, 6; CC 40, 2091: Illius enim immensa bonitas et interminabilis magnitudo, quanta alia fecit quae nos non novimus?

[108] See a. 42, q. 2; II, 6^{r}Q-8^{r}&, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}A-^{v}E.

[109] See a. 42, q. 2; II, 7^{r}T.

[110] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}17-21.

[111] *Ibid.*, 8-9.

[112] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 5; 204^{a}8-206^{a}8.

[113] Aristotle, *De Caelo*, I, 5-7; 271^{b}1-276^{a}17.

[114] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 206^{b}33-207^{a}2.

[115] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 206^{b}20-21.

[116] Cf. Ambrose, De Spirit. Sanct., I, vii, 81; PL 16, 753A: Cum igitur omnis creatura certis naturae suae sit circumscripta limitibus: . . .

[117] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 206^{a}18-25.

[118] Averroes, In Phys., III, comm. 57; Juncta, IV, 111^{v}L-M.

[119] See a. 28, q. 6; I, 170^{v}N.

[120] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 207^{a}2-7.

[121] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 206^{a}25-^{b}20.

[122] See a. 42, q. 2; II, 7^{r}T, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{v}C.

[123] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 207^{a}1-2.

[124] Ibid., 9-10.

[125] Aristotle, Phys., III, 6; 207^{a}12.

[126] The translation of Michael Scot. See Averroes, In Phys., III; Juncta, IV, 115^{r}F: Et illud extra quod aliquid est separatum non est totum, quodcumque sit illud separatum, sive extraneum sive non extraneum. The Moerbeke translation reads: Cujus autem absentia est extra, non omne est, quicquid abest (Ibid., E). This proves that Henry knew both of these translations. The addition does not appear in the Greek and is probably a gloss.

[127] Averroes, In Phys., III, comm. 63; Juncta, IV, 115^{v}H-J.

[128] Supra, a. 42, q. 1; II, 4^{v}H-I.

[129] Aristotle, Phys., III, 7; 207^{b}34-208^{a}2.

[130] Aristotle, Phys., III, 7; 207^{a}33-35.

[131] Averroes, In Phys., III, comm. 67; Juncta, IV, 117^{r}B-C.

[132] Averroes reads terminata.

[133] Emended from discreta following Averroes: . . . additio in continuo est ex forma, et in quantitate discreta est ex materia (In Phys., III, comm. 68; Juncta, IV, 118^{r}A).

[134] Emended from continua according to Averroes. See above, n. 133.

[135] Averroes, In Phys., III, comm. 68; Juncta, IV, 118^{r}A.

[136] Aristotle, Phys., III, 7; 207^{b}10-15.

[137] *Ibid.*, 207^{a}33-208^{a}4; cf. *Quodl.* V, q. 3; I, 156^{r}S.

[138] *Supra*, a. 25, q. 3; I, 153^{r}B-157^{r}Z, a. 28, q. 5; I, 169^{r}D-E, a. 43, q. 2; II, 9^{r}H.

[139] Aristotle, *Meta.* Δ, 16; 1021^{b}23-25.

[140] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}14.

[141] *Supra*, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}A-^{v}E, a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{r}-^{v}F.

[142] Added from Avicenna, *Meta.*, IV, 3.

[143] Avicenna, *Meta.*, IV, 3.

[144] *Infra*, q. 2; II, 14^{r}R-16^{r}H.

[145] *Supra*, II, 11^{v}B.

[146] *Infra*, q. 2; II, 14^{r}R-16^{r}H.

[147] *Ps.* cxxxiv, 5.

[148] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 2; II, 7^{r}T. See also, a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{r}D.

[149] *Ps.* cxliv, 3.

[150] *Gloss. Ordin.* in *Ps.* cxliv, 3.

[151] Cf. a. 21, q. 1, arg. 1; I, 123^{r}A and ad 1; I, 123^{v}C.

[152] Similar Anselmian arguments are listed as supporting arguments for divine infinity by Albert, Bonaventure, and Gerard of Abbeville, though none employs such phraseology in his own exposition. See Albert, *In I Sent.*, d. 43C, a. 1, arg. 9; Borgnet, 26, 378a, Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, arg. d; Quaracchi, I, 608b, Gerard of Abbeville, *Quodl.* XIII, q. 10, arg. 1; *infra*, Appendix, p. 2*. Henry of Ghent, however, appears to give the argument even less weight.

[153] *Supra*, a. 25, q. 3; I, 153^{v}D, a. 42, q. 2; II, 6^{r}Q-8^{r}&, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}A-^{v}E, a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{r}D.

[154] See a. 21, q. 2; I, 124^{v}O-125^{r}S.

[155] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 2; 185^{a}33-^{b}2.

[156] *Ibid.*, VIII, 10, 267^{b}17-26, *Meta.*, Λ, 7; 1073^{a}3-11.

[157] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 7; 191^{a}7-12.

[158] *Supra*, a. 23, qq. 1-2; I, 136^{r}P-^{v}Z.

[159] Emended in accordance with a, 33, q. 1, ad 1; I, 204^{r}-^{v}M. See below.

[160] *Infra*, a. 44, q. 1; II, 11^{v}-12^{r}C.

[161] *Supra*, I, 204^{r}L.

[162] *Infra*, a. 44, q. 1; II, 11^{v}-12^{r}C.

[163] *Supra*, I, 204^{r}L.

[164] *Ibid.*

[165] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 4; 187^{b}7-8.

[166] Averroes, *In Meta.*, II, comm. 1; Juncta, VIII, 29^{r}C.

[167] *Supra*, II, 12^{r}-^{v}F.

[168] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 1; II, 3^{v}A-6^{r}P, a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{v}F.

[169] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}13-14.

[170] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 64; Juncta, IV, 115^{v}M.

[171] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}14-15.

[172] Aristotle, *Meta.*, Δ, 26; 1023^{b}26-27.

[173] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 64; Juncta, IV, 115^{v}M.

[174] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 1; II, 4^{v}H-I, a. 44, q. 1; II, 12^{v}F.

[175] See a. 25, q. 3; I, 153^{r}B-156^{r}T.

[176] *Supra*, a. 29, q. 1; I, 171^{r}B-D. The view of the Manicheans and Hermes Trismegistus.

[177] *Supra*, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}B.

[178] Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Div. Nom.*, II; PL 122, 1122B. Henry probably used the translation of John Eriugena.

[179] A. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}B-^{v}C.

[180] A. 43, q. 4; II, 11^{r}X-Y.

[181] *Supra*, II, 12^{r}D-^{v}F.

[182] *Supra* (e.g.), a. 42, q. 2; II, 7^{r}T.

[183] *Supra*, a. 41, q. 1; II, 1^{v}C.

[184] *Infra*, q. 2; II, 14^{v}X-15^{r}B.

[185] Cf. *Quodl.* V, q. 3, ad 3; I, 157^{r}-^{v}B.

[186] I am unable to specify the ancients that Henry has in mind.

[187] *Supra*, a. 29, q. 1; I, 170^{v}B-171^{r}D.

[188] I, 171^{r}B-C.

[189] *Ibid.*

[190] *Ibid.*, D. The reference is to *Hermes Trismegistus ad Asclepium*, 6; ed. Nock, II, 303, *et passim*.

[191] I, 124^{r}F-^{v}L.

[192] *Act.* xvii, 28.

[193] See n. 190.

[194] 'Quorum' probably refers to both of the preceding views, for the first is quoted by Paul.

[195] *Act.* xvii, 24-28.

[196] Emended from *habitationes*, which is ungrammatical.

[197] *Glos. Ordin.* in *Act.* xvii, 28.

[198] *Sap.* viii, 1.

[199] *Glos. Ordin.* in *Act.* xvii, 28.

[200] *Rom.* xi, 36.

[201] *John.*, i, 3-4.

[202] Augustine, *In Joan.*, I, 16; PL 35, 1387.

[203] The text of Augustine reads *spiritualiter*.

[204] Not found.

[205] Augustine, *Ench.*, un., xi; PL 40, 236.

[206] Gregory the Great, *Moral.*, VI, xviii, 33 in *Job* v, 13; PL 75, 747B-C.

[207] The replies to a. 21, q. 1, ad 2 and a. 44, q. 1, ad 4 are related to Thomas' and Gerard of Abbeville's answers to the similar objections quoted above (n. 51). Thomas distinguishes two ways in which one thing can be distinct from another: (1) by difference of

the one with respect to the other (in which case both are finite), (2) by itself:

> Et sic Deus est distinctus ab omnibus rebus, et hoc eo ipso quia nihil addi ei est possibile; unde non oportet quod sit finitus neque ipse neque aliquid quod in ipso significatur (*De Pot.*, q. 1, a. 2, ad 7; ed. Pession, I, 12b, no. 2).

Merely laying it down that God is distinct because He is not susceptible to addition, Thomas does not offer any explanation here of why no addition can be made to God, though it is clear that, like Henry, he is concerned to show the compatibility of infinity and totality. Gerard bases his whole argument on the fact that it is only substances discrete through individuation and limitation that must be distinct by differences and, therefore, finite. Having asserted that God is not this kind of substance, he concludes that divine infinity is compatible with distinction from creatures, without explaining how this is possible. Thus, Gerard does not here bring in the question of the divine totality, which Henry regards as the root of the difficulty. See Gerard, *Quodl.* XIII, q. 10, ad obj.; *infra*, Appendix, pp. 4*-5*.

[208] *Supra*, ad 4; II, 13^{r}M-^{v}N, *et passim*.

[209] Aristotle, *Meta.*, Δ, 17; 1022^{a}4-13.

[210] Averroes, *In Meta.*, V, comm. 22; Juncta, VIII, 131^{v}G-H.

[211] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 2; II, 7^{r}-^{v}V.

[212] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 72; Juncta, IV, 119^{v}G.

[213] *Supra*, II, 12^{v}F.

[214] *Infra*, q. 2; II, 14^{r}Q-16^{r}H.

Chapter IV (pp. 158-204)

[1] v, 5; CC 32, 9.

[2] vi, 6; CC 32, 9-10.

[3] I; PL 122, 1173B.

[4] *Ibid.* and III; PL 122, 1175A.

[5] III; PL 122, 1175B.

[6] I; PL 122, 1173B.

[7] I; PL 122, 1171C-73A.

[8] III; PL 122, 1175B, V; PL 122, 1176C.

[9] III; PL 122, 1175A-B.

[10] c. vii, B.

[11] c. iv, A.

[12] c. vii, B.

[13] See c. iv, A.

[14] I, l-lx.

[15] I, li.

[16] I, lii.

[17] I, lv.

[18] I, lvi-lvii.

[19] I, lvii, lx.

[20] I, lviii.

[21] I, lix-lx.

[22] The "thirteentattributes" of *Ex.* xxxiv, 6-7.

[23] I, lxi. Throughout this section, the influence of Avicenna can be detected.

[24] I, 193^{r}K-L.

[25] See resol., 193^{r}K.

[26] *Ibid.*, respon., 193^{r}N.

[27] *Guide*, I, lviii, lx.

[28] *De Trin.*, XV, v, 7; PL 42, 1062.

[29] *De Div. Nom.*, vii; PL 122, 1153A. See below, pp. 196-97.

[30] *Op. cit.*, 193^{r}M-^{v}N.

[31] *Ibid.*, 193^{v}O.

[32] *Ibid.*, 193^{v}-194^{v}O.

[33] The predicaments are also held to be composed of *res* and *rationes praedicamenti*. See Paulus, p. 159.

[34] *Op. cit.*, 194^{v}P.

[35] *Ibid.*, 194^{v}P-195^{r}Q.

[36] *Ibid.*, 195^{r}R-^{v}S.

[37] Cf. Ambrose, *De Spirit. Sanct.*, I, vii, 81; PL 16, 753A, quoted above, Chapter III, n. 116.

[38] See below, n. 42.

[39] Emended from *Metaphysicae*. The reference is definitely to Averroes, *In Phys.*, VIII, comm. 75; Juncta, IV, 419^{v}H.

[40] *Supra*, q. 1; II, 12^{v}F.

[41] Cf. Richard of Middleton, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, contra; Brescia, 1591, I, 382b: Negatio non dicit aliquam nobilitatem in re de qua dicitur, nisi aliquam includat affirmationem. Sed 'infinitas' dicit magnam nobilitatem in deo. Ergo dicit in ipso aliquam positionem.

[42] Similar arguments can be found in William of Auvergne, Richard Fishacre, and Bonaventure. According to these authors, God is infinite because no finite multiplication of created power, goodness, etc. can ever make that power equal to the divine power, goodness, etc. Here again, God is infinite only by extrinsic denomination, as infinitely exceeding creatures. Henry's *sed contra*, however, does not assert that God is infinite because He infinitely exceeds creatures but holds rather that the impossibility of God's being equal to anything finite is one result of His infinity. See William of Auvergne, II *De Universo*, II, lxv; Paris, 1674, I, 915a, Richard Fishacre, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, c. 1, q. 1; ed. Ermatinger, ll. 16-19, Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, arg. e-f; Quaracchi, I, 608b-609a.

[43] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 4; 204^{a}3-4.

[44] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 34; Juncta, IV, 100^{r}F.

[45] 204^{a}4-6.

[46] Averroes, *In Meta.*, V, comm. 22; Juncta, VIII, 131^{v}G-H.

[47] *Supra*, q. 1; II, 12^{r}-^{v}F.

[48] *Infra*, 15^{r}B-^{v}C.

[49] See above, pp. 163-69.

[50] See also 5; PL 94, 801A; Burgundio, p. 22.

[51] Above, Chapter II, especially, p. 70.

[52] E.g. Albert the Great. See above, pp. 72-73.

[53] See above, pp. 74-82 and John of Paris (Quidort), *Commentaire sur les Sentences* (*Reportation*), I, ed. J.-P. Muller (Romae, 1961), q. 150 (d. 43, q. 3), pp. 460-61.

[54] Aristotle, *Meta.*, Γ, 2; 1004^{a}12-16.

[55] Averroes, *In Meta.*, IV, comm. 4; Juncta, VIII, 69^{r}B.

[56] Aristotle, *Phys.*, II, 1; 193^{b}19-20.

[57] Above, pp. 173-74.

[58] Aristotle, *Meta.*, B, 2; 996^{a}23-26.

[59] Averroes, *In Phys.*, VIII, comm. 75; Juncta, IV, 419^{v}G-H.

[60] *Supra*, a. 42, q. 1; II, 3^{v}B.

[61] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}11-12.

[62] *Supra*, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}B.

[63] *Supra*, a. 43, q. 1; II, 8^{r}B.

[64] Aristotle, *Phys.*, III, 6; 207^{a}13-14.

[65] Averroes, *In Phys.*, III, comm. 64; Juncta, IV, 115^{r}M.

[66] *Supra*, q. 1, ad 4; II, 13^{r}M.

[67] *Ps.* cxviii, 68.

[68] *Gloss. Ordin.* in *Ps.* cxviii, 68.

[69] *Ps.* cxviii, 98.

[70] *Gloss. Ordin.* in *Ps.* cxviii, 98.

[71] *Ibid.*

[72] Aristotle, *De Caelo*, I, 11; 281^{a}14-15.

[73] Emended from *Metaphysicae*. The reference is to Aristotle, *Phys.*, VIII, 3; 246^{a}13-14.

[74] *Ibid.*, 247^{a}3-4.

[75] *Ex.* xxxiii, 19.

[76] *Sap.* vii, 14.

[77] *Gloss. Ordin.* in *Sap.* vii, 14.

[78] Not found.

[79] *Supra*, 15^{r}X.

[80] Aristotle, *Phys.*, I, 4; 187^{b}7-8.

[81] *Supra*, q. 1; II, 13^{r}K. See also a. 33, q. 1, ad 1; I, 204^{r}-^{v}M.

[82] *Supra*, II, 15^{r}X.

[83] Pseudo-Dionysius, *Cael. Hier.*, ii; PL 122, 1041B-C.

[84] Eriugena reads *potentius*.

[85] See above, pp. 49-53.

[86] Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Div. Nom.*, vii; PL 122, 1153A.

[87] P. Chevallier, *Dionysiaca* . . . , I (Bruges, 1937), 382.

[88] *Le mystère de Dieu* . . . (Bruges, 1959), pp. 103-105.

[89] Pseudo-Dionysius, *De Div. Nom.*, vii; PL 122, 1153A-B.

[90] *I Cor.* i, 25.

[91] PL 122, 1153A.

[92] *Supra*, 15^{r}C-^{v}D.

[93] *Supra*, q. 1; II, 12^{v}F, q. 2; II, 15^{r}Y.

[94] *Supra*, q. 1; II, 12^{r}-^{v}F.

[95] *Supra*, q. 1; II, 12^{v}F, q. 2; II, 15^{r}Y.

[96] *Infra*, a. 51; II, 52^{r}A-56^{r}G.

[97] Compare with the brief account of a. 44 given by Gómez Caffarena in *Ser Participado y Ser Subsistente en la Metafisica de Enrique de Gante* (Rome, 1958), 167-170.

Chapter V (pp. 205-231)

[1] See Chapter III, n. 60.

[2] See Chapter III, n. 51.

[3] This also seems to be the case with Thomas. See Chapter III, n. 101.

[4] *Quodl.* III, q. 9, resol.; I, 60^{v}-61^{r}O, VII, 13, respon.; I, 267^{v}-268^{r}T, *Summa*, a. 28, q. 2, ad 2; I, 166^{r}F-^{v}G, a. 43, q. 2, resol.; II, 8^{v}-9^{r}E. See also Paulus, pp. 82-86, *et passim*.

[5] pp. 67-103, 385, *et passim*.

[6] See Chapter III, n. 101.

[7] For example, Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 3, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 612b; Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1; ed. Mandonnet, I, 1002-1004, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 7, aa. 1-2; Ottawa, I, 36b-38b.

[8] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 1, resp.; Ottawa, I, 37a, q. 86, a. 2, ad 1; Ottawa, I, 537a.

[9] Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 610a. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 1, resp.; Ottawa, I, 37a.

[10] *In I Sent.*, d. 8, p. 2, q. 2; Quaracchi, I, 132b-135a, d. 19, p. 2, a. un., q. 1; Quaracchi, I, 284a-286a, d. 43, a. un., q. 2; Quaracchi, I, 608a-611a.

[11] *Summa Theol.*, I, qq. 3-7; *S.C.G.*, I, cc. 18, 28, 31, 42, 43.

[12] D. 43, a. un., q. 2, ad 6; Quaracchi, I, 611a.

[13] D. 24, aa. 1-2, d. 31, p. 1, q. 1.

[14] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. 1, q. 3, obj. 1; Brescia, 1591, I, 382a.

[15] See Chapter IV, n. 42.

[16] See Chapter IV, n. 41.

[17] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 610a.

[18] The place of infinity in Marius Victorinus has not been investigated and presents an interesting topic for research.

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Abbreviations

CC	*Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina*. Turnholti, 1954-.
CSEL	*Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*. Wein, 1866-.
MS	*Mediaeval Studies*.
PG	Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca*. 162 vols. Parisiis, 1857-1866.
Phil. Rev.	*Philosophical Review*.
PL	Migne, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*. 221 vols. Parisiis, 1887-1890.
RPL	*Revue philosophique de Louvain*.

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APPENDIX

GERARD OF ABBEVILLE, QUODL. XIII, Q. 10

The following critical edition of and commentary on the hitherto unedited Quodl. XIII, q. 10 of Gerard of Abbeville represents a small contribution to the continuing effort to trace the history of infinity in the thirteenth century. Gerard of Abbeville probably wrote Quodl. XIII some twenty years[1] after Richard Fishacre completed his Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences, in which occurs the first known attribution of absolute infinity to God.[2] Gerard is known to have been acquainted with Fishacre's Commentary[3] and probably was also aware of the teachings of Bonaventure and Thomas on infinity, for he was embroiled in the controversy between the seculars and the mendicants at the University of Paris.[4] However, Gerard followed the tradition of the twelfth century on most matters.[5] It is precisely as a master who remained generally traditional, but who was also acquainted with the work of Fishacre that he is of interest to the student of divine infinity.

Manuscripts and Edition

The Quodlibetic Questions of Gerard of Abbeville are present in a number of MSS,[6] but only three of these contain the thirteenth quodlibet. Further, Paris, B.N., Lat. 14557 is wanting the tenth question.[7] Hence, our edition is prepared entirely from two MSS:

P--Paris, B.N., Lat. 16405, f. 95^{v}a-b.[8]

V--Vat., Lat. 1015, f. 89^{v}a-b.[9]

The quodlibets are numbered differently in the two collections, so that our text appears as *Quodl.* XIII, q. 10 in P and as *Quodl.* XII,, q. 10 in V.

Of the two MSS, P seems to be the superior and, therefore, has been adopted as the basis of the edition, though all discovered variant readings are included in the *apparatus criticus*. The text itself has been divided into paragraphs, and the punctuation of the original is not retained. The orthography has likewise been normalized to the standard of Lewis and Short, and the spelling of proper names has been brought into conformity with current usage.

Text

Decimo et ultimo quaesitum fuit utrum deus sit infinitus.

Et ostendebat quod sic dicit Anselmus[10] quod deus est quo melius excogitari non potest. Sed omne illud quo melius excogitari non potest est infinitum. Ergo, et cetera.

Item: *magnitudinis ejus non est finis.*[11] Ergo, et cetera.

Contra: Omne illud quod ita est hoc, quod non aliud, est finitum. Sed deus ita est deus quod non est leo vel asinus, et sic de aliis creaturis. Ergo deus est finitus.

Dic quod deus est simpliciter infinitus, quia infinitus est natura, virtute, operatione, comprehensione,[12] cognitione, circum-

scriptione, et duratione.

Natura quidem, quia certis initiis vel terminis natura non continetur, sicut natura creaturae, secundum quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro *De Spiritu Sancto*:[13] omnis creatura certis naturae limitibus est contenta.[14] Et glossa[15] *Genesis* 1,[16] super illud, *factum est vespere et mane, dies unus*, dicit: omnis creatura certis[17] initiis et terminis continetur. E[18] contra de creatore, qui non potest dici 'finitus' ratione summae simplicitatis, quia finitum componitur ex finiente et finibili. Unde dicitur primo *Sententiarum*[19] libro:[20] eadem, scilicet incommutabili[tati]s divinitatis essentia, sola proprie ac vere simplex est ubi nec partium nec accidentium ulla est diversitas sive variatio vel multitudo; et sumptum est de sexto libro *De Trinitate* capitulo (95^{v}b) v.[21] Et in eodem capitulo vii:[22] (89^{v}b) nihil simplex mutabile est; omnis autem creatura mutabilis est. Nulla ergo creatura vere est simplex. Deus vero et simpliciter dicitur 'vere ⟨unus⟩',[23] et summe simplex est. Et undecimo libro *De Civitate Dei* capitulo x:[24] ideo 'simplex' dicitur, quoniam hoc est quod habet, excepto eo quod relative quaeque persona ad alteram dicitur. Et infra:[25] propter hoc itaque natura[26] dei simplex est, cui non sit aliquid aliud habere, quod amittere possit; vel aliud sit habens, aliud quod habet.

Ex hoc sequitur quod[27] sit infinitus virtute, quia virtus quam habet non est aliud a sua natura. Dicitur enim 'infinitus virtute creandi', quia potest super infinitam distantiam quae est inter[28] omnino non esse et [inter] simpliciter esse. Augustinus, in primo libro *De Symbolo*:[29] ideo est omnipotens, quia de nihilo fecit[30] quaecumque fecit. Non enim aliqua materies, cum ⟨est fons⟩[31] ex qua demonstraret artis suae potentiam. Similiter infinitus est[32] virtute conservandi, quia omnes virtutes quibus non est finis pendentes sunt per infinitum primum, quod est virtus virtutum.[33]

Tertio dicitur 'infinitus operatione', quia omnia quaecumque voluit fecit. Chrysostomus, in Expositione Symboli:[34] 'omnipotens' dicitur, quia posse illius non potest invenire non posse, dicente Propheta,[35] omnia quaecumque voluit dominus fecit.

Quarto dicitur 'infinitus comprehensione', quia sicut dicit Damascenus, primo libro, capitulo[36] quarto,[37] infinitus est deus et incomprehensibilis, et hoc solum ejus est incomprehensibile:[38] infinitas et incomprehensibilitas.

Quinto propter summam simplicitatem essentiae dicitur 'infinitus circumscriptione temporis, loci, et cognitionis.[39] Augustinus, De Anima et Spiritu:[40] deus non eget corpore ut sit; nec[41] loco, ut alicubi sit; nec tempore, ut aliquando; nec causa, ut aliunde. Simpliciter ergo dicitur 'infinitus'.

Ad argumentum, dic quod non sequitur, quia cum dicitur 'omne quod ita est hoc, quod non aliud, est finitum' li 'hoc' demonstrat substantiam discretam per individuationem et discretionem individuationis et naturae, vel personae in limitationem. Sed cum dicitur 'deus est ita hoc quod non aliud', pronomen demonstrativum demonstrat substantiam discretam non per limitationem hypostasis vel personae nec per individuationem--ex quo non sequitur quod sit finitus. Deus enim proprie non dicitur 'substantia' a subsistendo accidentibus per modum hypostasis vel individui. Immo res mutabiles proprie dicuntur 'substantiae', sicut ostendit Augustinus,

vii libro De Trinitate.[42]

Ex dictis patet solutio omnium quaesitorum.

Commentary

Quodl. XIII, q. 10 has the basic quaestio form: (1) statement of the question, (2) two arguments in favor of the position to be defended, (3) one argument against it, (4) response, (5) reply to the opposing argument. It differs from the usual Thomistic form only in that the supporting arguments are placed before the opposing argument.

The first argument in favor of the position to be defended by Gerard is drawn from Anselm: Everything than which a greater can be thought is finite. (For anything to which an addition in some respect can be made must be limited in that respect.) Hence, since God is that than which a greater cannot be thought (in any respect), He is infinite. This argument appears in the Commentaries on the Sentences of Albert and Bonaventure in almost identical form.[43] A related argument is also to be found in William of Auvergne and Richard Fishacre: No finite multiplication of a created power can make it equal to the power of God. Hence, God's power is infinite.[44] Neither William nor Richard makes any reference to Anselm, which indicates that the argument is really independent of that author. Gerard's second authority is Psalm 144, 3, typically quoted throughout the middle ages in support of divine infinity of almost any type.[45] Gerard offers no explanation of the text, adding merely 'ergo, etc.'.

The contra is a rather interesting argument, which I have been unable to find in either Fishacre or Albert, but which appears in Bonaventure and Thomas. In Bonaventure, an analogy is set up between power and essence: Everything that has power over one thing only, so that it does not have power over another, is finite in power. Hence, *pari ratione*, every essence that is one only, so that it is not another, is a finite essence. God's essence is God and nothing else. Therefore, . . .[46] In Thomas' *Summa Theologiae*, the argument begins from place: Everything that is such that it is here and not there is limited in place. Hence, everything that is such that it is this and not another is limited in substance. God is this and not another. Therefore, . . .[47] In both, as we shall see later, the argument turns on the question whether an essence or substance must be in all other things, if it is to be infinite. Thomas' *De Potentia* contains the following objection to the infinity of the divine power: Everything that is distinct is finite. The power of God is distinct from other things and, hence, is finite.[48] The replies to this argument and to the objection in Gerard are very similar, as will be shown later. Hence, we may interpret Gerard's text as follows: Everything that is such that it is this and not another is finite. (For it must differ from that other by some characteristic limiting its substance.) God is not any creature, and, therefore, is limited in substance and finite.

Gerard proposes to argue that God is absolutely infinite because He is infinite in seven separate respects: (1) nature, (2) power, (3) operation, (4) comprehension, (5) cognition,

(6) place, (7) duration. In fact, however, he takes up only the first four separately and (like John Damascene) treats the others together.

(1) The first argument contrasts created natures with the divine nature. Quoting Ambrose,[49] Gerard argues that every creature is contained within certain limits of its nature. He supports this with a gloss on *Genesis* 1, 5, which clearly refers only to *temporal* beginnings and ends. Gerard immediately moves away from these arguments in the second half of the contrast: All finite things are composed of something that ends (form) and what is ended (formable). God, however, is simple in the highest degree and, hence, because He lacks the duality of form and the formable, cannot be finite. Peter Lombard quotes Augustine's opinion that only the divine essence is truly simple because in it alone there is no diversity, variation, or plurality of parts or accidents. Every creature, as Augustine also says, is mutable because it is compound. Although no creature can be simple, God is in the highest degree simple as identical with what He possesses, according to the same authority. Augustine makes an exception with respect to the relations of the Trinity, but this does not cause a real problem for Gerard, for God is one and simple because the persons, according to Augustine, are undistinguished (*infinitae*) with respect to themselves.[50] Gerard ends the argument at this point, leaving the reader to fill in the conclusion: if God is truly and in the highest degree simple, He is not composed of an ending and an endable, does not have the consequent limitations of His essence, and hence is infinite in nature.

Divine infinity, for Gerard, follows immediately upon divine simplicity. There is no question at all of its being predicated by extrinsic denomination. In fact, no argument that could leave the infinity of God dependent upon anything outside of Himself is even referred to in passing in the demonstrations of the infinity of God's nature. We cannot say here that the argument is necessarily taken from Richard Fishacre's Sentences, for (a) although Richard also argues from divine simplicity to divine infinity, the terminology he uses is altogether different,[51] and (b) Gerard may well have known the writings of Bonaventure and Thomas, who also argue from simplicity to infinity.[52] One or more of these authors may have been the factor that caused Gerard to turn from his traditional attitudes toward the relatively new doctrine of intrinsic divine infinity.

(2) Since God's nature is identical with His power, the latter also must be infinite. But supplementary arguments can be given for the infinity of His power of creating and His power of conserving. The first is the so-called "distantia" argument used by Richard Fishacre:[53] The distance between being and non-being is infinite, and only an infinite power has the capacity to traverse it. God uses no materials in creation and, therefore, must have the infinite power necessary to bring nothing into being. This argument seems to have come originally from Richard Fishacre:

> Quantum distant quod fit et ex quo fit, tanta est potentia facientis. Sed cum facerit materiam primam de nihilo, inter factum et id ex quo fit est distantia infinita, sicut inter aliquid et nihil, quae distant

> sicut affirmatio et negatio. Ergo potentia facientis est infinita.[54]

The argument is clearly one from extrinsic denomination: the extent of the distance between something and nothing, not some intrinsic characteristic of God, necessitates God's infinity. Gerard and Fishacre seem to employ the argument in exactly the same way, i.e. to support the infinity of God's creative power (_potentia facientis_, _virtus creandi_).

A second argument from the _Liber de Causis_ is adduced to show that God is infinite in power of conserving: Upon the divine power depend an infinite number of created powers, which are conserved by the "power of powers". Bonaventure uses the same quotation to show that no created power can be infinite in act with respect to production of act.[55] I have not been able to locate a similar argument in Fishacre, Albert, or Thomas, who, in fact, do not even distinguish between the infinity of creative power and that of conserving power, as both Gerard and Bonaventure do. Can we see in this the influence of Bonaventure on Gerard? It is not possible to make such a claim at this point, for further research into the problem of divine infinity may well lead to the discovery of a common source for both authors. One point, however, is clear: however much Gerard depends on Fishacre for other arguments, he here demonstrates a knowledge of some other thirteenth century teaching on infinity.

(3) God is infinite in operation, because He is able to make whatever He wishes to make. Chrysostom also remarks that God is omnipotent, for this reason. The quotation is used by Bonaventure

in an argument for the infinity of the divine power.[56] But he does not argue separately for the infinity of operation, nor does he use the argument in any more definite way.

(4) The argument for the infinity of the divine comprehension is taken from John Damascene. The critical edition of Burgundio's translation of Damascene reads 'et hoc solum ejus est comprehensibile' though some manuscripts have, with Gerard, 'incomprehensibile'. Clearly, the former is the correct reading. Damascene does not say here that God is "infinite in comprehension", but rather that He is both infinite and incomprehensible and that this alone can be understood concerning God. Gerard, however, understands that God is infinite in comprehension. But what is the meaning of 'comprehension' here? In John Damascene, it probably indicates comprehension by the created intellect. Gerard, however, gives another argument for God's lack of circumscription by place, time, and cognition. He may be distinguishing between the impossibility of understanding God and His inability to be bound by the understanding of any intellect, but this distinction is rather obscure and, to my knowledge, does not occur elsewhere.

(5)-(7) Lastly, God is infinite in circumscription by time, place, and cognition. The thought belongs to John Damascene:

> Circumscriptibile quidem est quod loco vel tempore vel comprehensione comprehenditur; incircumscriptibile vero quod nullo horum continetur.[57]

The quotation is used by Bonaventure[58] and, repeatedly, by Albert,[59] but it is not found in Fishacre. Gerard does not quote Damascene directly, but rather makes Augustine his authority.

Gerard replies to the objection by saying that the argument only applies to substances that are discrete by individuation or by limitation of hypostases. But God is not the subject ("hypostasis", "sub-stantia") of any accidents, which might individuate or limit Him. As Augustine notes, only changeable things are properly called 'substances'. Hence, the objection cannot be applied to God. Bonaventure treats the argument in a different way: There are two ways to compare something to many: (1) by comparison of causality, (2) by comparison of identity. In the first way, God is infinite in power, because His power extends to many. But this does not mean that the divine power is identical with many other powers. Similarly, God's essence is causally in many, but it is not thereby identical with many. Hence, since God can be causally in many and still be one in such a way that He is not another by comparison of identity, His unity and infinity do not conflict.[60] In the Prima Pars, Thomas replies to the argument by noting that, since God is subsistent being, which is received in nothing, He is distinct from all other things and infinite. Similarly, if there were a subsistent whiteness, that whiteness would not be received in anything, but would remain distinct from every white thing. God's being can be infinite precisely because it is not received being. Hence, He is not made finite by not being in other things.[61] In the De Potentia, Thomas argues that, although anything that is distinct from another thing by something superadded must be finite as determined with respect to that something, God is per se distinct from all other things just by having nothing superadded to His essence. Hence, God can be infinite and yet distinct from everything else.[62]

The first two replies do not seem to be similar to Gerard's response. Thomas's second reply is very like that of Gerard: Both seem to depend upon distinguishing the way in which God is distinct from other things from the individuation by accidental characteristics, by which one creature differs from another. For both, accidents would imply limitation and finitude in God. God is, therefore, discrete in a manner that does not conflict with His infinity. However similar the two arguments seem, they are stated in very different terms and are probably independent of one another.

The reply to the objection brings us back within the sphere of the infinity of the divine nature. Gerard devotes a large part of his response to proving that the divine nature is infinite intrinsically, because it is absolutely simple. He may have taken the view from Richard Fishacre or from one of his contemporaries at Paris. The divine power is infinite as identical with the intrinsically infinite divine nature, but Gerard also knows arguments that show the infinity of God's power of creating and conserving by extrinsic denomination. The first of these comes from Richard Fishacre, while the source of the second is not yet identified. Arguments from authority are used in the short demonstrations of divine infinity by extrinsic denomination with respect to operation (Chrysostom), comprehension (Damascene), and circumscription by place, time, and cognition (Augustine). The fact that these last are so briefly argued indicates that Gerard, like most of his contemporaries, regards the demonstrations of the intrinsic infinity of God and the proofs for the infinity of the divine power from extrinsic denomination as most important.

Notes

[1] Only two of the quodlibets are dated: *Quodl.* VI (1266), *Quodl.* XIV (1269). See P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320* (Paris, 1925), I, 116, 122.

[2] See L. Sweeney, "Divine Infinity According to Richard Fishacre", *Mod. Schoolman*, XXXV (1957-58), 191-212.

[3] See D. Callus, *Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford* (London, 1944), p. 33.

[4] D.L. Douie, *The Conflict Between the Seculars and the Mendicants at the University of Paris in the Thirteenth Century* (Blackfriars, 1954).

[5] P. Glorieux, "Pour une édition de Gérard d'Abbeville", *RTAM*, IX (1937), 56-61.

[6] P. Glorieux, *Litt. quodl.*, I, 111-127; *Répertoire des maitres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1933), no. 174, I, 356-360 for these MSS.

[7] It contains qq. 3-6, 1-2 (in that order) at ff. 138^ra-141^rb.

[8] Incipit of the MS: De caritate quaeritur primo utrum multa opera . . . (f. 25^va). Explicit of the MS: . . . e contrario utitur scientia ut dicitur *Physicorum* vii (f. 121^va). Incipit of the *Quodl.*: Quaesitum fuit primo utrum sacerdos qui . . . (f. 91^ra). Explicit of the *Quodl.*: Ex dictis patet solutio omnium quaesitorum (95^vb). Incipit of q. 10: Decimo et ultimo quaesitum fuit utrum deus . . . (f. 95^va). The explicit of q. 10 is the same as the explicit of the *Quodl.*

[9] Incipit of the MS: In nostra generali disputatione ad sex reducuntur . . . (f. 1^ra). Explicit of the MS: . . . in domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt, et cetera (f. 132^rb). Incipit of the *Quodl.*: Primo quaesitum fuit utrum sacerdos . . . (f. 84^vb). Explicit of the *Quodl.*, f. 89^vb, is as in P. Incipit, f. 89^va, and explicit, f. 89^vb, of q. 10 are the same as in P. The piece following the *Quodlibeta* in V at f. 132^rb-^{v}b probably does not belong to Gerard, for it employs the locution 'dicendum quod' instead of Gerard's characteristic 'dic quod'.

[10] Anselm, *Pros.*, II ff.; Schmitt, I, 101 ff. The formula with *excogitari* comes from Boethius, *De Consol. Phil.*, III, pr. 10; CC 94, i, 53, not from Anselm.

[11] *Ps.* cxliv, 3.

[12] *poss.* apprehensione *V*.

[13] Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, I, vii, 81; PL 16, 753A.

[14] obtenta *V*.

[15] *Glossa Ordinaria* in *Gen.* i, 5, attributed to Augustine.

[16] *Gen.* i, 5.

[17] *om.* *V*.

[18] *om.* *P*.

[19] Peter Lombard, *Sent.*, I, d. 8, c. 3; Quaracchi, I, 61.

[20] *add.* in *V*.

[21] Augustine, *De Trin.*, VI, iv, 6-v, 7; PL 42, 927-28.

[22] Augustine, *De Trin.*, VI, vi, 8; PL 42, 929.

[23] cām, tām *P*; cn̄, cū, tn̄, tū *V*. *poss.* esse.

[24] Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XI, x; CC 48, 330.

[25] Augustine, *De Civ. Dei*, XI, x; CC 48, 330.

[26] nam *V*.

[27] quo *V*.

[28] *om.* *V*.

[29] Ps.- Augustine, *Sermo* 237, 1-3; PL 39, 2183-84.

[30] *add.* omnia *V*.

[31] *lacuna* *P*.

[32] *om.* *V*.

[33] *Liber de Causis*, prop. 15; ed. Bardenhewer, p. 177.

[34] John Chrysostom, *Expos. in Ps.* cxxxiv, 2; PG 55, 389.

[35] *Ps.* cxxxiv, 6.

[36] *om. V.*

[37] John Damascene, *De Fide Orth.*, I, 4; tr. Burgundio, p. 21; PG 94, 808B.

[38] *Read* comprehensibile, *but some MSS have* incomprehensibile.

[39] Cf. John Damascene, *De Fide Orth.*, I, 13; tr. Burgundio, p. 59; PG, 853B.

[40] Ps.-Augustine, *De Spiritu et Anima*, xv; PL 40, 792.

[41] in *V*.

[42] Augustine, *De Trin.*, VII, v, 10; PL 42, 942. See also VII, vi, 11; PL 42, 943-45.

[43] Albert, *In I Sent.*, d. 43C, a. 1, arg. 9; Borgnet, 26, 378a. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, arg. d; Quaracchi, I, 608b.

[44] William of Auvergne, II *De Universo*, II, lxv; Paris, 1674, I, 915a. Richard Fishacre, *In I Sent.*, d. 2, c. 1, q. 1; ed. Ermatinger (*Mod. Schoolman*, XXXV [1957-58], pp. 213-235), ll. 16-19.

[45] Peter Lombard, for example, holds that the line indicates God's eternity. See *Comm. in Ps.* 144, 3; PL 191, 1263A. It is quite natural that the line should appear continually, for it, together with *Ps.* 146, 5 and *Sap.* 7, 14, constitutes the only scriptural authority for divine infinity.

[46] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, obj. 2; Quaracchi, I, 609a.

[47] I, q. 7, a. 1, obj. 3; Ottawa, I, 36b-37a.

[48] q. 1, a. 2, obj. 7; ed. Pession, II, 11a, no. 3.

[49] The lines from Ambrose are often quoted without attribution. See Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 44, q. 1, resp.; Paris, 1520, II, 12^{r}D.

[50] Augustine, *De Trin.*, VI, x, 12; PL 42, 932.

[51] *In I Sent.*, d. 2, c. 1, sol. q. 3; ed. Ermatinger, ll. 285-334.

[52] See Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, d. 43 and Thomas, *In I Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 1 and *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 7, a. 1, etc.

[53] *In I Sent.*, d. 2, c. 1, q. 1; ed. Ermatinger, ll. 10-15.

[54] *loc. cit.* The argument also appears in Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*,

d. 43, a. un., q. 1, arg. d; Quaracchi, I, 605b.

[55] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 1, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 606b-607a.

[56] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 1, arg. a; Quaracchi, I, 605b.

[57] *De Fide Orth.*, I, 13; tr. Burgundio, p. 59; PG 94, 853B.

[58] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, resp.; Quaracchi, I, 609b.

[59] See, for example, *In I Sent.*, d. 1B, a. 15, ad 10; Borgnet, 25, 37a, d. 43C, a. 1, arg. 5; Borgnet, 26, 378a.

[60] *In I Sent.*, d. 43, a. un., q. 2, ad 2; Quaracchi, I, 610b.

[61] q. 7, a. 1, ad 3; Ottawa, I, 37b.

[62] q. 1, a. 2, ad 7; ed. Pession, II, 12b, no. 2.

ADDENDA AND CORRIGENDA FOR "DIVINE INFINITY IN THE WRITINGS OF HENRY OF GHENT"

p. 4, l. 4: *corr.* question of divine infinity *ad* question of infinity.

p. 16, ll. 27-28: *corr.* why one . . . already adduced *ad* why only one world should be formed--a reason similar to that adduced.

p. 19, l. 3-p. 21. l. 24: A second discussion of infinity occurs at *Philebus*, 16C-18D. Here it is asserted that the dialectician's approach to any subject must be to analyze a generic notion into its species and sub-species, finally arriving at individuals, which are unlimited in their variety. Number (species and sub-species) thus serves as the intermediary between the one (genus) and the many (individuals). The unity in things is held to arise from form, which imposes limit, but the cause of the infinite variety (hence, individuality) of things is not identified. (The reason is probably that the cause must be matter or the receptacle, the reality of which Plato does not admit. Only a metaphysics which admits the reality of a material principle can provide an explanation for individuation of the *infima species*.) The discussion indicates that the argument of *Philebus*, 23C-27C is an application of a general theory of limit and infinity, in which limit is conceived as any principle that introduces unity, perfection, and order into the multiplicity, imperfection, and chaos of the infinite.

p. 57, l. 19: *corr.* evigilaui *ad* euigilaui.

p. 82, l. 30: *corr.* form, and *ad* form), and.

p. 103, l. 25: *corr.* Pythagorici *ad* Pythagorae.

p. 104, l. 24: *corr.* infinity *ad* infinity's.

p. 108, l. 14: *corr.* proportional *ad* potential.

p. 110, l. 11: *corr.* finite *ad* in act.

p. 113, l. 4: *corr.* eodum *ad* eodem.

p. 119, l. 17: *corr.* it *ad* the former.

p. 131, l. 22: *corr.* sic *ad* sic in.

p. 133, l. 2: *corr.* quidem *ad* quidam.

p. 136, l. 27-p. 137, l. 1: *corr.* 'totum' et 'perfectum' *ad* totum et perfectum.

p. 147, l. 10: *corr.* essent *ad* esset.

p. 147, l. 23: *corr.* divinae, bonitatis, et in- *ad* divinae bonitatis et in-.

p. 148, l. 3: *corr.* goodness, perfection *ad* perfection in goodness.

p. 162, l. 19-p. 163, l. 11: H. Wolfson argues (with Crescas) that Maimonides held that negative attributes involve indirect affirmations, because they directly signify the negations of creaturely attributes, which in turn imply the affirmations of qualities that are identical with the divine essence and yet have no relation to the creaturely attributes. (See "Crescas on the Problem of Divine Attributes", *Jewish Quarterly Rev.*, N.S., VII (1916), 19-24, 182-83.) If this interpretation is correct, we must concede that Henry could in fact have borrowed the notion of the positive signification of negative divine attributes from Maimonides. (Compare our pp. 165-66, 169, 222.)

p. 192, l. 14: *corr.* a negatione, non a privatione *ad* 'a negatione', non 'a privatione'.

p. 240, n. 14, l. 2: *corr.* <<Summa>> *ad* <<Suma>>.

p. 241, n. 22, l. 1: *corr.* rationis *ad* rationes.

p. 244, n. 66, l. 3: *corr.* appellamus. In hoc *ad* appellamus, in hoc.

p. 261, l. 24: *corr.* <<Summa>> *ad* <<Suma>>.

p. 134, ll. 25-26: *corr.* ad velis *ad* velis ad.